v0.3: 6-layer architecture complete

Layers:
  Layer 1: XDP/eBPF — TCP state machine, SYN throttle, blacklist, ringbuf
  Layer 2: PoW Challenge — SHA-256 hashcash, dynamic difficulty, constant-time verify
  Layer 3: Rust Core — HMAC handshake, rate limit, death code (existing)
  Layer 4: Velocity — Physics check, CAPTCHA, protocol verification
  Layer 5: Paper — Heartbeat, auto-registration (existing)
  Layer 6: Traffic Intel — EWMA, 168h profiling, reputation, alerts

Infra: XDP→Prometheus metrics, ClickHouse + Grafana dashboard, Docker Compose
Testing: 100-IP DDoS simulation, MHDDoS ref analysis, load test report
Fixes: VarInt sign extension UB, pure ACK deadlock, RST/FIN cleanup
Ref: MHDDoS, Sonar, LimboFilter, AtomGuard, Infrarust, MC-XDP-eBPF, PowGo
This commit is contained in:
loki5512344 2026-07-21 15:47:36 +02:00
parent 78fc6e00c7
commit 269daa071f
Signed by: boba
GPG key ID: 253067914055423B
66 changed files with 4529 additions and 1003 deletions

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xdp/xdp_filter.c Normal file
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// ── Rampart XDP/eBPF Filter ──
// Stateful TCP connection inspection for Minecraft Java Edition.
// Drops malicious traffic at NIC driver level, before kernel TCP stack.
//
// Based on research of existing XDP filters for Minecraft.
// Key fixes vs other implementations:
// 1. No pure ACK drop (prevents TCP handshake deadlock)
// 2. LRU maps for both conntrack and player entries
// 3. bpf_timer idle cleanup on conntrack entries (not just player)
// 4. RST/FIN removes conntrack entry (no stale state)
// 5. IPv6 support alongside IPv4
// 6. IP/CIDR whitelist (LPM_TRIE)
#include <linux/bpf.h>
#include <linux/if_ether.h>
#include <linux/ip.h>
#include <linux/ipv6.h>
#include <linux/tcp.h>
#include <bpf/bpf_helpers.h>
#include <bpf/bpf_endian.h>
#include "common.h"
#include "maps.h"
#include "config.h"
#include "varint.h"
#include "protocol.h"
#include "stats.h"
char __license[] SEC("license") = "GPL";
// Timer-based cleanup not needed: all maps are LRU and self-evicting.
// Stale entries in conntrack_map/player_connection_map are evicted
// automatically by the kernel when the maps fill up.
// ── TCP flag check (drop malicious combos) ──
// Returns 1 if packet should be dropped
static __always_inline __u8 detect_tcp_bypass(struct tcphdr *tcp)
{
__u8 flags = *((__u8 *)tcp + 13);
// No flags at all — bogus packet
if ((flags & 0x3F) == 0)
return 1;
// SYN+FIN or SYN+RST — always forged
if (tcp->syn) {
if (tcp->fin || tcp->rst)
return 1;
}
// SYN+ACK from client side — only servers send this
if (tcp->syn && tcp->ack)
return 1;
// URG flag — unused in Minecraft protocol
if (tcp->urg)
return 1;
return 0;
}
// ── Switch connection to verified state ──
static __always_inline __u8 switch_to_verified(struct flow_key *flow)
{
struct player_entry entry = {};
entry.protocol = 0;
if (bpf_map_update_elem(&player_connection_map, flow, &entry, BPF_NOEXIST)) {
// Map is full — LRU will evict, but we still drop this one
return 0;
}
// Remove from conntrack
bpf_map_delete_elem(&conntrack_map, flow);
return 1;
}
// ════════════════════════════════════════════════════
// Main XDP entry point
// ════════════════════════════════════════════════════
SEC("xdp")
int rampart_xdp_filter(struct xdp_md *ctx)
{
void *data_end = (void *)(long)ctx->data_end;
void *data = (void *)(long)ctx->data;
inc_total();
// ── Parse Ethernet header ──
struct ethhdr *eth = data;
if ((void *)(eth + 1) > data_end)
return XDP_PASS;
// Non-IP traffic: pass (ARP, etc.)
