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7 commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
280284667f
docs: per-task roadmap, architecture and changelog
- Split TODO into a thin status index plus docs/roadmap/ with one file per
  task (v0.4 reliability, v0.5 product, v0.6 research, icebox).
- Add docs/architecture.md (current processes, packet/data path, layers,
  storage, metrics) and docs/development.md (rules, gates, DoD).
- Add CHANGELOG.md reconstructed from history; move round details out of
  TODO.
- Align docs with the code: config defaults and missing [detect]/
  [protocol.http] sections, XDP metric names, ClickHouse table and TTL,
  Redis RDB restore, multiarch clang include, CLI binary name.
- Add scripts/check_docs_links.sh and run it in CI.
- release profile: thin LTO + one codegen unit. Binary 12.3 MB -> 9.7 MB,
  http parser bench 314 ns -> 278 ns; panic=abort stays off for
  catch_unwind in the Redis subscriber.
- Drop the unused JWT role claim; fix 'rampart doctor' hints in the CLI.
2026-11-16 14:51:50 +01:00
c1a076a4a3
fix(core): close auth bypass, hangs and memory leaks found by review
Security:
- An empty API_PASSWORD passed validation (only the literal "changeme" was
  rejected) and verify_password("", "") returned true, so a login with an
  empty password minted an admin token. Require >= 16 characters and >= 32
  non-whitespace bytes for JWT_SECRET; verify rejects an empty stored secret.
- syn_challenge_enabled required a real challenge_secret_hex: the public
  placeholder from config.h is now rejected in every spelling.
- docker-compose: Redis/ClickHouse/Grafana are loopback-only and every
  password uses ${VAR:?} instead of a default. An exposed Redis was a way to
  lift bans and publish unbans to the whole fleet with one redis-cli.
- Empty CORS_ORIGIN no longer means "allow any origin".
- ban_cidr / userspace blacklist validate and mask prefixes; CIDR bans are
  stored as ranges, so a /24 or /64 ban actually covers the subnet (before,
  only the network address was blocked).

Availability:
- ClickHouse client has connect/request timeouts and no mutex held across
  await: a hung analytics backend can no longer freeze the ban path. Events
  go through a bounded buffer with a drop counter.
- Redis uses a ConnectionManager with per-command timeouts; pubsub and
  reconcile reset the backoff after success; publish cannot block shutdown.
- Ban durations from pubsub are clamped and use checked_add; the sync task
  survives panics instead of silently dying.
- Blacklist TOCTOU (remove_if) and replace_redis no longer empties the table
  during a Redis reconnect.
- RateLimiter and reputation have hard caps with incremental eviction instead
  of an unbounded DashMap and a stop-the-world retain.
- The attack detector scores before updating its baseline and needs several
  quiet windows to leave UnderAttack, so a sustained flood keeps banning new
  offenders instead of ending after one tick.
- accept() backs off on EMFILE/ENFILE, shutdown Err is treated as shutdown,
  a global semaphore bounds in-flight connections, rate limiting runs before
  PoW, whitelisted IPs are never banned, and connect/handshake/relay have
  timeouts with an idle budget.
- PoW uses the configured difficulty as a floor, the clamp is enforced, and
  nonce framing survives split segments and coalesced handshake bytes.
- Subnet tracker memory is capped (prefixes and per-prefix sources) and the
  monitor bans with the configured TTL.

CI and docs:
- CI runs the test suite with --no-default-features --features protocol-http;
  make ebpf fails on errors; the secrets gate catches weak compose defaults.
- doctor skips protected endpoints without a token and exits non-zero on
  failure; a drain timeout returns exit code 1.
- TODO §2b records the review findings, what is fixed and what is deferred;
  configuration/testing docs describe the new XDP and secret semantics.
2026-11-16 12:06:23 +01:00
14dcaccdbf
fix(xdp): correct payload length, attach/detach, whitelist and ban upkeep
BPF program (the first two made the filter wrong on real hardware):
- Compute the TCP payload length from ip->tot_len (IPv4) / payload_len
  (IPv6) instead of data_end. Ethernet padding on a real NIC added 6 bogus
  payload bytes, broke expected_seq and dropped every connection after the
  fourth segment. scripts/xdp_pkt_test.sh reproduces it on synthetic frames
  and fails against the old code.
- Read map values (conn->fails, sent_at) before bpf_map_delete_elem; the LRU
  element is freed by the delete.
- Parse up to two VLAN/QinQ tags before L3; fragments are checked against the
  blacklist and passed instead of bypassing all filtering; first fragments are
  no longer dropped.
- Unknown non-SYN flows PASS: the program is a stateless filter fed by the
  conntrack state machine, not a firewall, so spoofed SYNs cannot evict
  established flows into a drop and replies to the daemon's own outbound TCP
  keep working.
- Reset conn->fails on in-order segments, honour SYN payload (TFO), fix the
  IPv6 SYN-ACK address swap, count every DROP path, drop SYN with IP options.
- Expired prefix bans are no longer deleted with the wrong LPM key; userspace
  reaps them with the exact key.

