The gateway already refused to ban addresses from proxy_protocol.trusted_cidrs, but the traffic-intelligence auto-ban and the subnet monitor still did, so a trusted load balancer living inside a banned /24 (or below the reputation threshold) could be knocked out together with its clients. - TrustedProxyCidr moved to src/config/trusted.rs (the edge section file hit the 250-line gate) and gained `overlaps_prefix`: a ban is suppressed when the banned prefix intersects a trusted network. - TrafficHook::with_trusted suppresses reputation and offender bans; its ban() now reports whether the ban was installed so `ban_offenders` counts real bans. - The subnet monitor takes a MonitorSetup bundle (spawn had 8 arguments) and suppresses both userspace CIDR bans and XDP prefix bans that overlap a trusted network, logging a warning instead. - IPv4-mapped addresses are normalised in `contains` too. - Tests: overlap maths (v4/v6, /0 rejected), tracker suppression vs unrelated networks, and auto-ban skipping a trusted range while still banning public offenders.
261 lines
9.3 KiB
Rust
261 lines
9.3 KiB
Rust
//! Client identity behind a trusted PROXY protocol proxy: header address
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//! validation, fallback to the transport peer and suppression of bans for
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//! addresses inside `proxy_protocol.trusted_cidrs`.
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#![cfg(feature = "protocol-minecraft")]
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use rampart::config::{Config, ProxyProtocolConfig, TrustedProxyCidr};
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use rampart::engine::challenge::DifficultyAdjuster;
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use rampart::engine::tunnel::{ClientIpRejection, Gateway, GatewayOutcome, validate_client_ip};
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use rampart::filter::blacklist::Blacklist;
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use rampart::filter::rate_limit::RateLimiter;
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use rampart::protocol::ProtocolRegistry;
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use rampart::traffic::reputation::IpReputation;
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use std::collections::HashSet;
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use std::net::{IpAddr, Ipv4Addr, SocketAddr};
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use std::sync::Arc;
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use std::sync::Mutex;
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use std::sync::atomic::AtomicU64;
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use tokio::io::AsyncWriteExt;
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use tokio::net::{TcpListener, TcpStream};
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/// Builds a gateway with no XDP/ClickHouse writers and an empty protocol
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/// registry, so every connection stops at the admission filters.
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fn test_gateway(config: Config, whitelist: HashSet<IpAddr>) -> Arc<Gateway> {
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Arc::new(Gateway::new(
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Arc::new(config.clone()),
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Arc::new(RateLimiter::new(
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config.limits.rate_limit_pps,
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config.limits.rate_limit_burst,
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)),
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Arc::new(Blacklist::new()),
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Arc::new(Mutex::new(DifficultyAdjuster::default())),
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Arc::new(whitelist),
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Arc::new(IpReputation::new()),
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None,
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None,
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Arc::new(AtomicU64::new(0)),
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Arc::new(ProtocolRegistry::new()),
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None,
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))
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}
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/// Encodes a PROXY protocol v2 TCP-over-IPv4 header.
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fn proxy_v2_header(source: Ipv4Addr, destination: Ipv4Addr) -> Vec<u8> {
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const SIGNATURE: [u8; 12] = *b"\r\n\r\n\0\r\nQUIT\n";
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let mut header = Vec::with_capacity(28);
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header.extend_from_slice(&SIGNATURE);
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header.push(0x21);
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header.push(0x11);
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header.extend_from_slice(&12u16.to_be_bytes());
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header.extend_from_slice(&source.octets());
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header.extend_from_slice(&destination.octets());
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header.extend_from_slice(&40_000u16.to_be_bytes());
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header.extend_from_slice(&25565u16.to_be_bytes());
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header
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}
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/// Runs one connection through the gateway after sending a PROXY v2 header that
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/// claims `claimed` as the client address. The transport peer passed to the
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/// gateway is `peer`, which lets the test model a trusted proxy explicitly.
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async fn handle_with_header(gateway: &Gateway, peer: SocketAddr, claimed: Ipv4Addr) -> GatewayOutcome {
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let listener = TcpListener::bind("127.0.0.1:0").await.expect("bind loopback");
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let local = listener.local_addr().expect("local addr");
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let (client, accepted) = tokio::join!(TcpStream::connect(local), listener.accept());
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let mut client = client.expect("connect");
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let server = accepted.expect("accept").0;
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let destination = match local.ip() {
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IpAddr::V4(ip) => ip,
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IpAddr::V6(_) => Ipv4Addr::LOCALHOST,
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};
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client
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.write_all(&proxy_v2_header(claimed, destination))
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.await
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.expect("write PROXY header");
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let outcome = gateway.handle(server, peer).await;
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drop(client);
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outcome
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}
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/// Runs one connection without a PROXY header.
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async fn handle_plain(gateway: &Gateway, peer: SocketAddr) -> GatewayOutcome {
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let listener = TcpListener::bind("127.0.0.1:0").await.expect("bind loopback");
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let local = listener.local_addr().expect("local addr");
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let (_client, server) = tokio::join!(TcpStream::connect(local), listener.accept());
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gateway.handle(server.expect("accept").0, peer).await
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}
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/// Parses a trusted proxy network for the test config.
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fn cidr(value: &str) -> TrustedProxyCidr {
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value.parse().expect("valid trusted proxy CIDR")
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}
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/// A trusted proxy may state a public client address, and that address is the
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/// one used for admission decisions and bans.
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#[tokio::test]
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async fn trusted_proxy_header_ip_is_used_for_identity_and_bans() {
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let mut config = Config::default();
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config.limits.rate_limit_pps = 0.0;
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config.limits.rate_limit_burst = 0.0;
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config.proxy_protocol.ingress_enabled = true;
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config.proxy_protocol.trusted_cidrs = vec![cidr("127.0.0.1/32")];
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let gateway = test_gateway(config, HashSet::new());
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let claimed = Ipv4Addr::new(198, 51, 100, 7);
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let peer = SocketAddr::from((Ipv4Addr::LOCALHOST, 51_100));
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for _ in 0..5 {
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let outcome = handle_with_header(&gateway, peer, claimed).await;
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assert!(outcome.result.is_ok(), "a rate-limited connection is dropped silently");
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assert_eq!(
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outcome.client_ip,
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Some(IpAddr::V4(claimed)),
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"the header IP, not the proxy IP, is the client identity"
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);
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}
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assert!(
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gateway.blacklist.is_blocked(IpAddr::V4(claimed)),
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"repeated rate-limit hits must ban the header IP"
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);
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assert!(
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!gateway.blacklist.is_blocked(peer.ip()),
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"the trusted proxy itself must stay unbanned"
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);
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}
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/// Header addresses that cannot be a real client are rejected and the
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/// transport peer becomes the identity.
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#[test]
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fn rejects_header_addresses_that_cannot_be_a_client() {
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let config = ProxyProtocolConfig {
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trusted_cidrs: vec![cidr("10.0.0.0/8")],
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..ProxyProtocolConfig::default()
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};
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let cases = [
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("0.0.0.0", ClientIpRejection::Unspecified),
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("::", ClientIpRejection::Unspecified),
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("127.0.0.1", ClientIpRejection::Loopback),
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("::1", ClientIpRejection::Loopback),
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("169.254.10.1", ClientIpRejection::LinkLocal),
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("fe80::1", ClientIpRejection::LinkLocal),
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("224.0.0.1", ClientIpRejection::Multicast),
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("ff02::1", ClientIpRejection::Multicast),
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("255.255.255.255", ClientIpRejection::Broadcast),
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("::ffff:127.0.0.1", ClientIpRejection::Loopback),
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("::ffff:169.254.10.1", ClientIpRejection::LinkLocal),
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];
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for (address, expected) in cases {
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let ip = address.parse().expect("valid test address");
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assert_eq!(validate_client_ip(&config, ip), Err(expected), "address {address}");
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}
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}
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/// A proxy must not be able to claim an address of the proxy network itself.
