feat(manager): SCAN inventory, pagination, request limits, graceful shutdown
- Inventory nodes/servers use cursor SCAN plus MGET batches instead of KEYS and per-key GET; a Redis error returns 503 instead of an empty fleet. - GET /blacklist no longer writes: the legacy metadata backfill moved to a one-shot startup task. The list endpoint paginates (limit 100, max 1000, offset max 10000) instead of dumping SMEMBERS. - Router-wide DefaultBodyLimit 8 KiB and TimeoutLayer 10 s; every mutating endpoint is rate limited (30/min per client IP) with idle eviction, and the login limiter resets on success. reason > 256 bytes and malformed targets are rejected with 400. - SIGTERM/Ctrl-C trigger graceful shutdown; the heartbeat and eviction tasks are cancelled and joined so in-flight ban edits reach Redis. - MANAGER_TRUSTED_PROXIES enables X-Forwarded-For (right-to-left walk) only for configured proxy networks; otherwise the TCP peer is used. - tests/manager_api.rs covers 401/400/413/429/503 and CORS preflight through the real router; manager_security gains limiter and proxy-IP tests.
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21 changed files with 1377 additions and 180 deletions
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@ -3,10 +3,14 @@
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//! Regression tests for the authentication bypass where an empty
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//! `API_PASSWORD` matched an empty login (`verify_password("", "")`).
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use axum::http::HeaderValue;
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use dashmap::DashMap;
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use rampart::manager::api::auth::allow_login_attempt;
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use rampart::manager::security::{CorsPolicy, validate_api_password, validate_jwt_secret, verify_password};
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use rampart::manager::api::auth::{allow_login_attempt, reset_login_attempts};
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use rampart::manager::api::guard::limit::{LOGIN_MAX_ATTEMPTS, check_attempt, evict_idle};
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use rampart::manager::api::guard::proxy::TrustedProxies;
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use rampart::manager::security::{CorsPolicy, IpNet, validate_api_password, validate_jwt_secret, verify_password};
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use std::net::IpAddr;
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use std::time::Duration;
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const STRONG_PASSWORD: &str = "correct-horse-battery-staple";
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const STRONG_SECRET: &str = "0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef";
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@ -122,3 +126,124 @@ fn login_limiter_blocks_after_five_attempts() {
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}
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assert!(!allow_login_attempt(&limiter, ip));
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}
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#[test]
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fn successful_login_resets_the_counter() {
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let limiter = DashMap::new();
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let ip = IpAddr::from([127, 0, 0, 1]);
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for _ in 0..LOGIN_MAX_ATTEMPTS {
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assert!(allow_login_attempt(&limiter, ip));
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}
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assert!(!allow_login_attempt(&limiter, ip));
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reset_login_attempts(&limiter, ip);
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for _ in 0..LOGIN_MAX_ATTEMPTS {
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assert!(
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allow_login_attempt(&limiter, ip),
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"a successful login must give a fresh budget"
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);
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}
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}
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#[test]
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fn idle_limiter_entries_are_evicted() {
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let limiter = DashMap::new();
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let first = IpAddr::from([127, 0, 0, 1]);
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let second = IpAddr::from([127, 0, 0, 2]);
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assert!(check_attempt(&limiter, first, Duration::from_secs(60), 5));
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assert!(check_attempt(&limiter, second, Duration::from_secs(60), 5));
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evict_idle(&limiter, Duration::from_secs(600));
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assert_eq!(limiter.len(), 2, "a live window must survive the sweep");
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evict_idle(&limiter, Duration::ZERO);
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assert!(limiter.is_empty(), "expired counters must not accumulate forever");
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}
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#[test]
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fn forwarded_for_is_ignored_from_an_untrusted_peer() {
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let proxies = TrustedProxies::parse("10.0.0.0/8").expect("network must parse");
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let peer: IpAddr = "203.0.113.7".parse().expect("peer must parse");
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let forwarded = HeaderValue::from_static("198.51.100.9");
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assert_eq!(proxies.client_ip(peer, Some(&forwarded)), peer);
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}
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#[test]
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fn forwarded_for_is_used_from_a_trusted_peer() {
