- Split TODO into a thin status index plus docs/roadmap/ with one file per
task (v0.4 reliability, v0.5 product, v0.6 research, icebox).
- Add docs/architecture.md (current processes, packet/data path, layers,
storage, metrics) and docs/development.md (rules, gates, DoD).
- Add CHANGELOG.md reconstructed from history; move round details out of
TODO.
- Align docs with the code: config defaults and missing [detect]/
[protocol.http] sections, XDP metric names, ClickHouse table and TTL,
Redis RDB restore, multiarch clang include, CLI binary name.
- Add scripts/check_docs_links.sh and run it in CI.
- release profile: thin LTO + one codegen unit. Binary 12.3 MB -> 9.7 MB,
http parser bench 314 ns -> 278 ns; panic=abort stays off for
catch_unwind in the Redis subscriber.
- Drop the unused JWT role claim; fix 'rampart doctor' hints in the CLI.
The gateway already refused to ban addresses from proxy_protocol.trusted_cidrs,
but the traffic-intelligence auto-ban and the subnet monitor still did, so a
trusted load balancer living inside a banned /24 (or below the reputation
threshold) could be knocked out together with its clients.
- TrustedProxyCidr moved to src/config/trusted.rs (the edge section file hit
the 250-line gate) and gained `overlaps_prefix`: a ban is suppressed when the
banned prefix intersects a trusted network.
- TrafficHook::with_trusted suppresses reputation and offender bans; its ban()
now reports whether the ban was installed so `ban_offenders` counts real
bans.
- The subnet monitor takes a MonitorSetup bundle (spawn had 8 arguments) and
suppresses both userspace CIDR bans and XDP prefix bans that overlap a
trusted network, logging a warning instead.
- IPv4-mapped addresses are normalised in `contains` too.
- Tests: overlap maths (v4/v6, /0 rejected), tracker suppression vs unrelated
networks, and auto-ban skipping a trusted range while still banning public
offenders.
- PROXY v2 header parsing is now the pure, total function
`parse_v2_header(buf, limit) -> (SocketAddr, consumed)`; the async reader
only reads bytes and delegates. This makes the parser reachable from tests
and fuzz targets and keeps every index bounds-checked.
- tests/proxy_v2_parser.rs: valid v4/v6 headers, bad signature, non-PROXY
command, TLVs, every truncated prefix, oversized header, unsupported
family, short address block, and a deterministic sweep over family/length.
- fuzz/: cargo-fuzz targets `http_head` (scan_head + evaluate) and `proxy_v2`
with invariants (no panic, no out-of-buffer consumption, family matches the
header). Seeds for the HTTP head keep coverage useful; `make fuzz` runs
60 s per target. Both targets ran clean (7M and 3M executions).
- docs/testing.md documents the fuzz workflow; .gitignore covers the
generated corpus/artifacts.
- All remaining #[cfg(test)] modules left src/ (manager auth/heartbeat,
protocol registry and HTTP parser, traffic hook/prefix/profile, TUI
Prometheus); 41 tests moved into 10 integration suites with the same names
and assertions, so `grep -rn '#[cfg(test)]' src/` is now empty.
- runbook.md: degradation signals (overloaded connections, ClickHouse drops,
XDP drops, generic mode, EMFILE backoff) and how to verify XDP was detached.
- troubleshooting.md: accept backoff, orphaned XDP, password/JWT startup
requirements, ClickHouse event loss.
- TODO: review round recorded as fixed/deferred.
Security:
- An empty API_PASSWORD passed validation (only the literal "changeme" was
rejected) and verify_password("", "") returned true, so a login with an
empty password minted an admin token. Require >= 16 characters and >= 32
non-whitespace bytes for JWT_SECRET; verify rejects an empty stored secret.
- syn_challenge_enabled required a real challenge_secret_hex: the public
placeholder from config.h is now rejected in every spelling.
- docker-compose: Redis/ClickHouse/Grafana are loopback-only and every
password uses ${VAR:?} instead of a default. An exposed Redis was a way to
lift bans and publish unbans to the whole fleet with one redis-cli.
- Empty CORS_ORIGIN no longer means "allow any origin".
- ban_cidr / userspace blacklist validate and mask prefixes; CIDR bans are
stored as ranges, so a /24 or /64 ban actually covers the subnet (before,
only the network address was blocked).
Availability:
- ClickHouse client has connect/request timeouts and no mutex held across
await: a hung analytics backend can no longer freeze the ban path. Events
go through a bounded buffer with a drop counter.
- Redis uses a ConnectionManager with per-command timeouts; pubsub and
reconcile reset the backoff after success; publish cannot block shutdown.