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#[test]
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fn rejects_header_address_inside_trusted_cidrs() {
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let config = ProxyProtocolConfig {
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trusted_cidrs: vec![cidr("198.51.100.0/24"), cidr("2001:db8:2::/48")],
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..ProxyProtocolConfig::default()
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};
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assert_eq!(
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validate_client_ip(&config, "198.51.100.7".parse().expect("ipv4")),
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Err(ClientIpRejection::TrustedProxy)
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);
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assert_eq!(
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validate_client_ip(&config, "2001:db8:2::7".parse().expect("ipv6")),
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Err(ClientIpRejection::TrustedProxy)
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);
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assert_eq!(
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validate_client_ip(&config, "::ffff:198.51.100.7".parse().expect("mapped ipv4")),
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Err(ClientIpRejection::TrustedProxy),
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"an IPv4-mapped address must match the IPv4 proxy network"
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);
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assert!(
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validate_client_ip(&config, "203.0.113.7".parse().expect("ipv4")).is_ok(),
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"an address outside the proxy networks is a valid client identity"
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);
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}
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/// An invalid header address falls back to the transport peer, and the peer
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/// (itself a trusted proxy) is never banned.
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#[tokio::test]
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async fn invalid_header_ip_falls_back_to_peer_and_suppresses_bans() {
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let mut config = Config::default();
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config.limits.rate_limit_pps = 0.0;
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config.limits.rate_limit_burst = 0.0;
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config.proxy_protocol.ingress_enabled = true;
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config.proxy_protocol.trusted_cidrs = vec![cidr("127.0.0.1/32")];
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let gateway = test_gateway(config, HashSet::new());
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let peer = SocketAddr::from((Ipv4Addr::LOCALHOST, 51_101));
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for _ in 0..8 {
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let outcome = handle_with_header(&gateway, peer, Ipv4Addr::LOCALHOST).await;
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assert!(outcome.result.is_ok());
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assert_eq!(
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outcome.client_ip,
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Some(peer.ip()),
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"a rejected header IP must fall back to the transport peer"
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);
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}
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assert!(
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gateway.blacklist.is_empty(),
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"a trusted proxy address must never be banned"
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);
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}
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/// A header claiming an address inside `trusted_cidrs` is rejected, and the
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/// fallback peer (also a trusted proxy) is not banned either.
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#[tokio::test]
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async fn header_inside_trusted_cidrs_is_rejected_and_never_banned() {
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let mut config = Config::default();
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config.limits.rate_limit_pps = 0.0;
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config.limits.rate_limit_burst = 0.0;
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config.proxy_protocol.ingress_enabled = true;
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config.proxy_protocol.trusted_cidrs = vec![cidr("127.0.0.1/32"), cidr("198.51.100.0/24")];
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let gateway = test_gateway(config, HashSet::new());
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let claimed = Ipv4Addr::new(198, 51, 100, 7);
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let peer = SocketAddr::from((Ipv4Addr::LOCALHOST, 51_102));
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for _ in 0..5 {
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let outcome = handle_with_header(&gateway, peer, claimed).await;
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assert_eq!(
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outcome.client_ip,
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Some(peer.ip()),
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"a proxy must not claim another proxy address as the client"
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);
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}
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assert!(
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gateway.blacklist.is_empty(),
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"neither the claimed proxy address nor the fallback peer may be banned"
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);
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}
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/// Plain traffic without PROXY protocol keeps using the transport peer.
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#[tokio::test]
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async fn plain_connection_uses_the_transport_peer() {
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let gateway = test_gateway(Config::default(), HashSet::new());
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let peer = SocketAddr::from(([198, 51, 100, 20], 51_103));
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let outcome = handle_plain(&gateway, peer).await;
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assert_eq!(outcome.client_ip, Some(peer.ip()));
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}
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#[test]
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fn trusted_network_overlap_checks_prefix_intersection() {
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let net: TrustedProxyCidr = "10.0.0.0/8".parse().expect("cidr");
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assert!(net.overlaps_prefix("10.1.2.0".parse().expect("ip"), 24), "same range");
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assert!(
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net.overlaps_prefix("10.0.0.0".parse().expect("ip"), 7),
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"wider prefix overlaps"
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);
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assert!(
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!net.overlaps_prefix("11.0.0.0".parse().expect("ip"), 8),
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"sibling range"
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);
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assert!(
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!net.overlaps_prefix("10.0.0.0".parse().expect("ip"), 0),
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"/0 is rejected"
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);
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let v6: TrustedProxyCidr = "fd00::/8".parse().expect("cidr");
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assert!(v6.overlaps_prefix("fd12::".parse().expect("ip"), 16));
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assert!(!v6.overlaps_prefix("2001:db8::".parse().expect("ip"), 32));
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}
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