fix(core): close auth bypass, hangs and memory leaks found by review
Security:
- An empty API_PASSWORD passed validation (only the literal "changeme" was
rejected) and verify_password("", "") returned true, so a login with an
empty password minted an admin token. Require >= 16 characters and >= 32
non-whitespace bytes for JWT_SECRET; verify rejects an empty stored secret.
- syn_challenge_enabled required a real challenge_secret_hex: the public
placeholder from config.h is now rejected in every spelling.
- docker-compose: Redis/ClickHouse/Grafana are loopback-only and every
password uses ${VAR:?} instead of a default. An exposed Redis was a way to
lift bans and publish unbans to the whole fleet with one redis-cli.
- Empty CORS_ORIGIN no longer means "allow any origin".
- ban_cidr / userspace blacklist validate and mask prefixes; CIDR bans are
stored as ranges, so a /24 or /64 ban actually covers the subnet (before,
only the network address was blocked).
Availability:
- ClickHouse client has connect/request timeouts and no mutex held across
await: a hung analytics backend can no longer freeze the ban path. Events
go through a bounded buffer with a drop counter.
- Redis uses a ConnectionManager with per-command timeouts; pubsub and
reconcile reset the backoff after success; publish cannot block shutdown.
- Ban durations from pubsub are clamped and use checked_add; the sync task
survives panics instead of silently dying.
- Blacklist TOCTOU (remove_if) and replace_redis no longer empties the table
during a Redis reconnect.
- RateLimiter and reputation have hard caps with incremental eviction instead
of an unbounded DashMap and a stop-the-world retain.
- The attack detector scores before updating its baseline and needs several
quiet windows to leave UnderAttack, so a sustained flood keeps banning new
offenders instead of ending after one tick.
- accept() backs off on EMFILE/ENFILE, shutdown Err is treated as shutdown,
a global semaphore bounds in-flight connections, rate limiting runs before
PoW, whitelisted IPs are never banned, and connect/handshake/relay have
timeouts with an idle budget.
- PoW uses the configured difficulty as a floor, the clamp is enforced, and
nonce framing survives split segments and coalesced handshake bytes.
- Subnet tracker memory is capped (prefixes and per-prefix sources) and the
monitor bans with the configured TTL.
CI and docs:
- CI runs the test suite with --no-default-features --features protocol-http;
make ebpf fails on errors; the secrets gate catches weak compose defaults.
- doctor skips protected endpoints without a token and exits non-zero on
failure; a drain timeout returns exit code 1.
- TODO §2b records the review findings, what is fixed and what is deferred;
configuration/testing docs describe the new XDP and secret semantics.
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57 changed files with 4193 additions and 1171 deletions
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@ -2,13 +2,17 @@ services:
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redis:
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image: redis:7-alpine
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container_name: rampart-redis
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command: redis-server --requirepass "${REDIS_PASSWORD:-rampart_dev}" --appendonly yes
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# Redis is reachable only from this Compose network and the loopback
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# interface; the password is mandatory so an unset variable aborts startup.
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ports:
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- "6379:6379"
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- "127.0.0.1:6379:6379"
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environment:
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REDIS_PASSWORD: "${REDIS_PASSWORD:?REDIS_PASSWORD must be set (see docs/deployment.md)}"
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command: redis-server --requirepass "${REDIS_PASSWORD:?REDIS_PASSWORD must be set (see docs/deployment.md)}" --appendonly yes
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volumes:
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- redis-data:/data
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healthcheck:
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test: ["CMD", "redis-cli", "--raw", "incr", "ping"]
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test: ["CMD-SHELL", "redis-cli -a \"$$REDIS_PASSWORD\" --no-auth-warning ping | grep -q PONG"]
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interval: 5s
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timeout: 3s
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retries: 5
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@ -17,9 +21,11 @@ services:
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clickhouse:
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image: clickhouse/clickhouse-server:24-alpine
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container_name: rampart-clickhouse
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# ClickHouse has no authentication here: bind it to loopback only and keep
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# container-to-container traffic on the Compose network (service name).
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ports:
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- "8123:8123" # HTTP
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- "9000:9000" # Native TCP
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- "127.0.0.1:8123:8123" # HTTP
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- "127.0.0.1:9000:9000" # Native TCP
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volumes:
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- clickhouse-data:/var/lib/clickhouse
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- ./deploy/clickhouse/schema.sql:/docker-entrypoint-initdb.d/schema.sql:ro
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@ -34,9 +40,9 @@ services:
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image: grafana/grafana:latest
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container_name: rampart-grafana
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ports:
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- "3000:3000"
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- "127.0.0.1:3000:3000"
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environment:
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- GF_SECURITY_ADMIN_PASSWORD=${GRAFANA_PASSWORD:-admin}
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- GF_SECURITY_ADMIN_PASSWORD=${GRAFANA_PASSWORD:?GRAFANA_PASSWORD must be set (see docs/deployment.md)}
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- GF_INSTALL_PLUGINS=grafana-clickhouse-datasource
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volumes:
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- grafana-data:/var/lib/grafana
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