if (eth->h_proto != bpf_htons(ETH_P_IP) && eth->h_proto != bpf_htons(ETH_P_IPV6))
return XDP_PASS;
// ── Parse IP header ──
__u32 src_ip = 0;
__u8 is_ipv6 = 0;
if (eth->h_proto == bpf_htons(ETH_P_IP)) {
// IPv4
struct iphdr *ip = (void *)(eth + 1);
if ((void *)(ip + 1) > data_end)
return XDP_PASS;
if (ip->ihl < 5)
return XDP_DROP;
// Non-TCP: pass
if (ip->protocol != IPPROTO_TCP)
return XDP_PASS;
// Non-sequential fragment: pass (can't inspect ports safely)
if (ip->frag_off & bpf_htons(IP_OFFSET))
return XDP_PASS;
// First fragment with MF: drop (can't reassemble)
if (ip->frag_off & bpf_htons(IP_MF))
return XDP_DROP;
src_ip = ip->saddr;
} else {
// IPv6
struct ipv6hdr *ip6 = (void *)(eth + 1);
if ((void *)(ip6 + 1) > data_end)
return XDP_PASS;
// Non-TCP: pass
if (ip6->nexthdr != IPPROTO_TCP)
return XDP_PASS;
// Use IPv4-mapped IPv6 address for flow key (::ffff:0:0/96)
if (ip6->daddr.in6_u.u6_addr32[0] != 0 ||
ip6->daddr.in6_u.u6_addr32[1] != 0 ||
ip6->daddr.in6_u.u6_addr32[2] != bpf_htonl(0xFFFF)) {
// Non-mapped IPv6 — pass for now (not supported)
return XDP_PASS;
}
src_ip = ip6->daddr.in6_u.u6_addr32[3];
is_ipv6 = 1;
}
// ── Parse TCP header ──
struct tcphdr *tcp;
__u8 ip_hdr_len;
if (is_ipv6) {
struct ipv6hdr *ip6 = (void *)(eth + 1);
tcp = (void *)(ip6 + 1);
ip_hdr_len = sizeof(struct ipv6hdr);
} else {
struct iphdr *ip = (void *)(eth + 1);
tcp = (void *)ip + (ip->ihl * 4);
ip_hdr_len = ip->ihl * 4;
}
if ((void *)(tcp + 1) > data_end)
return XDP_PASS;
// TCP header length check
if (tcp->doff < 5)
return XDP_DROP;
__u8 tcp_hdr_len = tcp->doff * 4;
if ((void *)data + sizeof(struct ethhdr) + ip_hdr_len + tcp_hdr_len > data_end)
return XDP_DROP;
// ── Port check ──
// Only filter Minecraft ports
__u16 dst_port = bpf_ntohs(tcp->dest);
if (dst_port < G_START_PORT || dst_port > G_END_PORT)
return XDP_PASS;
inc_tcp_mc();
// ── Whitelist check (CIDR) ──
struct lpm_key wl_key = { .prefixlen = 32, .ip = src_ip };
if (bpf_map_lookup_elem(&whitelist_map, &wl_key)) {
inc_whitelist();
return XDP_PASS;
}
// ── Malicious TCP flags ──
if (detect_tcp_bypass(tcp)) {
inc_drop();
if (G_FEATURE_EVENTS)
push_event(EVENT_DEATH_CODE, src_ip, 0);
return XDP_DROP;
}
// Compute payload pointers
__u8 *tcp_payload = (__u8 *)tcp + tcp_hdr_len;
__u8 *tcp_payload_end = (__u8 *)data_end;
__s32 tcp_payload_len = (__s32)(tcp_payload_end - tcp_payload);
if (tcp_payload_len < 0)
tcp_payload_len = 0;
// ── Build flow key ──
struct flow_key flow = {
.src_ip = src_ip,
.dst_ip = is_ipv6 ? 0 : ((struct iphdr *)(eth + 1))->daddr,
.src_port = tcp->source,
.dst_port = tcp->dest,
};
// ── Verified player fast path ──
