test: fuzz the HTTP and PROXY v2 parsers, make PROXY parsing pure

- PROXY v2 header parsing is now the pure, total function
  `parse_v2_header(buf, limit) -> (SocketAddr, consumed)`; the async reader
  only reads bytes and delegates. This makes the parser reachable from tests
  and fuzz targets and keeps every index bounds-checked.
- tests/proxy_v2_parser.rs: valid v4/v6 headers, bad signature, non-PROXY
  command, TLVs, every truncated prefix, oversized header, unsupported
  family, short address block, and a deterministic sweep over family/length.
- fuzz/: cargo-fuzz targets `http_head` (scan_head + evaluate) and `proxy_v2`
  with invariants (no panic, no out-of-buffer consumption, family matches the
  header). Seeds for the HTTP head keep coverage useful; `make fuzz` runs
  60 s per target. Both targets ran clean (7M and 3M executions).
- docs/testing.md documents the fuzz workflow; .gitignore covers the
  generated corpus/artifacts.
This commit is contained in:
Loki 2026-11-16 12:47:25 +01:00
parent da87d2a11f
commit 08b7292ac4
Signed by: boba
GPG key ID: 6CDE87BC9A778D97
289 changed files with 4837 additions and 31 deletions

5
.gitignore vendored
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@ -45,3 +45,8 @@ Thumbs.db
# Reference projects (cloned for research)
ref/
# cargo-fuzz
fuzz/corpus/
fuzz/artifacts/
fuzz/coverage/

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@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
CARGO = cargo
TARGET_DIR = target
.PHONY: all build release test test-all check check-all fmt fmt-check clippy clean deny audit
.PHONY: all build release test test-all check check-all fmt fmt-check clippy clean deny audit fuzz
.PHONY: ebpf ebpf-clean
.PHONY: docker docker-build docker-up docker-down docker-logs
.PHONY: ci ci-full repo-gates
@ -78,6 +78,12 @@ docker-logs:
checkstyle: fmt-check clippy
@echo "✓ Checkstyle passed (rustfmt + clippy)"
# Parser fuzzing (nightly + cargo-fuzz). 60 s per target is a smoke run;
# longer campaigns are run locally before a release.
fuzz:
cargo +nightly fuzz run http_head fuzz/seeds/http_head -- -max_total_time=60
cargo +nightly fuzz run proxy_v2 -- -max_total_time=60
repo-gates:
bash scripts/check_module_size.sh
bash scripts/check_default_secrets.sh

24
TODO.md
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@ -285,7 +285,13 @@ module-size, secrets, `cargo deny`, rustdoc без warning'ов, clang+verifier,
- `doctor` не дёргает защищённые ручки без токена и возвращает ненулевой код при провале.
- Инлайн-тесты: 25 → 10 файлов (остальные — в следующих итерациях).
### Осталось (следующий раунд)
### Осталось
- [ ] Monitor (`add_cidr`) и `traffic/hook` autoban не сверяются с `trusted_cidrs`: если
доверенный прокси физически живёт в банимой подсети, его адрес может попасть под
префиксный бан. Нужна общая проверка перед любым баном.
### Сделано в этом раунде
- [x] API manager'а: `SCAN`+`MGET` вместо `KEYS`/N+1, 503 вместо `200 []`, пагинация
`limit`/`offset` (100 по умолчанию, 1000 максимум), GET без записи (бэкфилл метаданных
@ -293,12 +299,12 @@ module-size, secrets, `cargo deny`, rustdoc без warning'ов, clang+verifier,
на все мутирующие ручки, graceful shutdown с SIGTERM и join heartbeat, эвикция
login-лимитера, `MANAGER_TRUSTED_PROXIES` для `X-Forwarded-For`. Тесты —
`tests/manager_api.rs` (9) и `tests/manager_security.rs` (23).
- [ ] `trusted_cidrs` + PROXY-header IP как ключ всех политик: банить/лимитировать по
transport-IP, header-IP — только после валидации (ban-amplification через LB).
- [ ] IPv6 bind в listener (`Domain::IPV4` + строковый парсинг адреса).
- [ ] `relay_idle_timeout_secs` в `[limits]` (сейчас константа 300 с) и семафор бюджета
полем `Gateway` вместо `OnceLock`.
- [x] PROXY-header IP валидируется (loopback/link-local/multicast/broadcast/unspecified и
адреса из `trusted_cidrs` отклоняются, mapped-IPv4 нормализуется), баны для адресов из
`trusted_cidrs` подавляются; невалидный заголовок → transport-peer.
- [x] IPv6 bind в listener (парсинг `IpAddr`, домен по семейству, dual-stack для `::`).
- [x] `limits.relay_idle_timeout_secs` (300 по умолчанию, 1..=86400) и семафор бюджета полем
`Gateway` вместо `OnceLock`.
- [x] Инлайн-тесты мигрированы: `grep -rn "#\[cfg(test)\]" src/` пуст, 41 тест переехал в
10 новых сюит (`manager_auth`, `manager_heartbeat`, `protocol_http_*`, `traffic_*`,
`tui_prometheus`); счётчик тестов не изменился.
@ -314,7 +320,9 @@ module-size, secrets, `cargo deny`, rustdoc без warning'ов, clang+verifier,
- [ ] Bloom filter для blacklist
- [ ] io_uring runtime (feature flag)
- [ ] ML anomaly detection (Isolation Forest)
- [ ] Fuzzing парсеров (`cargo-fuzz`)
- [x] Fuzzing парсеров (`cargo-fuzz`): цели `http_head` и `proxy_v2` в `fuzz/`, сиды в
`fuzz/seeds/`, запуск `make fuzz` (nightly); PROXY v2-парсер стал чистой функцией
`parse_v2_header` + 10 интеграционных тестов на обрезку/TLV/семейства.
- [ ] BGP Anycast (AS + /24)
---

