fix(core): close auth bypass, hangs and memory leaks found by review
Security:
- An empty API_PASSWORD passed validation (only the literal "changeme" was
rejected) and verify_password("", "") returned true, so a login with an
empty password minted an admin token. Require >= 16 characters and >= 32
non-whitespace bytes for JWT_SECRET; verify rejects an empty stored secret.
- syn_challenge_enabled required a real challenge_secret_hex: the public
placeholder from config.h is now rejected in every spelling.
- docker-compose: Redis/ClickHouse/Grafana are loopback-only and every
password uses ${VAR:?} instead of a default. An exposed Redis was a way to
lift bans and publish unbans to the whole fleet with one redis-cli.
- Empty CORS_ORIGIN no longer means "allow any origin".
- ban_cidr / userspace blacklist validate and mask prefixes; CIDR bans are
stored as ranges, so a /24 or /64 ban actually covers the subnet (before,
only the network address was blocked).
Availability:
- ClickHouse client has connect/request timeouts and no mutex held across
await: a hung analytics backend can no longer freeze the ban path. Events
go through a bounded buffer with a drop counter.
- Redis uses a ConnectionManager with per-command timeouts; pubsub and
reconcile reset the backoff after success; publish cannot block shutdown.
- Ban durations from pubsub are clamped and use checked_add; the sync task
survives panics instead of silently dying.
- Blacklist TOCTOU (remove_if) and replace_redis no longer empties the table
during a Redis reconnect.
- RateLimiter and reputation have hard caps with incremental eviction instead
of an unbounded DashMap and a stop-the-world retain.
- The attack detector scores before updating its baseline and needs several
quiet windows to leave UnderAttack, so a sustained flood keeps banning new
offenders instead of ending after one tick.
- accept() backs off on EMFILE/ENFILE, shutdown Err is treated as shutdown,
a global semaphore bounds in-flight connections, rate limiting runs before
PoW, whitelisted IPs are never banned, and connect/handshake/relay have
timeouts with an idle budget.
- PoW uses the configured difficulty as a floor, the clamp is enforced, and
nonce framing survives split segments and coalesced handshake bytes.
- Subnet tracker memory is capped (prefixes and per-prefix sources) and the
monitor bans with the configured TTL.
CI and docs:
- CI runs the test suite with --no-default-features --features protocol-http;
make ebpf fails on errors; the secrets gate catches weak compose defaults.
- doctor skips protected endpoints without a token and exits non-zero on
failure; a drain timeout returns exit code 1.
- TODO §2b records the review findings, what is fixed and what is deferred;
configuration/testing docs describe the new XDP and secret semantics.
This commit is contained in:
parent
14dcaccdbf
commit
c1a076a4a3
57 changed files with 4193 additions and 1171 deletions
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@ -1,17 +1,14 @@
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//! Rampart manager daemon: HTTP API in front of the redis state store.
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use axum::{
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Router,
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http::HeaderValue,
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middleware,
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Router, middleware,
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routing::{get, post},
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};
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use dashmap::DashMap;
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#[cfg(feature = "store-redis")]
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use rampart::manager::sync;
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use rampart::manager::{AppState, api, auth};
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use rampart::manager::{AppState, api, auth, security};
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use std::sync::Arc;
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use tower_http::cors::CorsLayer;
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use tracing_subscriber::EnvFilter;
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#[tokio::main]
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@ -32,9 +29,7 @@ async fn main() -> anyhow::Result<()> {
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let redis_client = redis::Client::open(redis_url)?;
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let jwt_secret = std::env::var("JWT_SECRET").map_err(|_| anyhow::anyhow!("JWT_SECRET must be set"))?;
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if jwt_secret.len() < 32 {
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return Err(anyhow::anyhow!("JWT_SECRET must be at least 32 bytes"));
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}
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security::validate_jwt_secret(&jwt_secret)?;
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let jwt_audience = std::env::var("JWT_AUDIENCE").unwrap_or_else(|_| "rampart".to_string());
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let jwt_expiration = std::env::var("JWT_EXPIRATION_SECS")
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.unwrap_or_else(|_| "86400".to_string())
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@ -42,9 +37,7 @@ async fn main() -> anyhow::Result<()> {
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.map_err(|_| anyhow::anyhow!("JWT_EXPIRATION_SECS must be a valid u64"))?;
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let api_password = std::env::var("API_PASSWORD").map_err(|_| anyhow::anyhow!("API_PASSWORD must be set"))?;
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if api_password == "changeme" {
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return Err(anyhow::anyhow!("API_PASSWORD must not be the default 'changeme'"));
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}
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security::validate_api_password(&api_password)?;
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let state = Arc::new(AppState {
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#[cfg(feature = "store-redis")]
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@ -78,17 +71,13 @@ async fn main() -> anyhow::Result<()> {
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.route("/api/v1/nodes", get(api::inventory::nodes::list_nodes));
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let protected = protected.route_layer(middleware::from_fn_with_state(state.clone(), auth::auth_middleware));
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let cors = match std::env::var("CORS_ORIGIN") {
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Ok(origin) if origin.is_empty() || origin == "*" => CorsLayer::new().allow_origin(tower_http::cors::Any),
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Ok(origin) => CorsLayer::new().allow_origin(HeaderValue::from_str(&origin)?),
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Err(_) => CorsLayer::new().allow_origin(HeaderValue::from_static("http://localhost:5173")),
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};
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let cors_policy = security::CorsPolicy::parse(std::env::var("CORS_ORIGIN").ok().as_deref())?;
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tracing::info!("CORS policy: {cors_policy:?}");
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let app = Router::new()
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.merge(public)
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.merge(protected)
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.layer(cors)
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.with_state(state);
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let mut app = Router::new().merge(public).merge(protected).with_state(state);
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if let Some(cors) = cors_policy.cors_layer() {
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app = app.layer(cors);
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}
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let addr = "0.0.0.0:8080";
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tracing::info!("Manager API listening on {addr}");
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