fix(core): close auth bypass, hangs and memory leaks found by review

Security:
- An empty API_PASSWORD passed validation (only the literal "changeme" was
  rejected) and verify_password("", "") returned true, so a login with an
  empty password minted an admin token. Require >= 16 characters and >= 32
  non-whitespace bytes for JWT_SECRET; verify rejects an empty stored secret.
- syn_challenge_enabled required a real challenge_secret_hex: the public
  placeholder from config.h is now rejected in every spelling.
- docker-compose: Redis/ClickHouse/Grafana are loopback-only and every
  password uses ${VAR:?} instead of a default. An exposed Redis was a way to
  lift bans and publish unbans to the whole fleet with one redis-cli.
- Empty CORS_ORIGIN no longer means "allow any origin".
- ban_cidr / userspace blacklist validate and mask prefixes; CIDR bans are
  stored as ranges, so a /24 or /64 ban actually covers the subnet (before,
  only the network address was blocked).

Availability:
- ClickHouse client has connect/request timeouts and no mutex held across
  await: a hung analytics backend can no longer freeze the ban path. Events
  go through a bounded buffer with a drop counter.
- Redis uses a ConnectionManager with per-command timeouts; pubsub and
  reconcile reset the backoff after success; publish cannot block shutdown.
- Ban durations from pubsub are clamped and use checked_add; the sync task
  survives panics instead of silently dying.
- Blacklist TOCTOU (remove_if) and replace_redis no longer empties the table
  during a Redis reconnect.
- RateLimiter and reputation have hard caps with incremental eviction instead
  of an unbounded DashMap and a stop-the-world retain.
- The attack detector scores before updating its baseline and needs several
  quiet windows to leave UnderAttack, so a sustained flood keeps banning new
  offenders instead of ending after one tick.
- accept() backs off on EMFILE/ENFILE, shutdown Err is treated as shutdown,
  a global semaphore bounds in-flight connections, rate limiting runs before
  PoW, whitelisted IPs are never banned, and connect/handshake/relay have
  timeouts with an idle budget.
- PoW uses the configured difficulty as a floor, the clamp is enforced, and
  nonce framing survives split segments and coalesced handshake bytes.
- Subnet tracker memory is capped (prefixes and per-prefix sources) and the
  monitor bans with the configured TTL.

CI and docs:
- CI runs the test suite with --no-default-features --features protocol-http;
  make ebpf fails on errors; the secrets gate catches weak compose defaults.
- doctor skips protected endpoints without a token and exits non-zero on
  failure; a drain timeout returns exit code 1.
- TODO §2b records the review findings, what is fixed and what is deferred;
  configuration/testing docs describe the new XDP and secret semantics.
This commit is contained in:
Loki 2026-11-16 12:06:23 +01:00
parent 14dcaccdbf
commit c1a076a4a3
Signed by: boba
GPG key ID: 6CDE87BC9A778D97
57 changed files with 4193 additions and 1171 deletions

View file

@ -1,17 +1,14 @@
//! Rampart manager daemon: HTTP API in front of the redis state store.
use axum::{
Router,
http::HeaderValue,
middleware,
Router, middleware,
routing::{get, post},
};
use dashmap::DashMap;
#[cfg(feature = "store-redis")]
use rampart::manager::sync;
use rampart::manager::{AppState, api, auth};
use rampart::manager::{AppState, api, auth, security};
use std::sync::Arc;
use tower_http::cors::CorsLayer;
use tracing_subscriber::EnvFilter;
#[tokio::main]
@ -32,9 +29,7 @@ async fn main() -> anyhow::Result<()> {
let redis_client = redis::Client::open(redis_url)?;
let jwt_secret = std::env::var("JWT_SECRET").map_err(|_| anyhow::anyhow!("JWT_SECRET must be set"))?;
if jwt_secret.len() < 32 {
return Err(anyhow::anyhow!("JWT_SECRET must be at least 32 bytes"));
}
security::validate_jwt_secret(&jwt_secret)?;
let jwt_audience = std::env::var("JWT_AUDIENCE").unwrap_or_else(|_| "rampart".to_string());
let jwt_expiration = std::env::var("JWT_EXPIRATION_SECS")
.unwrap_or_else(|_| "86400".to_string())
@ -42,9 +37,7 @@ async fn main() -> anyhow::Result<()> {
.map_err(|_| anyhow::anyhow!("JWT_EXPIRATION_SECS must be a valid u64"))?;
let api_password = std::env::var("API_PASSWORD").map_err(|_| anyhow::anyhow!("API_PASSWORD must be set"))?;
if api_password == "changeme" {
return Err(anyhow::anyhow!("API_PASSWORD must not be the default 'changeme'"));
}
security::validate_api_password(&api_password)?;
let state = Arc::new(AppState {
#[cfg(feature = "store-redis")]
@ -78,17 +71,13 @@ async fn main() -> anyhow::Result<()> {
.route("/api/v1/nodes", get(api::inventory::nodes::list_nodes));
let protected = protected.route_layer(middleware::from_fn_with_state(state.clone(), auth::auth_middleware));
let cors = match std::env::var("CORS_ORIGIN") {
Ok(origin) if origin.is_empty() || origin == "*" => CorsLayer::new().allow_origin(tower_http::cors::Any),
Ok(origin) => CorsLayer::new().allow_origin(HeaderValue::from_str(&origin)?),
Err(_) => CorsLayer::new().allow_origin(HeaderValue::from_static("http://localhost:5173")),
};
let cors_policy = security::CorsPolicy::parse(std::env::var("CORS_ORIGIN").ok().as_deref())?;
tracing::info!("CORS policy: {cors_policy:?}");
let app = Router::new()
.merge(public)
.merge(protected)
.layer(cors)
.with_state(state);
let mut app = Router::new().merge(public).merge(protected).with_state(state);
if let Some(cors) = cors_policy.cors_layer() {
app = app.layer(cors);
}
let addr = "0.0.0.0:8080";
tracing::info!("Manager API listening on {addr}");