Loader:
- Remember the effective attach flags (native vs generic) and use them for
  detach/query, verifying the interface is clean afterwards. The old code
  always detached the native slot, leaving a generic program attached after
  shutdown.
- DetachGuard rolls back the attach if anything after it fails.
- ban_cidr validates the prefix length and masks host bits.
- Whitelist maps (v4 and the new v6 LPM trie) are populated from the config at
  startup and fail fast on error.
- Stats read all 13 counters, and a test asserts every map's key/value size
  against the Rust encodings.

Tests: xdp_pkt_test (padding, VLAN/QinQ, fragments), xdp_loader (attach flags,
rollback, detach), xdp_ban_keys, xdp_whitelist_keys, xdp_services, live
xdp_attach_smoke (ignored, needs root).
2026-11-16 12:06:05 +01:00
a8a3057719
feat(xdp): IPv6 UDP rate limit, working loader; English comments and docs
XDP behaviour:
- udp_rate_limit6 (LRU, full 128-bit source key) plus throttle_hit6, so
  udp_policy = "rate-limit" applies to native IPv6 as well.
- scripts/xdp_ipv6_smoke.sh: phase 4 patches .rodata before load and
  verifies policy=2 on a real kernel (3 pass / 3 rate-limited).

Loader (XDP could never load before this):
- .rodata is one struct rampart_config with frozen offsets enforced by
  _Static_assert; XdpGlobals is #[repr(C)] and the image is built with
  offset_of!. Before, a 96-byte image was written into a 76-byte map at
  offsets clang had reordered, so load() failed with EINVAL.
- patch_rodata fails loudly when the map size and image size diverge.
- build.rs tracks xdp/core and xdp/hooks, not just universal_filter.c.
- build_ringbuf looked for "events_map"; the map is "events_ringbuf".
- tests/xdp_object_maps.rs checks map names and .rodata size without root.

Docs and style:
- Code comments are English, JavaDoc/Rustdoc style, without emoji or
  banners (new project rule, TODO §0.8).
- README rewritten bilingual: Russian first, English below, nav buttons,
  compact TOC and copy-paste quick start.
- docs/README.md: documentation index and maintenance rules;
  configuration.md documents the whole [xdp] section and IPv4/IPv6
  coverage; testing.md covers the real-kernel smoke; stale links removed.
2026-11-15 23:50:52 +01:00
b64c329125
feat(xdp): IPv6 parity, monotonic ban expiry, per-protocol L4 minimum
IPv6 parity:
- blacklist6_map (LPM trie, 20-byte key) and is_blacklisted6(); the
  native_v6 path now passes the port gate and the L4 checks instead of
  returning XDP_PASS early.
- ban_cidr() covers V4 and V6; gateway bans by /32 or /128; subnet monitor
  bans v6 /64 prefixes; ban_ip() removed (dead code is a bug).
- v6 TCP feeds prefix stats through prefix_key_from_v6 (subnet detector
  now sees IPv6); UDP policy=drop and detect_tcp_bypass apply to v6.
- tests/xdp_ban_v6.rs and scripts/xdp_ipv6_smoke.sh (real netns/verifier).

Bug fixes (both families):
- Ban expiry compared SystemTime epoch-ns against bpf_ktime_get_ns(), so
  bans never expired. Userspace now writes CLOCK_MONOTONIC via
  xdp::monotonic_ns(); regression in tests/xdp_ban_clock.rs.
- The L4 gate required sizeof(struct tcphdr) for every protocol, so short
  UDP datagrams bypassed the port gate and the blacklist. The minimum is
  now per-protocol (UDP 8 bytes); smoke covers it.
2026-11-15 23:08:05 +01:00
a4d0880a0a
smoke: add xdp netns test script; fix XDP filter attach/globals 2026-10-04 12:47:19 +02:00
bf6d34c882
fix: XDP unsafe loader + Redis sync; enforce 250-line/4-file layout limits
- xdp: CString for if_nametoindex (was UB), real detach via prog fd
  (fabricated borrow_raw(-1) silently never detached), SAFETY comments,
  saturating expiry math; +5 unit tests
- redis: real pubsub reconnect with exponential backoff (was sleep+return);
  KEYS -> SCAN in heartbeat sweep
- ci: cargo test --all-features, repo-gates job — module size gate
  (scripts/check_module_size.sh, ratchet baseline) + default-secrets grep
- refactor src/ to <=250 LOC/file, <=4 .rs/dir without behavior change;
  thin bins (rampart.rs 330 -> 6 LOC), new app/, subnet/, intel/,
  profile/, prefix/, challenge/, filter/, probe/, inventory/, metrics/, node/
- docs: TODO v5.0 (status refresh, new rules, findings backlog),
  README quickstart now matches real binaries
- verify: fmt/clippy -D warnings/test --all-features (164 tests)/clang XDP green
2026-09-15 23:55:17 +02:00