guard/tests/traffic_intel.rs
loki5512344 c1a076a4a3
fix(core): close auth bypass, hangs and memory leaks found by review
Security:
- An empty API_PASSWORD passed validation (only the literal "changeme" was
  rejected) and verify_password("", "") returned true, so a login with an
  empty password minted an admin token. Require >= 16 characters and >= 32
  non-whitespace bytes for JWT_SECRET; verify rejects an empty stored secret.
- syn_challenge_enabled required a real challenge_secret_hex: the public
  placeholder from config.h is now rejected in every spelling.
- docker-compose: Redis/ClickHouse/Grafana are loopback-only and every
  password uses ${VAR:?} instead of a default. An exposed Redis was a way to
  lift bans and publish unbans to the whole fleet with one redis-cli.
- Empty CORS_ORIGIN no longer means "allow any origin".
- ban_cidr / userspace blacklist validate and mask prefixes; CIDR bans are
  stored as ranges, so a /24 or /64 ban actually covers the subnet (before,
  only the network address was blocked).

Availability:
- ClickHouse client has connect/request timeouts and no mutex held across
  await: a hung analytics backend can no longer freeze the ban path. Events
  go through a bounded buffer with a drop counter.
- Redis uses a ConnectionManager with per-command timeouts; pubsub and
  reconcile reset the backoff after success; publish cannot block shutdown.
- Ban durations from pubsub are clamped and use checked_add; the sync task
  survives panics instead of silently dying.
- Blacklist TOCTOU (remove_if) and replace_redis no longer empties the table
  during a Redis reconnect.
- RateLimiter and reputation have hard caps with incremental eviction instead
  of an unbounded DashMap and a stop-the-world retain.
- The attack detector scores before updating its baseline and needs several
  quiet windows to leave UnderAttack, so a sustained flood keeps banning new
  offenders instead of ending after one tick.
- accept() backs off on EMFILE/ENFILE, shutdown Err is treated as shutdown,
  a global semaphore bounds in-flight connections, rate limiting runs before
  PoW, whitelisted IPs are never banned, and connect/handshake/relay have
  timeouts with an idle budget.
- PoW uses the configured difficulty as a floor, the clamp is enforced, and
  nonce framing survives split segments and coalesced handshake bytes.
- Subnet tracker memory is capped (prefixes and per-prefix sources) and the
  monitor bans with the configured TTL.

CI and docs:
- CI runs the test suite with --no-default-features --features protocol-http;
  make ebpf fails on errors; the secrets gate catches weak compose defaults.
- doctor skips protected endpoints without a token and exits non-zero on
  failure; a drain timeout returns exit code 1.
- TODO §2b records the review findings, what is fixed and what is deferred;
  configuration/testing docs describe the new XDP and secret semantics.
2026-11-16 12:06:23 +01:00

448 lines
11 KiB
Rust

//! Integration tests for Traffic Intelligence on the hot path: EWMA sanity,
//! attack detection across a sustained flood, reputation decay/eviction and
//! auto-ban driven by reputation.
use rampart::config::DetectAutobanConfig;
use rampart::filter::blacklist::Blacklist;
use rampart::traffic::alert::AlertDispatcher;
use rampart::traffic::detector::{AttackDetector, AttackStatus, DetectorThresholds};
use rampart::traffic::ewma::Ewma;
use rampart::traffic::hook::TrafficHook;
use rampart::traffic::reputation::{IpReputation, ReputationPolicy};
use std::net::{IpAddr, Ipv4Addr, Ipv6Addr};
use std::sync::Arc;
use std::time::Duration;
fn ip(octets: [u8; 4]) -> IpAddr {
IpAddr::V4(Ipv4Addr::from(octets))
}
fn autoban_cfg(enabled: bool) -> DetectAutobanConfig {
DetectAutobanConfig {
enabled,
reputation_threshold: -50,
}
}
fn quiet(detector: &mut AttackDetector) {
for _ in 0..12 {
detector.analyze(500.0, 50.0);
