fix: never ban a trusted proxy network from any ban source

The gateway already refused to ban addresses from proxy_protocol.trusted_cidrs,
but the traffic-intelligence auto-ban and the subnet monitor still did, so a
trusted load balancer living inside a banned /24 (or below the reputation
threshold) could be knocked out together with its clients.

- TrustedProxyCidr moved to src/config/trusted.rs (the edge section file hit
  the 250-line gate) and gained `overlaps_prefix`: a ban is suppressed when the
  banned prefix intersects a trusted network.
- TrafficHook::with_trusted suppresses reputation and offender bans; its ban()
  now reports whether the ban was installed so `ban_offenders` counts real
  bans.
- The subnet monitor takes a MonitorSetup bundle (spawn had 8 arguments) and
  suppresses both userspace CIDR bans and XDP prefix bans that overlap a
  trusted network, logging a warning instead.
- IPv4-mapped addresses are normalised in `contains` too.
- Tests: overlap maths (v4/v6, /0 rejected), tracker suppression vs unrelated
  networks, and auto-ban skipping a trusted range while still banning public
  offenders.
This commit is contained in:
Loki 2026-11-16 13:03:50 +01:00
parent 72c1f45d62
commit bcae8901c6
Signed by: boba
GPG key ID: 6CDE87BC9A778D97
11 changed files with 300 additions and 106 deletions

View file

@ -237,3 +237,25 @@ async fn plain_connection_uses_the_transport_peer() {
let outcome = handle_plain(&gateway, peer).await;
assert_eq!(outcome.client_ip, Some(peer.ip()));
}
#[test]
fn trusted_network_overlap_checks_prefix_intersection() {
let net: TrustedProxyCidr = "10.0.0.0/8".parse().expect("cidr");
assert!(net.overlaps_prefix("10.1.2.0".parse().expect("ip"), 24), "same range");
assert!(
net.overlaps_prefix("10.0.0.0".parse().expect("ip"), 7),
"wider prefix overlaps"
);
assert!(
!net.overlaps_prefix("11.0.0.0".parse().expect("ip"), 8),
"sibling range"
);
assert!(
!net.overlaps_prefix("10.0.0.0".parse().expect("ip"), 0),
"/0 is rejected"
);
let v6: TrustedProxyCidr = "fd00::/8".parse().expect("cidr");
assert!(v6.overlaps_prefix("fd12::".parse().expect("ip"), 16));
assert!(!v6.overlaps_prefix("2001:db8::".parse().expect("ip"), 32));
}

