fix(core): close auth bypass, hangs and memory leaks found by review

Security:
- An empty API_PASSWORD passed validation (only the literal "changeme" was
  rejected) and verify_password("", "") returned true, so a login with an
  empty password minted an admin token. Require >= 16 characters and >= 32
  non-whitespace bytes for JWT_SECRET; verify rejects an empty stored secret.
- syn_challenge_enabled required a real challenge_secret_hex: the public
  placeholder from config.h is now rejected in every spelling.
- docker-compose: Redis/ClickHouse/Grafana are loopback-only and every
  password uses ${VAR:?} instead of a default. An exposed Redis was a way to
  lift bans and publish unbans to the whole fleet with one redis-cli.
- Empty CORS_ORIGIN no longer means "allow any origin".
- ban_cidr / userspace blacklist validate and mask prefixes; CIDR bans are
  stored as ranges, so a /24 or /64 ban actually covers the subnet (before,
  only the network address was blocked).

Availability:
- ClickHouse client has connect/request timeouts and no mutex held across
  await: a hung analytics backend can no longer freeze the ban path. Events
  go through a bounded buffer with a drop counter.
- Redis uses a ConnectionManager with per-command timeouts; pubsub and
  reconcile reset the backoff after success; publish cannot block shutdown.
- Ban durations from pubsub are clamped and use checked_add; the sync task
  survives panics instead of silently dying.
- Blacklist TOCTOU (remove_if) and replace_redis no longer empties the table
  during a Redis reconnect.
- RateLimiter and reputation have hard caps with incremental eviction instead
  of an unbounded DashMap and a stop-the-world retain.
- The attack detector scores before updating its baseline and needs several
  quiet windows to leave UnderAttack, so a sustained flood keeps banning new
  offenders instead of ending after one tick.
- accept() backs off on EMFILE/ENFILE, shutdown Err is treated as shutdown,
  a global semaphore bounds in-flight connections, rate limiting runs before
  PoW, whitelisted IPs are never banned, and connect/handshake/relay have
  timeouts with an idle budget.
- PoW uses the configured difficulty as a floor, the clamp is enforced, and
  nonce framing survives split segments and coalesced handshake bytes.
- Subnet tracker memory is capped (prefixes and per-prefix sources) and the
  monitor bans with the configured TTL.

CI and docs:
- CI runs the test suite with --no-default-features --features protocol-http;
  make ebpf fails on errors; the secrets gate catches weak compose defaults.
- doctor skips protected endpoints without a token and exits non-zero on
  failure; a drain timeout returns exit code 1.
- TODO §2b records the review findings, what is fixed and what is deferred;
  configuration/testing docs describe the new XDP and secret semantics.
This commit is contained in:
Loki 2026-11-16 12:06:23 +01:00
parent 14dcaccdbf
commit c1a076a4a3
Signed by: boba
GPG key ID: 6CDE87BC9A778D97
57 changed files with 4193 additions and 1171 deletions

View file

@ -132,6 +132,9 @@ pub async fn run() -> anyhow::Result<RunExit> {
let subnet_tracker = start_subnet_tracker(&config);
monitor::spawn(
&config.detect.prefix,
Duration::from_secs(config.ban.ban_duration_secs),
blacklist.clone(),
!config.proxy_protocol.ingress_enabled,
subnet_tracker.clone(),
xdp_filter.clone(),
shutdown_rx.clone(),
@ -190,7 +193,9 @@ pub async fn run() -> anyhow::Result<RunExit> {
tracing::info!("Rampart edge starting on {}:{}", config.bind.address, config.bind.port);
tracing::info!("Upstreams: {:?}", config.backend.upstreams);
let adjuster = Arc::new(Mutex::new(DifficultyAdjuster::default()));
// The configured difficulty is the floor and the starting point; the
// adjuster only raises it under load.
let adjuster = Arc::new(Mutex::new(DifficultyAdjuster::with_floor(config.pow.difficulty)));
let gateway = Arc::new(Gateway::new(
config.clone(),
rate_limiter,