docs: clarify private network deployment

This commit is contained in:
Loki 2026-10-16 23:16:20 +02:00
parent 7b41d0b7eb
commit cc9034e86b
Signed by: boba
GPG key ID: 253067914055423B
2 changed files with 34 additions and 0 deletions

View file

@ -79,6 +79,15 @@ cargo run --release --bin rampart-manager
# API на 0.0.0.0:8080
```
Manager listens on all interfaces by default. Permit `8080` only from an admin
VPN or specific admin addresses; do not expose the API to the public Internet.
The same applies to Redis (`6379`) and monitoring endpoints such as Prometheus
(`9090`), ClickHouse (`8123`/`9000`) and Grafana (`3000`). The sample Compose
file publishes ClickHouse and Grafana ports on the host, so restrict them with
the host firewall or change their port bindings before deploying on a public
VDS. Redis has no published host port in that Compose file and is reachable
only by containers on its Docker network unless you deliberately expose it.
Инфраструктура (Redis, ClickHouse, Grafana):
```bash

View file

@ -68,6 +68,31 @@ filtering in front of the VDS, hide the home's public address, and carry
accepted traffic to the home server through a restricted tunnel. Two ordinary
VDS instances without upstream filtering do not provide that protection.
## Network layout and firewall
Use the VDS edge as the only public Minecraft endpoint. The provider should
send filtered TCP `25565` traffic to that edge; the edge then reaches Paper over
a private link (for example, WireGuard). Use addresses from your own VPN and
replace the example roles below with the actual interfaces and addresses.
| Service | Allowed source | Publicly reachable? |
| --- | --- | --- |
| VDS edge TCP `25565` | DDoS provider ranges, or the Internet only if the provider requires it | Yes, through the provider |
| Paper TCP `25566` | Edge VPN address only | No |
| Redis TCP `6379` | Manager and edge VPN addresses only | No |
| Manager API TCP `8080` | Admin VPN or explicitly allowed admin IPs | No |
| Prometheus TCP `9090` | Monitoring VPN / localhost | No |
Do not forward Paper, Redis, or management ports from the home router to the
Internet. On Proxmox, allow the Paper port only on the tunnel/private interface
and restrict it to the edge addresses. If Manager and Redis run on a VDS, bind
or firewall Redis to the private interface and let each edge reach it through
the VPN. Use the same protected Redis endpoint in Manager and every edge
configuration; do not publish Redis with a Docker `ports` mapping. Protect the
Manager API and monitoring UI with the admin VPN or firewall as well. A private
tunnel limits who can reach these services; it does not add DDoS scrubbing to
the public edge.
For a DDoS provider that sends PROXY protocol v2, enable inbound parsing only
for that provider's TCP source ranges: