Commit graph

14 commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
c1a076a4a3
fix(core): close auth bypass, hangs and memory leaks found by review
Security:
- An empty API_PASSWORD passed validation (only the literal "changeme" was
  rejected) and verify_password("", "") returned true, so a login with an
  empty password minted an admin token. Require >= 16 characters and >= 32
  non-whitespace bytes for JWT_SECRET; verify rejects an empty stored secret.
- syn_challenge_enabled required a real challenge_secret_hex: the public
  placeholder from config.h is now rejected in every spelling.
- docker-compose: Redis/ClickHouse/Grafana are loopback-only and every
  password uses ${VAR:?} instead of a default. An exposed Redis was a way to
  lift bans and publish unbans to the whole fleet with one redis-cli.
- Empty CORS_ORIGIN no longer means "allow any origin".
- ban_cidr / userspace blacklist validate and mask prefixes; CIDR bans are
  stored as ranges, so a /24 or /64 ban actually covers the subnet (before,
  only the network address was blocked).

Availability:
- ClickHouse client has connect/request timeouts and no mutex held across
  await: a hung analytics backend can no longer freeze the ban path. Events
  go through a bounded buffer with a drop counter.
- Redis uses a ConnectionManager with per-command timeouts; pubsub and
  reconcile reset the backoff after success; publish cannot block shutdown.
- Ban durations from pubsub are clamped and use checked_add; the sync task
  survives panics instead of silently dying.
- Blacklist TOCTOU (remove_if) and replace_redis no longer empties the table
  during a Redis reconnect.
- RateLimiter and reputation have hard caps with incremental eviction instead
  of an unbounded DashMap and a stop-the-world retain.
- The attack detector scores before updating its baseline and needs several
  quiet windows to leave UnderAttack, so a sustained flood keeps banning new
  offenders instead of ending after one tick.
- accept() backs off on EMFILE/ENFILE, shutdown Err is treated as shutdown,
  a global semaphore bounds in-flight connections, rate limiting runs before
  PoW, whitelisted IPs are never banned, and connect/handshake/relay have
  timeouts with an idle budget.
- PoW uses the configured difficulty as a floor, the clamp is enforced, and
  nonce framing survives split segments and coalesced handshake bytes.
- Subnet tracker memory is capped (prefixes and per-prefix sources) and the
  monitor bans with the configured TTL.

CI and docs:
- CI runs the test suite with --no-default-features --features protocol-http;
  make ebpf fails on errors; the secrets gate catches weak compose defaults.
- doctor skips protected endpoints without a token and exits non-zero on
  failure; a drain timeout returns exit code 1.
- TODO §2b records the review findings, what is fixed and what is deferred;
  configuration/testing docs describe the new XDP and secret semantics.
2026-11-16 12:06:23 +01:00
14dcaccdbf
fix(xdp): correct payload length, attach/detach, whitelist and ban upkeep
BPF program (the first two made the filter wrong on real hardware):
- Compute the TCP payload length from ip->tot_len (IPv4) / payload_len
  (IPv6) instead of data_end. Ethernet padding on a real NIC added 6 bogus
  payload bytes, broke expected_seq and dropped every connection after the
  fourth segment. scripts/xdp_pkt_test.sh reproduces it on synthetic frames
  and fails against the old code.
- Read map values (conn->fails, sent_at) before bpf_map_delete_elem; the LRU
  element is freed by the delete.
- Parse up to two VLAN/QinQ tags before L3; fragments are checked against the
  blacklist and passed instead of bypassing all filtering; first fragments are
  no longer dropped.
- Unknown non-SYN flows PASS: the program is a stateless filter fed by the
  conntrack state machine, not a firewall, so spoofed SYNs cannot evict
  established flows into a drop and replies to the daemon's own outbound TCP
  keep working.
- Reset conn->fails on in-order segments, honour SYN payload (TFO), fix the
  IPv6 SYN-ACK address swap, count every DROP path, drop SYN with IP options.
- Expired prefix bans are no longer deleted with the wrong LPM key; userspace
  reaps them with the exact key.

Loader:
- Remember the effective attach flags (native vs generic) and use them for
  detach/query, verifying the interface is clean afterwards. The old code
  always detached the native slot, leaving a generic program attached after
  shutdown.
- DetachGuard rolls back the attach if anything after it fails.
- ban_cidr validates the prefix length and masks host bits.
- Whitelist maps (v4 and the new v6 LPM trie) are populated from the config at
  startup and fail fast on error.
- Stats read all 13 counters, and a test asserts every map's key/value size
  against the Rust encodings.

Tests: xdp_pkt_test (padding, VLAN/QinQ, fragments), xdp_loader (attach flags,
rollback, detach), xdp_ban_keys, xdp_whitelist_keys, xdp_services, live
xdp_attach_smoke (ignored, needs root).
2026-11-16 12:06:05 +01:00
a8a3057719
feat(xdp): IPv6 UDP rate limit, working loader; English comments and docs
XDP behaviour:
- udp_rate_limit6 (LRU, full 128-bit source key) plus throttle_hit6, so
  udp_policy = "rate-limit" applies to native IPv6 as well.
- scripts/xdp_ipv6_smoke.sh: phase 4 patches .rodata before load and
  verifies policy=2 on a real kernel (3 pass / 3 rate-limited).

