docs: clarify private network deployment

This commit is contained in:
Loki 2026-10-16 23:16:20 +02:00
parent 7b41d0b7eb
commit cc9034e86b
Signed by: boba
GPG key ID: 253067914055423B
2 changed files with 34 additions and 0 deletions

View file

@ -68,6 +68,31 @@ filtering in front of the VDS, hide the home's public address, and carry
accepted traffic to the home server through a restricted tunnel. Two ordinary
VDS instances without upstream filtering do not provide that protection.
## Network layout and firewall
Use the VDS edge as the only public Minecraft endpoint. The provider should
send filtered TCP `25565` traffic to that edge; the edge then reaches Paper over
a private link (for example, WireGuard). Use addresses from your own VPN and
replace the example roles below with the actual interfaces and addresses.
| Service | Allowed source | Publicly reachable? |
| --- | --- | --- |
| VDS edge TCP `25565` | DDoS provider ranges, or the Internet only if the provider requires it | Yes, through the provider |
| Paper TCP `25566` | Edge VPN address only | No |
| Redis TCP `6379` | Manager and edge VPN addresses only | No |
| Manager API TCP `8080` | Admin VPN or explicitly allowed admin IPs | No |
| Prometheus TCP `9090` | Monitoring VPN / localhost | No |
Do not forward Paper, Redis, or management ports from the home router to the
Internet. On Proxmox, allow the Paper port only on the tunnel/private interface
and restrict it to the edge addresses. If Manager and Redis run on a VDS, bind
or firewall Redis to the private interface and let each edge reach it through
the VPN. Use the same protected Redis endpoint in Manager and every edge
configuration; do not publish Redis with a Docker `ports` mapping. Protect the
Manager API and monitoring UI with the admin VPN or firewall as well. A private
tunnel limits who can reach these services; it does not add DDoS scrubbing to
the public edge.
For a DDoS provider that sends PROXY protocol v2, enable inbound parsing only
for that provider's TCP source ranges: