- PROXY v2 header parsing is now the pure, total function `parse_v2_header(buf, limit) -> (SocketAddr, consumed)`; the async reader only reads bytes and delegates. This makes the parser reachable from tests and fuzz targets and keeps every index bounds-checked. - tests/proxy_v2_parser.rs: valid v4/v6 headers, bad signature, non-PROXY command, TLVs, every truncated prefix, oversized header, unsupported family, short address block, and a deterministic sweep over family/length. - fuzz/: cargo-fuzz targets `http_head` (scan_head + evaluate) and `proxy_v2` with invariants (no panic, no out-of-buffer consumption, family matches the header). Seeds for the HTTP head keep coverage useful; `make fuzz` runs 60 s per target. Both targets ran clean (7M and 3M executions). - docs/testing.md documents the fuzz workflow; .gitignore covers the generated corpus/artifacts.
30 lines
929 B
Rust
30 lines
929 B
Rust
#![no_main]
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//! Fuzz target for the HTTP/1.x request-head parser.
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//!
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//! `scan_head` and `evaluate` consume attacker-controlled bytes on every
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//! connection, so they must never panic and must stay within the buffer.
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use libfuzzer_sys::fuzz_target;
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use rampart::protocol::http::parser::{Policy, evaluate, scan_head};
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fuzz_target!(|data: &[u8]| {
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if let Some(head_len) = scan_head(data) {
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assert!(head_len <= data.len(), "scan_head returned an out-of-bounds length");
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let policy = Policy {
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max_header_bytes: 8192,
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blocked_paths: vec!["/admin".to_string()],
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require_user_agent: true,
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};
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let _ = evaluate(&data[..head_len], &policy);
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}
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// The whole buffer (not only a terminated head) must also be safe: a
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// truncated head is evaluated defensively by callers.
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let policy = Policy {
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max_header_bytes: 8192,
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blocked_paths: vec![],
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require_user_agent: false,
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};
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let _ = evaluate(data, &policy);
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});
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