View file

@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
//! Integration tests for subnet-level detection: tracker, detector and verdicts.
use rampart::config::Config;
use rampart::config::{Config, TrustedProxyCidr};
use rampart::engine::subnet::monitor::enforce_tracker_verdicts;
use rampart::engine::subnet_tracker::SubnetTracker;
use rampart::filter::blacklist::Blacklist;
@ -299,7 +299,7 @@ fn block_verdict(prefix: IpAddr) -> PrefixVerdict {
fn trusted_tracker_block_reaches_the_blacklist_with_the_configured_ttl() {
let blacklist = Blacklist::new();
let verdicts = [block_verdict(v4([203, 0, 113, 0]))];
let banned = enforce_tracker_verdicts(&verdicts, &blacklist, Duration::from_secs(120), true);
let banned = enforce_tracker_verdicts(&verdicts, &blacklist, Duration::from_secs(120), true, &[]);
assert_eq!(banned, 1);
assert!(blacklist.is_blocked(v4([203, 0, 113, 0])));
}
@ -308,7 +308,7 @@ fn trusted_tracker_block_reaches_the_blacklist_with_the_configured_ttl() {
fn untrusted_tracker_block_only_warns() {
let blacklist = Blacklist::new();
let verdicts = [block_verdict(v4([198, 51, 100, 0]))];
let banned = enforce_tracker_verdicts(&verdicts, &blacklist, Duration::from_secs(120), false);
let banned = enforce_tracker_verdicts(&verdicts, &blacklist, Duration::from_secs(120), false, &[]);
assert_eq!(banned, 0);
assert!(blacklist.is_empty());
}
@ -317,7 +317,7 @@ fn untrusted_tracker_block_only_warns() {
fn tracker_ban_uses_the_given_duration() {
let blacklist = Blacklist::new();
let verdicts = [block_verdict(v4([192, 0, 2, 0]))];
enforce_tracker_verdicts(&verdicts, &blacklist, Duration::from_millis(1), true);
enforce_tracker_verdicts(&verdicts, &blacklist, Duration::from_millis(1), true, &[]);
std::thread::sleep(Duration::from_millis(2));
assert!(
!blacklist.is_blocked(v4([192, 0, 2, 0])),
@ -331,7 +331,7 @@ fn non_block_verdicts_do_not_ban() {
let mut verdict = block_verdict(v4([203, 0, 113, 0]));
verdict.verdict = SubnetVerdict::Challenge;
assert_eq!(
enforce_tracker_verdicts(&[verdict], &blacklist, Duration::from_secs(60), true),
enforce_tracker_verdicts(&[verdict], &blacklist, Duration::from_secs(60), true, &[]),
0
);
assert!(blacklist.is_empty());
@ -375,3 +375,23 @@ fn prefix_key_normalises_ipv4_mapped_addresses() {
assert_eq!(PrefixKey::new(mapped).to_prefix(), Some(prefix_of(mapped)));
assert_eq!(PrefixKey::new(mapped).to_prefix(), Some(v4([1, 2, 3, 0])));
}
#[test]
fn tracker_block_is_suppressed_when_a_trusted_proxy_lives_in_the_prefix() {
let blacklist = Blacklist::new();
let verdicts = [block_verdict(v4([10, 9, 0, 0]))];
let trusted: Vec<TrustedProxyCidr> = vec!["10.9.0.5/32".parse().expect("trusted cidr")];
let banned = enforce_tracker_verdicts(&verdicts, &blacklist, Duration::from_secs(120), true, &trusted);
assert_eq!(banned, 0, "a ban covering a trusted proxy must be suppressed");
assert!(blacklist.is_empty());
}
#[test]
fn tracker_block_still_applies_when_trusted_networks_do_not_overlap() {
let blacklist = Blacklist::new();
let verdicts = [block_verdict(v4([10, 9, 0, 0]))];
let trusted: Vec<TrustedProxyCidr> = vec!["192.0.2.0/24".parse().expect("trusted cidr")];
let banned = enforce_tracker_verdicts(&verdicts, &blacklist, Duration::from_secs(120), true, &trusted);
assert_eq!(banned, 1);
assert!(blacklist.is_blocked(v4([10, 9, 0, 7])));
}

View file

@ -446,3 +446,33 @@ fn alerts_fire_only_on_state_transitions() {
assert!(alerts[0].message.contains("attack started"));
assert!(alerts[1].message.contains("attack ended"));
}
#[test]
fn auto_ban_never_targets_a_trusted_proxy_network() {
let reputation = Arc::new(IpReputation::new());
let blacklist = Arc::new(Blacklist::new());
let trusted: Vec<rampart::config::TrustedProxyCidr> = vec!["10.0.0.0/8".parse().expect("trusted cidr")];
let hook =
TrafficHook::new(Arc::clone(&reputation), Arc::clone(&blacklist), autoban_cfg(true), 60).with_trusted(trusted);
let inside = ip([10, 1, 2, 3]);
for _ in 0..6 {
reputation.record_bad(inside);
hook.on_connection_end(inside);
}
assert!(
reputation.score(inside) <= -50,
"reputation must fall below the threshold"
);
assert_eq!(hook.ban_offenders(), 0, "trusted addresses are never banned");
let public = ip([198, 51, 100, 9]);
for _ in 0..6 {
reputation.record_bad(public);
hook.on_connection_end(public);
}
assert!(
blacklist.is_blocked(public),
"non-trusted offenders are still banned by the reputation path"
);
}