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let proxies = TrustedProxies::parse("10.0.0.0/8,2001:db8::/32").expect("networks must parse");
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let peer: IpAddr = "10.1.2.3".parse().expect("peer must parse");
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let forwarded = HeaderValue::from_static("203.0.113.9");
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assert_eq!(
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proxies.client_ip(peer, Some(&forwarded)),
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"203.0.113.9".parse::<IpAddr>().expect("client must parse")
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);
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let v6_peer: IpAddr = "2001:db8::5".parse().expect("peer must parse");
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assert_eq!(
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proxies.client_ip(v6_peer, Some(&forwarded)),
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"203.0.113.9".parse::<IpAddr>().expect("client must parse")
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);
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}
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#[test]
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fn forwarded_chain_is_walked_right_to_left() {
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let proxies = TrustedProxies::parse("10.0.0.0/8").expect("network must parse");
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let peer: IpAddr = "10.1.2.3".parse().expect("peer must parse");
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let chain = HeaderValue::from_static("203.0.113.9, 10.9.9.9");
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assert_eq!(
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proxies.client_ip(peer, Some(&chain)),
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"203.0.113.9".parse::<IpAddr>().expect("client must parse")
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);
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// The leftmost entry is client supplied: the nearest untrusted hop wins.
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let spoofed = HeaderValue::from_static("1.2.3.4, 198.51.100.7");
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assert_eq!(
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proxies.client_ip(peer, Some(&spoofed)),
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"198.51.100.7".parse::<IpAddr>().expect("client must parse")
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);
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}
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#[test]
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fn malformed_forwarded_chain_falls_back_to_the_peer() {
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let proxies = TrustedProxies::parse("10.0.0.0/8").expect("network must parse");
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let peer: IpAddr = "10.1.2.3".parse().expect("peer must parse");
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assert_eq!(proxies.client_ip(peer, None), peer);
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let garbage = HeaderValue::from_static("not-an-address");
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assert_eq!(proxies.client_ip(peer, Some(&garbage)), peer);
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}
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#[test]
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fn trusted_proxy_list_rejects_malformed_entries() {
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assert!(
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!TrustedProxies::parse("")
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.expect("empty is valid")
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.is_trusted("10.0.0.1".parse().expect("ip"))
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);
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assert!(TrustedProxies::parse("10.0.0.0/8,").is_err());
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assert!(TrustedProxies::parse("10.0.0.0/33").is_err());
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assert!(TrustedProxies::parse("not-a-network").is_err());
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assert!(TrustedProxies::parse("::/129").is_err());
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}
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#[test]
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fn ip_net_matches_the_configured_prefix() {
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let network = IpNet::parse("192.168.1.0/24").expect("network must parse");
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assert!(network.contains("192.168.1.200".parse().expect("ip")));
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assert!(!network.contains("192.168.2.1".parse().expect("ip")));
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assert!(!network.contains("::ffff:192.168.1.1".parse().expect("ip")));
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let host = IpNet::parse("192.168.1.5").expect("host route must parse");
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assert!(host.contains("192.168.1.5".parse().expect("ip")));
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assert!(!host.contains("192.168.1.6".parse().expect("ip")));
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let v6 = IpNet::parse("2001:db8::/32").expect("network must parse");
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assert!(v6.contains("2001:db8::1".parse().expect("ip")));
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assert!(!v6.contains("2001:db9::1".parse().expect("ip")));
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assert!(
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IpNet::parse("0.0.0.0/0")
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.expect("default route must parse")
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.contains("203.0.113.1".parse().expect("ip"))
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);
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assert!(IpNet::parse("bad").is_err());
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}
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