}
}
// EWMA
#[test]
fn ewma_starts_at_zero() {
assert_eq!(Ewma::new(0.125).value(), 0.0);
}
#[test]
fn ewma_alpha_one_follows_the_sample() {
let mut ewma = Ewma::new(1.0);
ewma.update(100.0);
assert!((ewma.value() - 100.0).abs() < 1.0);
}
#[test]
fn ewma_converges_to_a_constant_sample() {
let mut ewma = Ewma::new(0.5);
for _ in 0..10 {
ewma.update(50.0);
}
assert!((ewma.value() - 50.0).abs() < 1.0);
}
#[test]
fn ewma_falls_back_on_invalid_alpha() {
for alpha in [f64::NAN, f64::INFINITY, 0.0, -0.5] {
let mut ewma = Ewma::new(alpha);
ewma.update(100.0);
assert!(ewma.value().is_finite(), "alpha={alpha} must keep the average finite");
assert!(
ewma.value() > 0.0 && ewma.value() < 100.0,
"alpha={alpha} must fall back to the default smoothing"
);
}
}
#[test]
fn ewma_seed_primes_the_baseline() {
let mut ewma = Ewma::new(0.01);
ewma.seed(500.0);
assert_eq!(ewma.value(), 500.0, "a seeded baseline starts at the observed value");
ewma.update(500.0);
assert_eq!(ewma.value(), 500.0);
assert!(!ewma.value().is_nan());
}
#[test]
fn ewma_ignores_non_finite_samples() {
let mut ewma = Ewma::new(0.5);
ewma.update(10.0);
let before = ewma.value();
ewma.update(f64::NAN);
ewma.update(f64::INFINITY);
assert_eq!(ewma.value(), before, "non-finite samples must not move the average");
}
// Attack detector
#[test]
fn attack_detector_reports_normal_traffic() {
let mut detector = AttackDetector::new();
quiet(&mut detector);
assert_eq!(detector.analyze(500.0, 50.0), AttackStatus::Normal);
}
#[test]
fn attack_detector_flags_pps_spike_as_suspicious() {
let mut detector = AttackDetector::new();
for _ in 0..10 {
detector.analyze(1.0, 1.0);
}
assert_eq!(detector.analyze(5.0, 1.0), AttackStatus::Suspicious);
}
#[test]
fn attack_detector_flags_cps_spike_as_suspicious() {
let mut detector = AttackDetector::new();
for _ in 0..10 {
detector.analyze(1.0, 1.0);
}
assert_eq!(detector.analyze(1.0, 5.0), AttackStatus::Suspicious);
}
#[test]
fn attack_detector_escalates_after_three_anomalies() {
let mut detector = AttackDetector::new();
for _ in 0..10 {
detector.analyze(1.0, 1.0);
}
detector.analyze(10_000.0, 100.0);
detector.analyze(10_000.0, 100.0);
assert_eq!(detector.analyze(10_000.0, 100.0), AttackStatus::UnderAttack);
}
#[test]
fn attack_detector_resets_on_a_normal_window() {
let mut detector = AttackDetector::new();
for _ in 0..10 {
detector.analyze(1.0, 1.0);
}
detector.analyze(100.0, 10.0);
detector.analyze(100.0, 10.0);
detector.analyze(1.0, 1.0);
assert_eq!(detector.analyze(1.0, 1.0), AttackStatus::Normal);
}
#[test]
fn detector_flags_synthetic_traffic_spike() {
let mut detector = AttackDetector::new();
// Baseline: a quiet profile.
for _ in 0..12 {
detector.analyze(500.0, 50.0);
}
// Synthetic spike: 200x pps and cps for three consecutive windows.
assert_eq!(
detector.analyze(100_000.0, 10_000.0),
AttackStatus::Suspicious,
"first anomalous window is suspicious"
);
assert_eq!(detector.analyze(100_000.0, 10_000.0), AttackStatus::Suspicious);
assert_eq!(
detector.analyze(100_000.0, 10_000.0),
AttackStatus::UnderAttack,
"three anomalous windows in a row must escalate to UnderAttack"
);
}
#[test]
fn sustained_flood_stays_under_attack_and_keeps_banning_offenders() {
let reputation = Arc::new(IpReputation::new());
let blacklist = Arc::new(Blacklist::new());
let hook = TrafficHook::new(Arc::clone(&reputation), Arc::clone(&blacklist), autoban_cfg(true), 60);
let mut detector = AttackDetector::new();
quiet(&mut detector);
for tick in 0..10u8 {
let status = detector.analyze(100_000.0, 10_000.0);
if tick < 2 {
assert_eq!(status, AttackStatus::Suspicious, "flood tick {tick}");
} else {
assert_eq!(
status,
AttackStatus::UnderAttack,
"flood tick {tick}: the detector must not learn the attack as normal"
);
}
// A fresh offender joins on every tick of the attack. The edge keeps
// banning them only while the detector stays in UnderAttack.
