Security:
- An empty API_PASSWORD passed validation (only the literal "changeme" was
rejected) and verify_password("", "") returned true, so a login with an
empty password minted an admin token. Require >= 16 characters and >= 32
non-whitespace bytes for JWT_SECRET; verify rejects an empty stored secret.
- syn_challenge_enabled required a real challenge_secret_hex: the public
placeholder from config.h is now rejected in every spelling.
- docker-compose: Redis/ClickHouse/Grafana are loopback-only and every
password uses ${VAR:?} instead of a default. An exposed Redis was a way to
lift bans and publish unbans to the whole fleet with one redis-cli.
- Empty CORS_ORIGIN no longer means "allow any origin".
- ban_cidr / userspace blacklist validate and mask prefixes; CIDR bans are
stored as ranges, so a /24 or /64 ban actually covers the subnet (before,
only the network address was blocked).
Availability:
- ClickHouse client has connect/request timeouts and no mutex held across
await: a hung analytics backend can no longer freeze the ban path. Events
go through a bounded buffer with a drop counter.
- Redis uses a ConnectionManager with per-command timeouts; pubsub and
reconcile reset the backoff after success; publish cannot block shutdown.
- Ban durations from pubsub are clamped and use checked_add; the sync task
survives panics instead of silently dying.
- Blacklist TOCTOU (remove_if) and replace_redis no longer empties the table
during a Redis reconnect.
- RateLimiter and reputation have hard caps with incremental eviction instead
of an unbounded DashMap and a stop-the-world retain.
- The attack detector scores before updating its baseline and needs several
quiet windows to leave UnderAttack, so a sustained flood keeps banning new
offenders instead of ending after one tick.
- accept() backs off on EMFILE/ENFILE, shutdown Err is treated as shutdown,
a global semaphore bounds in-flight connections, rate limiting runs before
PoW, whitelisted IPs are never banned, and connect/handshake/relay have
timeouts with an idle budget.
- PoW uses the configured difficulty as a floor, the clamp is enforced, and
nonce framing survives split segments and coalesced handshake bytes.
- Subnet tracker memory is capped (prefixes and per-prefix sources) and the
monitor bans with the configured TTL.
CI and docs:
- CI runs the test suite with --no-default-features --features protocol-http;
make ebpf fails on errors; the secrets gate catches weak compose defaults.
- doctor skips protected endpoints without a token and exits non-zero on
failure; a drain timeout returns exit code 1.
- TODO §2b records the review findings, what is fixed and what is deferred;
configuration/testing docs describe the new XDP and secret semantics.
25 lines
792 B
Rust
25 lines
792 B
Rust
//! Integration tests for the Redis reconnect backoff policy.
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// The backoff helpers live behind the optional `store-redis` feature, so this
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// test target must be skipped when that feature is off (`cargo check
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// --no-default-features --all-targets`, CI protocol-http job).
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#![cfg(feature = "store-redis")]
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use std::time::Duration;
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use rampart::store::redis::{BACKOFF_MAX, BACKOFF_MIN, next_backoff};
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#[test]
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fn backoff_doubles_until_cap() {
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let mut backoff = BACKOFF_MIN;
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for expected_secs in [2, 4, 8, 16, 30, 30] {
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backoff = next_backoff(backoff, BACKOFF_MAX);
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assert_eq!(backoff, Duration::from_secs(expected_secs));
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}
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}
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#[test]
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fn backoff_never_exceeds_max() {
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let backoff = next_backoff(Duration::from_secs(u64::MAX / 2), BACKOFF_MAX);
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assert!(backoff <= BACKOFF_MAX);
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}
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