Security:
- An empty API_PASSWORD passed validation (only the literal "changeme" was
rejected) and verify_password("", "") returned true, so a login with an
empty password minted an admin token. Require >= 16 characters and >= 32
non-whitespace bytes for JWT_SECRET; verify rejects an empty stored secret.
- syn_challenge_enabled required a real challenge_secret_hex: the public
placeholder from config.h is now rejected in every spelling.
- docker-compose: Redis/ClickHouse/Grafana are loopback-only and every
password uses ${VAR:?} instead of a default. An exposed Redis was a way to
lift bans and publish unbans to the whole fleet with one redis-cli.
- Empty CORS_ORIGIN no longer means "allow any origin".
- ban_cidr / userspace blacklist validate and mask prefixes; CIDR bans are
stored as ranges, so a /24 or /64 ban actually covers the subnet (before,
only the network address was blocked).
Availability:
- ClickHouse client has connect/request timeouts and no mutex held across
await: a hung analytics backend can no longer freeze the ban path. Events
go through a bounded buffer with a drop counter.
- Redis uses a ConnectionManager with per-command timeouts; pubsub and
reconcile reset the backoff after success; publish cannot block shutdown.
- Ban durations from pubsub are clamped and use checked_add; the sync task
survives panics instead of silently dying.
- Blacklist TOCTOU (remove_if) and replace_redis no longer empties the table
during a Redis reconnect.
- RateLimiter and reputation have hard caps with incremental eviction instead
of an unbounded DashMap and a stop-the-world retain.
- The attack detector scores before updating its baseline and needs several
quiet windows to leave UnderAttack, so a sustained flood keeps banning new
offenders instead of ending after one tick.
- accept() backs off on EMFILE/ENFILE, shutdown Err is treated as shutdown,
a global semaphore bounds in-flight connections, rate limiting runs before
PoW, whitelisted IPs are never banned, and connect/handshake/relay have
timeouts with an idle budget.
- PoW uses the configured difficulty as a floor, the clamp is enforced, and
nonce framing survives split segments and coalesced handshake bytes.
- Subnet tracker memory is capped (prefixes and per-prefix sources) and the
monitor bans with the configured TTL.
CI and docs:
- CI runs the test suite with --no-default-features --features protocol-http;
make ebpf fails on errors; the secrets gate catches weak compose defaults.
- doctor skips protected endpoints without a token and exits non-zero on
failure; a drain timeout returns exit code 1.
- TODO §2b records the review findings, what is fixed and what is deferred;
configuration/testing docs describe the new XDP and secret semantics.
84 lines
3.3 KiB
Bash
Executable file
84 lines
3.3 KiB
Bash
Executable file
#!/usr/bin/env bash
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#
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# check_default_secrets.sh — reject placeholder and weak secrets committed as
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# real values in code, deploy configs, or docs.
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#
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# Catches:
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# 1. the literal placeholder "changeme";
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# 2. Compose-style fallbacks to weak defaults, e.g. ${REDIS_PASSWORD:-rampart_dev}
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# or ${GRAFANA_PASSWORD:-admin};
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# 3. Redis `requirepass` with a weak or empty password.
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#
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# Intentional occurrences are whitelisted in two layers:
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# 1. File level — the validation code itself:
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# src/bin/rampart-manager.rs (startup guard rejecting the default)
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# src/manager/security.rs (password/secret policy + placeholders)
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# src/manager/api/auth.rs (login handler)
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# 2. Line level — a matching line is skipped when it contains "must not be" or
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# "test" (case-insensitive), states the prohibition ("запр" root: запрет /
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# запрещено / запрещён — the project docs are partly Russian), or is a
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# comment / markdown table row (starts with '#', '//', '*', '|', '--').
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#
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# Any remaining occurrence is an offender -> exit 1, offending lines listed.
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set -u
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SCAN_DIRS="src deploy docs"
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FILE_WHITELIST="src/bin/rampart-manager.rs src/manager/security.rs src/manager/api/auth.rs"
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# "<extended regex>@@<human description>" pairs. The `|` inside alternations is
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# safe because entries are split on the first `@@`.
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PATTERNS=(
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'changeme@@placeholder password "changeme"'
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'\$\{[A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*:-[[:space:]]*(rampart_dev|admin|password|secret|root)@@fallback to a weak default value'
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"requirepass[[:space:]]+[\"']?[[:space:]]*(rampart_dev|admin|password|redis|secret|root)@@requirepass with a weak password"
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"requirepass[[:space:]]*([\"']{2})?[[:space:]]*\$@@requirepass without a password"
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)
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cd "$(CDPATH= cd -- "$(dirname -- "$0")/.." && pwd)" || exit 1
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offenders=$(mktemp)
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trap 'rm -f "$offenders"' EXIT
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for dir in $SCAN_DIRS; do
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[ -d "$dir" ] || continue
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for entry in "${PATTERNS[@]}"; do
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pattern="${entry%%@@*}"
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description="${entry#*@@}"
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while IFS= read -r match; do
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[ -n "$match" ] || continue
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file="${match%%:*}"
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rest="${match#*:}"
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lineno="${rest%%:*}"
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content="${rest#*:}"
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skip=0
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for whitelisted in $FILE_WHITELIST; do
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[ "$file" = "$whitelisted" ] && skip=1
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done
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if printf '%s' "$content" | grep -qiE 'must not be|test|запр'; then
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skip=1
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fi
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trimmed="${content#"${content%%[![:space:]]*}"}"
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if [ "${trimmed:0:2}" = "//" ] || [ "${trimmed:0:2}" = "--" ]; then
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skip=1
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fi
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case "${trimmed:0:1}" in
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'#'|'*'|'|') skip=1 ;;
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esac
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if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then
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printf 'FAIL %s:%s: %s [%s]\n' "$file" "$lineno" "$trimmed" "$description" >> "$offenders"
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fi
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done < <(grep -rnE --binary-files=without-match "$pattern" "$dir" 2>/dev/null)
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done
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done
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if [ -s "$offenders" ]; then
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sort -u "$offenders" >&2
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echo "secrets gate: FAIL — placeholder/weak secret used as a value (see lines above)" >&2
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exit 1
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fi
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echo "secrets gate: PASS — no placeholder or weak default secrets in: $SCAN_DIRS"
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exit 0
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