fix(core): close auth bypass, hangs and memory leaks found by review

Security:
- An empty API_PASSWORD passed validation (only the literal "changeme" was
  rejected) and verify_password("", "") returned true, so a login with an
  empty password minted an admin token. Require >= 16 characters and >= 32
  non-whitespace bytes for JWT_SECRET; verify rejects an empty stored secret.
- syn_challenge_enabled required a real challenge_secret_hex: the public
  placeholder from config.h is now rejected in every spelling.
- docker-compose: Redis/ClickHouse/Grafana are loopback-only and every
  password uses ${VAR:?} instead of a default. An exposed Redis was a way to
  lift bans and publish unbans to the whole fleet with one redis-cli.
- Empty CORS_ORIGIN no longer means "allow any origin".
- ban_cidr / userspace blacklist validate and mask prefixes; CIDR bans are
  stored as ranges, so a /24 or /64 ban actually covers the subnet (before,
  only the network address was blocked).

Availability:
- ClickHouse client has connect/request timeouts and no mutex held across
  await: a hung analytics backend can no longer freeze the ban path. Events
  go through a bounded buffer with a drop counter.
- Redis uses a ConnectionManager with per-command timeouts; pubsub and
  reconcile reset the backoff after success; publish cannot block shutdown.
- Ban durations from pubsub are clamped and use checked_add; the sync task
  survives panics instead of silently dying.
- Blacklist TOCTOU (remove_if) and replace_redis no longer empties the table
  during a Redis reconnect.
- RateLimiter and reputation have hard caps with incremental eviction instead
  of an unbounded DashMap and a stop-the-world retain.
- The attack detector scores before updating its baseline and needs several
  quiet windows to leave UnderAttack, so a sustained flood keeps banning new
  offenders instead of ending after one tick.
- accept() backs off on EMFILE/ENFILE, shutdown Err is treated as shutdown,
  a global semaphore bounds in-flight connections, rate limiting runs before
  PoW, whitelisted IPs are never banned, and connect/handshake/relay have
  timeouts with an idle budget.
- PoW uses the configured difficulty as a floor, the clamp is enforced, and
  nonce framing survives split segments and coalesced handshake bytes.
- Subnet tracker memory is capped (prefixes and per-prefix sources) and the
  monitor bans with the configured TTL.

CI and docs:
- CI runs the test suite with --no-default-features --features protocol-http;
  make ebpf fails on errors; the secrets gate catches weak compose defaults.
- doctor skips protected endpoints without a token and exits non-zero on
  failure; a drain timeout returns exit code 1.
- TODO §2b records the review findings, what is fixed and what is deferred;
  configuration/testing docs describe the new XDP and secret semantics.
This commit is contained in:
Loki 2026-11-16 12:06:23 +01:00
parent 14dcaccdbf
commit c1a076a4a3
Signed by: boba
GPG key ID: 6CDE87BC9A778D97
57 changed files with 4193 additions and 1171 deletions

View file

@ -28,6 +28,8 @@ rate_limit_burst = 10.0
ban_duration_secs = 3600
[store]
# deploy/docker-compose.yml requires REDIS_PASSWORD; add it to the URL when the
# edge uses that stack: redis://:PASSWORD@redis:6379/0
redis_url = "redis://redis:6379/0"
blacklist_cache_ttl_secs = 300
clickhouse_url = ""

View file

@ -1,19 +1,26 @@
services:
redis:
image: redis:7-alpine
restart: unless-stopped
# No published host port: only containers on this network reach Redis, and
# the password is mandatory so an unset variable aborts startup.
environment:
REDIS_PASSWORD: "${REDIS_PASSWORD:?REDIS_PASSWORD must be set (see docs/deployment.md)}"
command: redis-server --requirepass "${REDIS_PASSWORD:?REDIS_PASSWORD must be set (see docs/deployment.md)}"
healthcheck:
test: ["CMD", "redis-cli", "ping"]
test: ["CMD-SHELL", "redis-cli -a \"$$REDIS_PASSWORD\" --no-auth-warning ping | grep -q PONG"]
interval: 3s
timeout: 1s
retries: 5
restart: unless-stopped
clickhouse:
image: clickhouse/clickhouse-server:latest
container_name: rampart-clickhouse
# ClickHouse has no authentication here: bind it to loopback only and keep
# container-to-container traffic on the Compose network (service name).
ports:
- "8123:8123"
- "9000:9000"
- "127.0.0.1:8123:8123"
- "127.0.0.1:9000:9000"
volumes:
- ./clickhouse/schema.sql:/docker-entrypoint-initdb.d/schema.sql:ro
healthcheck:
@ -27,12 +34,12 @@ services:
image: grafana/grafana:latest
container_name: rampart-grafana
ports:
- "3000:3000"
- "127.0.0.1:3000:3000"
depends_on:
clickhouse:
condition: service_started
environment:
GF_INSTALL_PLUGINS: grafana-clickhouse-datasource
GF_SECURITY_ADMIN_PASSWORD: "${GRAFANA_PASSWORD:?GRAFANA_PASSWORD must be set (see docs/deployment.md)}"
volumes:
- ./grafana/datasources:/etc/grafana/provisioning/datasources:ro
- ./grafana/dashboards:/etc/grafana/provisioning/dashboards:ro

View file

@ -70,4 +70,4 @@ rampart_attack_status
```
ClickHouse (опционально): http://localhost:8123 — долгосрочное хранение событий.
Grafana: http://localhost:3000 (admin/admin) — дашборды из `deploy/grafana/`.
Grafana: http://localhost:3000 (логин `admin`, пароль из `GRAFANA_PASSWORD`) — дашборды из `deploy/grafana/`.