fix(edge): IPv6 bind, configurable relay idle, per-gateway budget, PROXY identity

- bind.address is parsed as IpAddr (no ":::port"), the socket domain follows
  the family, and "::" binds dual-stack. IPv6 was impossible before.
- limits.relay_idle_timeout_secs (default 300, 1..=86400) replaces the
  hardcoded relay constant; the deploy examples document it.
- The connection budget is an Arc<Semaphore> owned by Gateway instead of a
  process-wide OnceLock, so tests and multiple gateways stay independent.
- PROXY header identity is validated: unspecified, loopback, link-local,
  multicast, broadcast and addresses inside trusted_cidrs are rejected, and
  IPv4-mapped IPv6 is normalised first. An invalid header falls back to the
  transport peer. Bans targeting trusted_cidrs are suppressed, closing the
  ban-amplification path through a trusted load balancer.
- TrustedProxyCidr::contains no longer overflows its mask for IPv6 prefixes
  shorter than /96.
This commit is contained in:
Loki 2026-11-16 12:36:19 +01:00
parent 9baae25acb
commit 324ef12b27
Signed by: boba
GPG key ID: 6CDE87BC9A778D97
15 changed files with 530 additions and 76 deletions

View file

@ -2,19 +2,85 @@
//! parsing of headers injected by trusted ingress peers.
use crate::config::ProxyProtocolConfig;
use std::net::SocketAddr;
use std::net::{IpAddr, Ipv4Addr, SocketAddr};
use std::time::Duration;
use tokio::net::TcpStream;
mod inbound;
pub(super) use inbound::read_v2_header;
/// Reason a PROXY header client address is rejected as an identity.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub enum ClientIpRejection {
/// `0.0.0.0` or `::`: no host behind the header.
Unspecified,
/// The header claims a loopback address, which is never a real client.
Loopback,
/// The header claims a link-local address (`169.254.0.0/16`, `fe80::/10`).
LinkLocal,
/// The header claims a multicast address.
Multicast,
/// The header claims the limited IPv4 broadcast address.
Broadcast,
/// The header claims an address of the proxy network itself.
TrustedProxy,
}
/// Validates the client IP claimed in an inbound PROXY v2 header.
///
/// A trusted proxy is allowed to state who the client is, but it must not be
/// able to name an address that can never be a real remote client (host-local,
/// link-local, multicast, broadcast) or another trusted proxy. Without this
/// check a single compromised or misconfigured proxy could ban arbitrary
/// addresses cluster-wide or poison their reputation.
///
/// # Errors
/// Returns the reason `ip` is not usable as a client identity.
pub fn validate_client_ip(config: &ProxyProtocolConfig, ip: IpAddr) -> Result<(), ClientIpRejection> {
// Collapse IPv4-mapped IPv6 first: the ban tables do the same, so leaving
// `::ffff:127.0.0.1` as v6 would bypass the loopback and trusted-network
// checks and then be normalized into a ban for `127.0.0.1`.
let ip = match ip {
IpAddr::V6(v6) => v6.to_ipv4_mapped().map_or(ip, IpAddr::V4),
IpAddr::V4(_) => ip,
};
if ip.is_unspecified() {
return Err(ClientIpRejection::Unspecified);
}
if ip.is_loopback() {
return Err(ClientIpRejection::Loopback);
}
let link_local = match ip {
IpAddr::V4(v4) => v4.is_link_local(),
IpAddr::V6(v6) => v6.is_unicast_link_local(),
};
if link_local {
return Err(ClientIpRejection::LinkLocal);
}
if ip.is_multicast() {
return Err(ClientIpRejection::Multicast);
}
if ip == IpAddr::V4(Ipv4Addr::BROADCAST) {
return Err(ClientIpRejection::Broadcast);
}
if config.trusted_cidrs.iter().any(|cidr| cidr.contains(ip)) {
return Err(ClientIpRejection::TrustedProxy);
}
Ok(())
}
/// Resolves the effective client address from an inbound PROXY v2 header.
///
/// Only peers inside `config.trusted_cidrs` may inject a header; anyone else
/// is rejected instead of being believed. The whole header must arrive within
/// `config.ingress_timeout_ms` and fit in `config.max_header_bytes`.
///
/// A header whose client address fails [`validate_client_ip`] is not fatal:
/// the transport peer becomes the client identity and the reason is logged once
/// per connection at debug level. Failing closed would drop every connection
/// behind a misbehaving proxy, while trusting the claimed address would hand
/// the ban path to the proxy.
///
/// # Errors
/// Fails when the peer is not trusted, on timeout and on any header parse error.
pub(super) async fn resolve_client_addr(
@ -25,12 +91,24 @@ pub(super) async fn resolve_client_addr(
if !config.trusted_cidrs.iter().any(|cidr| cidr.contains(peer_addr.ip())) {
anyhow::bail!("untrusted peer attempted inbound PROXY protocol");
}
read_v2_header(
let claimed = read_v2_header(
client,
Duration::from_millis(config.ingress_timeout_ms),
config.max_header_bytes,
)
.await
.await?;
match validate_client_ip(config, claimed.ip()) {
Ok(()) => Ok(claimed),
Err(reason) => {
tracing::debug!(
peer = %peer_addr,
claimed = %claimed,
reason = ?reason,
"ignoring PROXY header client address, using the transport peer"
);
Ok(peer_addr)
},
}
}
/// Encodes a PROXY protocol v2 TCP header for the backend.