# Security > **LNEx v3 status.** TCP traffic runs over TLS 1.3. > UDP voice path is still plaintext (Phase 2). See > [features/encryption.md](../05-features/encryption.md) for details. ## Threat model VNOX is designed for self-hosted deployments where the node operator is trusted. The threat model covers: | Threat | Mitigated by | |--------|--------------| | MITM on client-server connection | TLS 1.3 with SPKI pinning / public CA, channel-bound Ed25519 auth | | MITM on UDP voice path | LNEx packet encryption (Phase 2; not active in v0.1.x) | | Rogue node in federation | Mutual keypair authentication on federation handshake (Phase 3) | | Identity spoofing | Ed25519 signature on every auth (challenge-response) | | Metadata leakage (who talks to whom) | Phase 2 | | Passive voice interception | Packet encryption (Phase 2; not active in v0.1.x) | | Replay attacks | Sequence number + nonce per packet (Phase 2 wire encryption) | | Brute-force on session | Sessions are short-lived, token is not a password | ### Out of scope - Physical access to the server - Compromised node operator (they own the node, this is by design) - E2EE between clients (planned Phase 2, not in v1) - Anonymity / traffic analysis resistance --- ## Encryption TCP control traffic is protected by **TLS 1.3** (rustls, ALPN `vnox-lnex/3`). The earlier LNEx v2 per-frame ChaCha20-Poly1305 layer is removed. Trust model, certificate handling, channel binding and version bump: see [tls.md](tls.md). - Self-hosted servers: self-signed certificate (key = server identity), client pins the SPKI SHA-256 fingerprint on first use and blocks any change. - Public CA certificates are accepted without a prompt. - Ed25519 client authentication is signed over a TLS exporter value so it cannot be relayed. - A TLS-terminating reverse proxy is not supported (it breaks the channel binding); use TCP passthrough. ### UDP transport UDP has no TLS. LNEx packet encryption (ChaCha20-Poly1305) is the only protection layer on the voice path. This is standard practice for real-time voice protocols (SRTP, DTLS-SRTP follow the same model). --- ## E2EE (Phase 2) In v1, encryption is between client and server (node). The node operator can theoretically decrypt voice and text in transit. Phase 2 will introduce optional end-to-end encryption for: - direct messages - private channels (opt-in) E2EE for voice is significantly harder (requires key distribution to all channel members in real time) and is a Phase 4 design question. --- ## Identity verification When user A sees a message from `raven@nightcore.lnex`, how do they know it's the same raven they spoke to yesterday? In v1: the gateway enforces that a connected user's pubkey matches their asserted identity. The client can verify the server's claim by checking the pubkey shown in the UI against a known value. Future: out-of-band key verification (QR code, safety number, similar to Signal). --- ## Rate limiting and anti-flood Applied at the gateway level: | Limit | Default | Configurable | |-------|---------|-------------| | Auth attempts per IP | 5 / minute | yes | | Messages per user per second | 10 | yes | | Voice packet rate per user | ~50/s (20ms frames) | no (codec-determined) | | Federation connection attempts | 3 / minute per remote | yes | | Max concurrent connections per IP | 4 | yes | Exceeding a rate limit returns `ERR_RATE_LIMITED` and may trigger a temporary ban depending on node configuration. --- ## Node operator notes ### What the operator can see - IP addresses of connected clients - usernames (nicknames) and pubkeys - channel activity (who joined when) - message content (in v1, no E2EE) ### What the operator cannot do (by design) - impersonate a user's identity (requires their private key) - forge signatures on behalf of a user ### Recommended hardening - if a proxy is used, pass TCP through (no TLS termination) - restrict UDP port to known IP ranges if possible - enable fail2ban or equivalent on auth failure logs - back up the node keypair (used for federation identity) - rotate node keypair on suspected compromise See `03-server/operations.md` for hardening checklist.