Loader (XDP could never load before this):
- .rodata is one struct rampart_config with frozen offsets enforced by
  _Static_assert; XdpGlobals is #[repr(C)] and the image is built with
  offset_of!. Before, a 96-byte image was written into a 76-byte map at
  offsets clang had reordered, so load() failed with EINVAL.
- patch_rodata fails loudly when the map size and image size diverge.
- build.rs tracks xdp/core and xdp/hooks, not just universal_filter.c.
- build_ringbuf looked for "events_map"; the map is "events_ringbuf".
- tests/xdp_object_maps.rs checks map names and .rodata size without root.

Docs and style:
- Code comments are English, JavaDoc/Rustdoc style, without emoji or
  banners (new project rule, TODO §0.8).
- README rewritten bilingual: Russian first, English below, nav buttons,
  compact TOC and copy-paste quick start.
- docs/README.md: documentation index and maintenance rules;
  configuration.md documents the whole [xdp] section and IPv4/IPv6
  coverage; testing.md covers the real-kernel smoke; stale links removed.
2026-11-15 23:50:52 +01:00
b5238cf4c1
Update links to the new GitHub account 2026-10-25 19:14:54 +01:00
20afa2e301
docs: update protocol troubleshooting guidance 2026-10-16 23:20:42 +02:00
ed118f56c6
docs: clarify private network deployment 2026-10-16 23:16:20 +02:00
b741e042ac
fix: report unsupported CLI operations honestly 2026-10-16 23:15:33 +02:00
622a5964f2
feat: sync edge autobans across nodes 2026-10-16 23:09:26 +02:00
cfaad47948
feat: add Minecraft proxy and refresh dependencies 2026-10-16 23:04:41 +02:00
08e26df73f
feat!: universal redesign — drop Minecraft stack, single-crate architecture
- remove Java plugins (velocity/paper), dashboard, all MC-specific code
  (handshake, death_code, varint, hostname-HMAC); available in history pre-v0.2
- merge crates/* into one package with src/bin/{rampart,rampart-manager,rampart-cli}
- ProtocolHandler trait + registry (no implementations yet), universal PoW kept
- XDP: universal L3/L4 filter (xdp/core/) + pluggable hook API (xdp/hooks/),
  fix IPv6 saddr bug; clang build verified
- docs: bilingual knowledge base (docs/kb/: attacks x4, defense-levels,
  practice x3), rewrite README/architecture for universal concept
- TODO.md v4.0: <=300-line module limit, competitor benchmark section (ref/)
- deploy/CI/docs cleanup: no MC references, new binary names

cargo build/clippy(-D warnings)/test green (55 tests)
2026-08-24 01:50:22 +02:00
7d15dfd45e
feat: VDS stress test harness (edge-only) and load-test results
- deploy/test/stress/: multi-IP masked handshake flood (flood.py), legit client
  during attack (legit.py), full orchestration (run-stress.sh), edge Dockerfile
  with socat stub backend and high/defense configs
- docs/research/load-test-report.md: v3 VDS loopback results (2026-08-04)
- README.md: performance table update (4k conn/s raw, 99.6% blocked in defense,
  legit clients RTT 2-6ms during attack)
- docs/testing.md: multi-IP masked stress-test procedure
2026-08-04 19:16:27 +02:00
cb183d42a2
feat: velocity routing, server registry and RampartVelocity tests 2026-08-03 10:54:28 +02:00
6d76a7eeb1
v0.3: 6-layer architecture complete
Layers:
  Layer 1: XDP/eBPF — TCP state machine, SYN throttle, blacklist, ringbuf
  Layer 2: PoW Challenge — SHA-256 hashcash, dynamic difficulty, constant-time verify
  Layer 3: Rust Core — HMAC handshake, rate limit, death code (existing)
  Layer 4: Velocity — Physics check, CAPTCHA, protocol verification
  Layer 5: Paper — Heartbeat, auto-registration (existing)
  Layer 6: Traffic Intel — EWMA, 168h profiling, reputation, alerts

Infra: XDP→Prometheus metrics, ClickHouse + Grafana dashboard, Docker Compose
Testing: 100-IP DDoS simulation, MHDDoS ref analysis, load test report
Fixes: VarInt sign extension UB, pure ACK deadlock, RST/FIN cleanup
Ref: MHDDoS, Sonar, LimboFilter, AtomGuard, Infrarust, MC-XDP-eBPF, PowGo
2026-07-21 15:47:36 +02:00
a52ab4b3f2
Initial commit: Rampart v0.2.0
Multi-layer DDoS protection for Minecraft servers.

- rampart-core: Edge node with XDP/eBPF + Rust L7 filtering
- rampart-manager: REST API with JWT auth, Redis sync
- rampart-cli: CLI tool for operators
- velocity-plugin: Domain check, HMAC verify, server registry, load balancer
- paper-plugin: Auto-registration, heartbeat, HMAC verify
- dashboard: React + Vite web UI for management
2026-07-20 20:53:32 +02:00