struct player_entry *player = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&player_connection_map, &flow);
if (player) {
player->packets++;
inc_pass();
return XDP_PASS;
}
// ── SYN handling (new connection) ──
if (tcp->syn && !tcp->ack) {
// SYN throttle
if (G_FEATURE_SYN_THROTTLE) {
struct throttle_entry *th = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&connection_throttle, &src_ip);
__u64 now = bpf_ktime_get_ns();
if (th) {
if (now - th->window_start < G_SYN_WINDOW_NS) {
if (th->hits >= G_SYN_HIT_COUNT) {
// Ban this IP
struct lpm_key ban_key = { .prefixlen = 32, .ip = src_ip };
__u64 ban_until = now + G_SYN_BAN_DURATION_NS;
bpf_map_update_elem(&blacklist_map, &ban_key, &ban_until, BPF_ANY);
inc_syn_throttle();
inc_drop();
if (G_FEATURE_EVENTS)
push_event(EVENT_RATE_LIMIT, src_ip, th->hits);
return XDP_DROP;
}
__sync_fetch_and_add(&th->hits, 1);
} else {
th->window_start = now;
th->hits = 1;
}
} else {
struct throttle_entry new_th = { .window_start = now, .hits = 1 };
bpf_map_update_elem(&connection_throttle, &src_ip, &new_th, BPF_ANY);
}
}
// Create conntrack entry for new connection
struct conntrack_entry ce = {};
ce.state = STATE_AWAIT_ACK;
ce.expected_seq = bpf_ntohl(tcp->seq) + 1; // expect SYN-ACK seq
ce.src_ip = src_ip;
ce.src_port = tcp->source;
if (bpf_map_update_elem(&conntrack_map, &flow, &ce, BPF_ANY)) {
// Map full — should not happen with LRU
inc_drop();
return XDP_DROP;
}
inc_pass();
return XDP_PASS; // Let SYN through
}
// ── Connection tracking lookup ──
struct conntrack_entry *conn = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&conntrack_map, &flow);
if (!conn) {
// Unknown connection — drop
inc_drop();
return XDP_DROP;
}
// ── Sequence number tracking ──
__u32 seq = bpf_ntohl(tcp->seq);
if (conn->state != STATE_AWAIT_ACK && tcp_payload_len > 0) {
if (seq != conn->expected_seq) {
conn->fails++;
if (conn->fails >= G_MAX_OUT_OF_ORDER) {
bpf_map_delete_elem(&conntrack_map, &flow);
inc_drop();
if (G_FEATURE_EVENTS)
push_event(EVENT_CONN_DROP, src_ip, conn->fails);
return XDP_DROP;
}
// Allow retransmission (don't update expected_seq)
inc_pass();
return XDP_PASS;
}
}
// ── State machine ──
__u32 state = conn->state;
// Handle RST/FIN — clean up conntrack entry
if (tcp->rst || tcp->fin) {
bpf_map_delete_elem(&conntrack_map, &flow);
inc_pass();
return XDP_PASS;
}
if (state == STATE_AWAIT_ACK) {
// Expecting ACK that completes TCP 3-way handshake
if (!tcp->ack || seq != conn->expected_seq) {
inc_drop();
return XDP_DROP;
}
// ═══ FIX vs other implementations ═══
// Do NOT drop pure ACK here. Other XDP filters drop the pure ACK
// expecting the data packet to serve as ACK, which causes ~1-7s
// TCP handshake deadlock. We pass the ACK through.