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@ -62,6 +62,35 @@ TCP-payload по `ip->tot_len`), VLAN/QinQ-теги и фрагменты — з
---
## 3. Fuzzing
Внешние парсеры (HTTP request-head и PROXY protocol v2) фаззятся через `cargo-fuzz`.
Нужен nightly-тулчейн и установленный `cargo-fuzz`:
```bash
rustup toolchain install nightly
cargo install cargo-fuzz
# короткий прогон (60 с на цель), как в CI-смоуке
make fuzz
# длительная кампания локально
cargo +nightly fuzz run http_head fuzz/seeds/http_head -- -max_total_time=600
cargo +nightly fuzz run proxy_v2 -- -max_total_time=600
```
Найденный краш сохраняется в `fuzz/artifacts/<target>/`; воспроизведение —
`cargo +nightly fuzz run <target> fuzz/artifacts/<target>/<file>`. Цели лежат в
`fuzz/fuzz_targets/`, сиды — в `fuzz/seeds/` (каталоги `corpus/`, `artifacts/`
в git не попадают).
Инварианты, которые проверяют цели: парсер не паникует на произвольных байтах,
`scan_head` не выходит за буфер, `parse_v2_header` не потребляет больше
переданного и не принимает заголовок выше лимита, семейство адреса совпадает с
байтом family.
---
## 3. Локальный integration-стенд (Docker)
```bash

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fuzz/Cargo.lock generated Normal file

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fuzz/Cargo.toml Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
[package]
name = "rampart-fuzz"
version = "0.0.0"
publish = false
edition = "2024"
[package.metadata]
cargo-fuzz = true
[dependencies]
libfuzzer-sys = "0.4"
rampart = { path = "..", default-features = false, features = ["protocol-http", "protocol-minecraft"] }
[[bin]]
name = "http_head"
path = "fuzz_targets/http_head.rs"
test = false
doc = false
bench = false
[[bin]]
name = "proxy_v2"
path = "fuzz_targets/proxy_v2.rs"
test = false
doc = false
bench = false
# Isolate the fuzz crate from the parent package.
[workspace]

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#![no_main]
//! Fuzz target for the HTTP/1.x request-head parser.
//!
//! `scan_head` and `evaluate` consume attacker-controlled bytes on every
//! connection, so they must never panic and must stay within the buffer.
use libfuzzer_sys::fuzz_target;
use rampart::protocol::http::parser::{Policy, evaluate, scan_head};
fuzz_target!(|data: &[u8]| {
if let Some(head_len) = scan_head(data) {
assert!(head_len <= data.len(), "scan_head returned an out-of-bounds length");
let policy = Policy {
max_header_bytes: 8192,
blocked_paths: vec!["/admin".to_string()],
require_user_agent: true,
};
let _ = evaluate(&data[..head_len], &policy);
}
// The whole buffer (not only a terminated head) must also be safe: a
// truncated head is evaluated defensively by callers.
let policy = Policy {
max_header_bytes: 8192,
blocked_paths: vec![],
require_user_agent: false,
};
let _ = evaluate(data, &policy);
});

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#![no_main]
//! Fuzz target for the inbound PROXY protocol v2 header parser.
//!
//! The parser runs before authentication on a connection controlled by a
//! trusted proxy, so arbitrary bytes must produce an error, never a panic or
//! an out-of-bounds read.
use libfuzzer_sys::fuzz_target;
use rampart::engine::tunnel::parse_v2_header;
fuzz_target!(|data: &[u8]| {
const LIMIT: usize = 512;
if let Ok((client, consumed)) = parse_v2_header(data, LIMIT) {
assert!(consumed <= data.len(), "parser consumed more than the buffer");
assert!(consumed <= LIMIT, "parser accepted a header above the limit");
assert!(consumed >= 16, "a parsed header is at least the fixed part");
// The address must be in the family advertised by the header byte.
let family = data[13];
assert!(
(family == 0x11 && client.is_ipv4()) || (family == 0x21 && client.is_ipv6()),
"address family does not match the header"
);
}
});

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GET / HTTP/1.1
ost:om
User-Agent: Accep

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GGET / HTTP/1.1
Hc G

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GET / HTTP/1.1
H-ot-t:
:
H-ot-t:
.1
:
1 */*1
A
Co-t:
.1
H-ot:
!
eLe-

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GET / HTTP/1.1
e.co:
ept:

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GET / HTTP/1.1
Ho]t:t

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POST /#dQmin HTTP/1.1
Hosv:

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@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
POPOST in HTTP/1.1
Hot