- Ban durations from pubsub are clamped and use checked_add; the sync task
survives panics instead of silently dying.
- Blacklist TOCTOU (remove_if) and replace_redis no longer empties the table
during a Redis reconnect.
- RateLimiter and reputation have hard caps with incremental eviction instead
of an unbounded DashMap and a stop-the-world retain.
- The attack detector scores before updating its baseline and needs several
quiet windows to leave UnderAttack, so a sustained flood keeps banning new
offenders instead of ending after one tick.
- accept() backs off on EMFILE/ENFILE, shutdown Err is treated as shutdown,
a global semaphore bounds in-flight connections, rate limiting runs before
PoW, whitelisted IPs are never banned, and connect/handshake/relay have
timeouts with an idle budget.
- PoW uses the configured difficulty as a floor, the clamp is enforced, and
nonce framing survives split segments and coalesced handshake bytes.
- Subnet tracker memory is capped (prefixes and per-prefix sources) and the
monitor bans with the configured TTL.
CI and docs:
- CI runs the test suite with --no-default-features --features protocol-http;
make ebpf fails on errors; the secrets gate catches weak compose defaults.
- doctor skips protected endpoints without a token and exits non-zero on
failure; a drain timeout returns exit code 1.
- TODO §2b records the review findings, what is fixed and what is deferred;
configuration/testing docs describe the new XDP and secret semantics.
XDP behaviour:
- udp_rate_limit6 (LRU, full 128-bit source key) plus throttle_hit6, so
udp_policy = "rate-limit" applies to native IPv6 as well.
- scripts/xdp_ipv6_smoke.sh: phase 4 patches .rodata before load and
verifies policy=2 on a real kernel (3 pass / 3 rate-limited).
Loader (XDP could never load before this):
- .rodata is one struct rampart_config with frozen offsets enforced by
_Static_assert; XdpGlobals is #[repr(C)] and the image is built with
offset_of!. Before, a 96-byte image was written into a 76-byte map at
offsets clang had reordered, so load() failed with EINVAL.
- patch_rodata fails loudly when the map size and image size diverge.
- build.rs tracks xdp/core and xdp/hooks, not just universal_filter.c.
- build_ringbuf looked for "events_map"; the map is "events_ringbuf".
- tests/xdp_object_maps.rs checks map names and .rodata size without root.
Docs and style:
- Code comments are English, JavaDoc/Rustdoc style, without emoji or
banners (new project rule, TODO §0.8).
- README rewritten bilingual: Russian first, English below, nav buttons,
compact TOC and copy-paste quick start.
- docs/README.md: documentation index and maintenance rules;
configuration.md documents the whole [xdp] section and IPv4/IPv6
coverage; testing.md covers the real-kernel smoke; stale links removed.
IPv6 parity:
- blacklist6_map (LPM trie, 20-byte key) and is_blacklisted6(); the
native_v6 path now passes the port gate and the L4 checks instead of
returning XDP_PASS early.
- ban_cidr() covers V4 and V6; gateway bans by /32 or /128; subnet monitor
bans v6 /64 prefixes; ban_ip() removed (dead code is a bug).
- v6 TCP feeds prefix stats through prefix_key_from_v6 (subnet detector
now sees IPv6); UDP policy=drop and detect_tcp_bypass apply to v6.
- tests/xdp_ban_v6.rs and scripts/xdp_ipv6_smoke.sh (real netns/verifier).
Bug fixes (both families):
- Ban expiry compared SystemTime epoch-ns against bpf_ktime_get_ns(), so
bans never expired. Userspace now writes CLOCK_MONOTONIC via
xdp::monotonic_ns(); regression in tests/xdp_ban_clock.rs.
- The L4 gate required sizeof(struct tcphdr) for every protocol, so short
UDP datagrams bypassed the port gate and the blacklist. The minimum is
now per-protocol (UDP 8 bytes); smoke covers it.
- xdp: real 24-byte xdp_event parsing (fixes LE byte-swap of src IP),
opt-in [xdp] auto_ban (RATE_LIMIT always, CONN_DROP at fails>=threshold;
EVENT_BAN/POLICY_DROP excluded by design), rampart_xdp_autobans_total;
wired in app before load(); 10 tests in tests/xdp_events.rs
- build: --no-default-features compiles — redis paths cfg-gated behind
store-redis, manager fail-fasts without it; CI gates the config now
- app: RunExit enum replaces process::exit in lib; single exit site in main
- tests: seed PoW roundtrip token (was ~1/16 flaky; 50 pre-fix fails -> 0)
- docs: TODO statuses refreshed (round 2)