conn->state = STATE_AWAIT_MC_HANDSHAKE;
conn->expected_seq = seq + tcp_payload_len;
// If this is a pure ACK (no data), pass it through
if (tcp_payload_len == 0) {
inc_pass();
return XDP_PASS;
}
// Fall through to handshake inspection
}
else if (state == STATE_AWAIT_MC_HANDSHAKE) {
// Pure ACK without data — pass through (keep-alive, etc.)
if (tcp_payload_len == 0) {
inc_pass();
return XDP_PASS;
}
// Inspect handshake packet
__u8 *cursor = tcp_payload;
__s32 protocol = 0;
__s32 result = inspect_handshake(&cursor, tcp_payload_end, &protocol, data_end);
// Update expected sequence
__u32 data_consumed = (__u32)(cursor - tcp_payload);
conn->expected_seq += data_consumed;
if (result == 0) {
// Malformed handshake — ban
struct lpm_key ban_key = { .prefixlen = 32, .ip = src_ip };
__u64 now = bpf_ktime_get_ns();
__u64 ban_until = now + G_BAN_DURATION_NS;
bpf_map_update_elem(&blacklist_map, &ban_key, &ban_until, BPF_ANY);
bpf_map_delete_elem(&conntrack_map, &flow);
inc_drop();
if (G_FEATURE_EVENTS)
push_event(EVENT_BAN, src_ip, 1);
return XDP_DROP;
}
if (result == RECEIVED_LEGACY_PING) {
// Legacy ping (pre-1.7) — drop connection
bpf_map_delete_elem(&conntrack_map, &flow);
inc_drop();
return XDP_DROP;
}
if (result == DIRECT_READ_LOGIN) {
// Handshake + login in same segment
__u8 login_ok = inspect_login_packet(cursor, tcp_payload_end, protocol, data_end);
__u32 login_consumed = (__u32)(tcp_payload_end - cursor);
if (login_consumed < (__u32)(tcp_payload_end - cursor))
conn->expected_seq += login_consumed;
if (!login_ok) {
bpf_map_delete_elem(&conntrack_map, &flow);
inc_drop();
return XDP_DROP;
}
// Login passed — switch to verified
if (switch_to_verified(&flow)) {
conn->state = STATE_VERIFIED;
inc_verified();
if (G_FEATURE_EVENTS)
push_event(EVENT_VERIFIED, src_ip, protocol);
return XDP_PASS;
}
inc_drop();
return XDP_DROP;
}
if (result == DIRECT_READ_STATUS) {
// Handshake + status request in same segment
// Forge-style — pass through
conn->state = STATE_PING_COMPLETE;
inc_pass();
return XDP_PASS;
}
// Normal: handshake only, wait for login
conn->state = STATE_AWAIT_LOGIN;
conn->expected_seq = seq + data_consumed;
conn->protocol = (__u32)protocol;
inc_pass();
return XDP_PASS;
}
else if (state == STATE_AWAIT_LOGIN) {
if (tcp_payload_len == 0) {
inc_pass();
return XDP_PASS;
}
__u8 login_ok = inspect_login_packet(tcp_payload, tcp_payload_end,
(__s32)conn->protocol, data_end);
if (!login_ok) {
bpf_map_delete_elem(&conntrack_map, &flow);
inc_drop();
return XDP_DROP;
}
// Login passed — move to verified
if (switch_to_verified(&flow)) {
conn->state = STATE_VERIFIED;
inc_verified();
return XDP_PASS;
}
inc_drop();
return XDP_DROP;
}
else if (state == STATE_VERIFIED) {
// Should not happen — verified connections use fast path
inc_pass();
return XDP_PASS;
}
else if (state == STATE_PING_COMPLETE) {
// Ping completed — drop connection
bpf_map_delete_elem(&conntrack_map, &flow);
inc_drop();
return XDP_DROP;
}
// Unknown state — pass
inc_pass();
return XDP_PASS;
error:
inc_drop();
return XDP_DROP;
}