Security:
- An empty API_PASSWORD passed validation (only the literal "changeme" was
rejected) and verify_password("", "") returned true, so a login with an
empty password minted an admin token. Require >= 16 characters and >= 32
non-whitespace bytes for JWT_SECRET; verify rejects an empty stored secret.
- syn_challenge_enabled required a real challenge_secret_hex: the public
placeholder from config.h is now rejected in every spelling.
- docker-compose: Redis/ClickHouse/Grafana are loopback-only and every
password uses ${VAR:?} instead of a default. An exposed Redis was a way to
lift bans and publish unbans to the whole fleet with one redis-cli.
- Empty CORS_ORIGIN no longer means "allow any origin".
- ban_cidr / userspace blacklist validate and mask prefixes; CIDR bans are
stored as ranges, so a /24 or /64 ban actually covers the subnet (before,
only the network address was blocked).
Availability:
- ClickHouse client has connect/request timeouts and no mutex held across
await: a hung analytics backend can no longer freeze the ban path. Events
go through a bounded buffer with a drop counter.
- Redis uses a ConnectionManager with per-command timeouts; pubsub and
reconcile reset the backoff after success; publish cannot block shutdown.
- Ban durations from pubsub are clamped and use checked_add; the sync task
survives panics instead of silently dying.
- Blacklist TOCTOU (remove_if) and replace_redis no longer empties the table
during a Redis reconnect.
- RateLimiter and reputation have hard caps with incremental eviction instead
of an unbounded DashMap and a stop-the-world retain.
- The attack detector scores before updating its baseline and needs several
quiet windows to leave UnderAttack, so a sustained flood keeps banning new
offenders instead of ending after one tick.
- accept() backs off on EMFILE/ENFILE, shutdown Err is treated as shutdown,
a global semaphore bounds in-flight connections, rate limiting runs before
PoW, whitelisted IPs are never banned, and connect/handshake/relay have
timeouts with an idle budget.
- PoW uses the configured difficulty as a floor, the clamp is enforced, and
nonce framing survives split segments and coalesced handshake bytes.
- Subnet tracker memory is capped (prefixes and per-prefix sources) and the
monitor bans with the configured TTL.
CI and docs:
- CI runs the test suite with --no-default-features --features protocol-http;
make ebpf fails on errors; the secrets gate catches weak compose defaults.
- doctor skips protected endpoints without a token and exits non-zero on
failure; a drain timeout returns exit code 1.
- TODO §2b records the review findings, what is fixed and what is deferred;
configuration/testing docs describe the new XDP and secret semantics.
81 lines
2.6 KiB
Rust
81 lines
2.6 KiB
Rust
//! Integration tests for the ClickHouse sink: buffering, bounded flush and
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//! retry on failure.
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use std::time::{Duration, Instant};
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use rampart::store::clickhouse::{ClickHouseEvent, ClickHouseWriter, MAX_BUFFER_EVENTS};
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fn event(seq: usize) -> ClickHouseEvent {
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ClickHouseEvent {
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timestamp: chrono::Utc::now(),
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event_type: "test".to_string(),
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ip: format!("192.0.2.{}", seq % 250),
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data_float: 0.0,
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data_int: 0,
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data_string: String::new(),
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}
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}
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#[tokio::test]
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async fn push_only_buffers_events() {
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let mut writer = ClickHouseWriter::new("http://127.0.0.1:1");
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writer.push(event(0)).await.expect("push must succeed");
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assert_eq!(writer.pending(), 1, "push must not flush eagerly");
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assert_eq!(writer.dropped(), 0);
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}
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#[tokio::test]
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async fn empty_flush_is_a_noop() {
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let mut writer = ClickHouseWriter::new("http://127.0.0.1:1");
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writer.flush().await.expect("empty flush must not touch the network");
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}
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#[tokio::test]
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async fn failed_flush_requeues_the_batch() {
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let mut writer = ClickHouseWriter::new("http://127.0.0.1:1");
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writer.push(event(1)).await.expect("push must succeed");
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let result = writer.flush().await;
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assert!(result.is_err(), "connection refused must surface as an error");
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assert_eq!(writer.pending(), 1, "failed batch must be re-queued");
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assert_eq!(writer.dropped(), 0, "a single failed batch is not a drop");
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}
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#[tokio::test]
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async fn stalled_server_flush_is_bounded() {
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let listener = tokio::net::TcpListener::bind("127.0.0.1:0").await.expect("bind");
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let addr = listener.local_addr().expect("local addr");
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let server = tokio::spawn(async move {
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let (_stream, _) = listener.accept().await.expect("accept");
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// Keep the connection open without ever answering.
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std::future::pending::<()>().await;
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});
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let mut writer = ClickHouseWriter::new(&format!("http://{addr}/"));
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writer.push(event(2)).await.expect("push must succeed");
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let started = Instant::now();
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let result = writer.flush().await;
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let elapsed = started.elapsed();
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server.abort();
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assert!(result.is_err(), "a stalled server must fail the flush");
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assert!(
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elapsed < Duration::from_secs(5),
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"flush must be bounded, took {elapsed:?}"
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);
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assert_eq!(writer.pending(), 1, "timed-out batch must be re-queued");
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}
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#[tokio::test]
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async fn buffer_is_bounded_and_overflow_is_counted() {
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let mut writer = ClickHouseWriter::new("http://127.0.0.1:1");
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for seq in 0..MAX_BUFFER_EVENTS + 7 {
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writer.push(event(seq)).await.expect("push must succeed");
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}
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assert_eq!(writer.pending(), MAX_BUFFER_EVENTS, "buffer must stay bounded");
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assert_eq!(writer.dropped(), 7, "overflow must be counted");
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}
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