diff --git a/deploy/central/VERIFIED.md b/deploy/central/VERIFIED.md index c397ac2..aaca262 100644 --- a/deploy/central/VERIFIED.md +++ b/deploy/central/VERIFIED.md @@ -17,3 +17,14 @@ This deployment is a real foundation service, not complete global authentication/social functionality. Email/GitHub auth, server registry, friends, DM and marketplace are explicitly not_enabled. No public send-email endpoint exists. Email HTML previews use dummy tokens and their future verification routes are not active. Approved logo is the V connection mark. The Hub serves SVG and PNG; mail uses a PNG with text fallback. + +## GitHub authorization update — 2026-10-24 + +- Source: `ff9c8f330e15`, release `ff9c8f330e15-ca84d4e4b6fa`. +- Static binary SHA256: `ca84d4e4b6fa6c9aa0f6852e9f1af22465cac1f6e088a1ac93692877a3b10db3`. +- Paired private database/issuer backup created before migration; service restarted and readiness returned 200. +- GitHub client configuration stored only in protected service environment. App metadata/client identity was verified through GitHub API; private signing key is unnecessary in the running Hub. +- Authentication paths disable Nginx access/error logging before OAuth was enabled. +- Public `/v1/info` reports GitHub enabled; `/v1/auth/session` reports anonymous without a cookie. Live start endpoint returns 303 to GitHub with the configured callback, state, S256 PKCE and a Secure/HttpOnly/SameSite cookie. +- Workspace tests: 66 passed; all-target Clippy with `-D warnings`, formatting and dependency audit passed (zero vulnerabilities/warnings). +- Complete provider authorization/code exchange still requires an account owner's browser consent. Automated checks verify the local callback/session flow with an injected provider, not real user consent. diff --git a/hub/AUTH.md b/hub/AUTH.md index 0dd372d..9f13305 100644 --- a/hub/AUTH.md +++ b/hub/AUTH.md @@ -24,3 +24,5 @@ The Hub binds only to loopback. Its reverse proxy must overwrite `X-Forwarded-Fo Back up SQLite with the issuer identity, protect backups as credentials, and apply the account-deletion policy to them. Expired attempts/sessions are pruned on new login attempts; expiry is independently enforced on every consumption/read. Revoking a GitHub authorization does not currently revoke an already created Vnox session; sign out or delete its database session to revoke it. `cargo test -p vnox-hub` exercises the complete local browser flow against an injected provider, wrong-browser/replay/expiry rejection and logout CSRF. A real GitHub login requires the account owner to authorize in their browser; automated tests never impersonate consent. + +Provider reference: [GitHub App user authorization and PKCE](https://docs.github.com/en/apps/creating-github-apps/authenticating-with-a-github-app/generating-a-user-access-token-for-a-github-app). GitHub App resource permissions are configured by its owner; this flow adds no OAuth scopes and only calls the public user endpoint.