feat(manager): SCAN inventory, pagination, request limits, graceful shutdown

- Inventory nodes/servers use cursor SCAN plus MGET batches instead of KEYS
  and per-key GET; a Redis error returns 503 instead of an empty fleet.
- GET /blacklist no longer writes: the legacy metadata backfill moved to a
  one-shot startup task. The list endpoint paginates (limit 100, max 1000,
  offset max 10000) instead of dumping SMEMBERS.
- Router-wide DefaultBodyLimit 8 KiB and TimeoutLayer 10 s; every mutating
  endpoint is rate limited (30/min per client IP) with idle eviction, and the
  login limiter resets on success. reason > 256 bytes and malformed targets
  are rejected with 400.
- SIGTERM/Ctrl-C trigger graceful shutdown; the heartbeat and eviction tasks
  are cancelled and joined so in-flight ban edits reach Redis.
- MANAGER_TRUSTED_PROXIES enables X-Forwarded-For (right-to-left walk) only
  for configured proxy networks; otherwise the TCP peer is used.
- tests/manager_api.rs covers 401/400/413/429/503 and CORS preflight through
  the real router; manager_security gains limiter and proxy-IP tests.
This commit is contained in:
Loki 2026-11-16 12:36:29 +01:00
parent 324ef12b27
commit e456cb583f
Signed by: boba
GPG key ID: 6CDE87BC9A778D97
21 changed files with 1377 additions and 180 deletions

View file

@ -1,6 +1,9 @@
//! `POST`/`DELETE /api/v1/blacklist`: validated ban and unban mutations.
use super::common::{
ADD_BAN_SCRIPT, BLACKLIST_CHANNEL, BLACKLIST_KEY, BLACKLIST_METADATA_KEY, DEFAULT_BAN_DURATION_SECS,
MAX_BAN_DURATION_SECS, REMOVE_BAN_SCRIPT, api_error, event_payload, parse_ip, redis_error, redis_unavailable,
MAX_BAN_DURATION_SECS, REMOVE_BAN_SCRIPT, api_error, event_payload, redis_error, redis_unavailable,
validate_reason, validate_target,
};
use super::{AddBlacklistRequest, RemoveBlacklistRequest};
use crate::manager::AppState;
@ -11,7 +14,8 @@ pub async fn add_blacklist(
State(state): State<Arc<AppState>>,
Json(req): Json<AddBlacklistRequest>,
) -> Result<Json<serde_json::Value>, (StatusCode, Json<serde_json::Value>)> {
let ip = parse_ip(&req.target)?;
let ip = validate_target(&req.target)?;
validate_reason(&req.reason)?;
if req.entry_type != "ip" {
return Err(api_error(
StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST,
@ -73,7 +77,7 @@ pub async fn remove_blacklist(
State(state): State<Arc<AppState>>,
Json(req): Json<RemoveBlacklistRequest>,
) -> Result<Json<serde_json::Value>, (StatusCode, Json<serde_json::Value>)> {
let ip = parse_ip(&req.target)?;
let ip = validate_target(&req.target)?;
let target = ip.to_string();
let event = event_payload(&target, "unban", 0, None)?;
let mut conn = state