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@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
GE / HTTP/1.1
exa

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@ -0,0 +1 @@
T / H`TP /*

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@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
GET , HTTP/1.1
Hosr-AgJnt: fuzz
Act: example.com
User-AgJnt: fuzz
Accept: */*

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@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
GET / HTTP/1.1
Ho]t:
󷐢(0.1

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@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
GET / HTTP/1.1
H-ot-t:
.1
:

1
H-ot-t:
.1
:
1 */*1
A
Co-t:
.1
H-o :
1t:
.11
H-ot-t:
.1
:
1 */*1
A
Co-t:
.1
H-o :
1t:
.1
:

1
H-ot-t:
.1
:
1 */*1
eLe-

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GET / HTTP/1.1
H,G:T
UsermgJAKt:

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GET / HTTP/1.1
Host:: ex /0HTTP/1.1TP/1.1
Host: example.com
User-Agent: f

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GET / HTTP/1.1
Host: example.com
User-AgJnt: fuzz
Accept: */*
/

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@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
GET /1 HTTP/1.1
osHt:
AcceTTP/1.1
osHt:
AccTTP1.

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G)T / HTTP/1.1
H

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GET , HTTP/1.1
Hosr-AgJot:

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@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
GET / HTTP/1.1
Ho-t:
AcceT

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GET / HTTP/1.1
H1.t:יuzzept:*/*

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@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
GET / HTTP/1.1
*/*

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GET / HTTP/1.1
Host: exGET / HT
User-Agent:

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GET / HTTP/1.1
H-ot:
Act*/*1
H
Co-t:*/*1
H
:
AP/1.1
H-o:
0
e

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GET , HTTP/1.1
HHot:z 

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@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
POST /admin HTTP/1.1
H
Cgth: 0

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POST n HTTP/1.1
H[to:sTP1 Host

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.At

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@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
P qi HTTP/1.0

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@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
GET / HTTP/1.1
Host:
Acce

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@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
GET / HTTP/1.1
H-ot:
/*1
H
Co-t:*/*1
-t:/1.1
H-ot:0555
e

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GET / HTTP/1.1
st:pl
UsermgJAKt:*

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@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
GET / HTTP/1.1
sx:mpl/c

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@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
GET /1 HTTP/1.1
osHt:TT1
osHt:
AcceTTP/1.1
osHt:
AccP/1.1
osHt:
AccTTP/1.1

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@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
GET / HTTP/1.1
ost: excom
User-Ageot: fPOTep

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@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
GET / HTTP/1.1
H-ot:
AcGGG/1.1
Host:
Ac Ggetx: 0
eLe

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GET /' HTTP/1.1
zost:

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@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
POST HTTP/1.1
Host: x: x
Co: 0

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GET UUUUW/ HTTP/1.1
Host:Acce
Host:AccepHTTP.1
Host:Accep

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@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
GET / HTTP/1.1
Host: eampl
UsermgJAKt: fl
UsermgJAKt: fuzz : */*

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@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
GET / HTTP/1.1
Host:xa.com
User-AgJnt: fuzz
Accept: */*

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@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
GET / HTTP/1.1
Host:
: f
GET / HTTP/1.1
H
o]t:
󷐢(0.1

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@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
n HTTP/1.0
Hsx ov
C

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