let offender = ip([203, 0, 113, tick + 1]);
for _ in 0..6 {
reputation.record_bad(offender);
}
assert!(hook.ban_offenders() >= 1, "flood tick {tick} must produce a ban");
assert!(
blacklist.is_blocked(offender),
"flood tick {tick}: offender must be banned"
);
}
}
#[test]
fn under_attack_exits_only_after_the_recovery_window() {
let mut detector = AttackDetector::new();
quiet(&mut detector);
for _ in 0..3 {
detector.analyze(100_000.0, 10_000.0);
}
assert_eq!(detector.analyze(100_000.0, 10_000.0), AttackStatus::UnderAttack);
// Four calm windows are not enough: the exit hysteresis is five ticks.
for tick in 0..4 {
assert_eq!(
detector.analyze(500.0, 50.0),
AttackStatus::UnderAttack,
"calm tick {tick} must not end the attack"
);
}
assert_eq!(
detector.analyze(500.0, 50.0),
AttackStatus::Normal,
"the fifth calm tick ends the attack"
);
}
#[test]
fn detector_thresholds_are_configurable() {
let thresholds = DetectorThresholds {
suspicious_score: 1.5,
attack_score: 2.0,
escalate_after: 1,
recover_after: 2,
};
let mut detector = AttackDetector::with_thresholds(thresholds);
for _ in 0..10 {
detector.analyze(100.0, 10.0);
}
assert_eq!(
detector.analyze(1_000.0, 100.0),
AttackStatus::UnderAttack,
"escalate_after = 1 must escalate on the first anomalous window"
);
assert_eq!(detector.analyze(100.0, 10.0), AttackStatus::UnderAttack);
assert_ne!(
detector.analyze(100.0, 10.0),
AttackStatus::UnderAttack,
"recover_after = 2 must end the attack"
);
}
// Reputation
#[test]
fn reputation_initial_score_is_neutral() {
let rep = IpReputation::new();
assert_eq!(rep.score(ip([192, 168, 1, 1])), 0);
}
#[test]
fn reputation_good_and_bad_steps() {
let rep = IpReputation::new();
let good = ip([10, 0, 0, 1]);
let bad = ip([10, 0, 0, 2]);
rep.record_good(good);
rep.record_bad(bad);
assert_eq!(rep.score(good), 1);
assert_eq!(rep.score(bad), -10);
}
#[test]
fn reputation_scores_are_clamped() {
let rep = IpReputation::new();
let good = ip([10, 0, 0, 3]);
let bad = ip([10, 0, 0, 4]);
for _ in 0..200 {
rep.record_good(good);
}
for _ in 0..20 {
rep.record_bad(bad);
}
assert_eq!(rep.score(good), 100);
assert_eq!(rep.score(bad), -100);
}
#[test]
fn reputation_trusts_after_enough_good_connections() {
let rep = IpReputation::new();
let ip = ip([10, 0, 0, 5]);
assert!(!rep.is_trusted(ip));
for _ in 0..51 {
rep.record_good(ip);
}
assert!(rep.is_trusted(ip));
}
#[test]
fn reputation_tracks_ipv6() {
let rep = IpReputation::new();
let ip = IpAddr::V6(Ipv6Addr::LOCALHOST);
rep.record_bad(ip);
assert_eq!(rep.score(ip), -10);
}
#[test]
fn reputation_decays_toward_neutral() {
let policy = ReputationPolicy {
idle_ttl: Duration::from_secs(10),
decay_half_life: Duration::from_millis(20),
max_offenders: 64,
};
let rep = IpReputation::with_policy(policy);
let bad = ip([10, 0, 0, 6]);
for _ in 0..20 {
rep.record_bad(bad);
}
assert_eq!(rep.score(bad), -100);
std::thread::sleep(Duration::from_millis(40));
let decayed = rep.score(bad);
assert!(
decayed > -100 && decayed < 0,
"two half-lives must move the score toward neutral, got {decayed}"
);
}
#[test]
fn reputation_sweep_evicts_idle_and_keeps_active() {
let policy = ReputationPolicy {
idle_ttl: Duration::from_millis(20),
decay_half_life: Duration::from_secs(1800),
max_offenders: 64,
};
let rep = IpReputation::with_policy(policy);
let idle = ip([10, 0, 0, 7]);
let active = ip([10, 0, 0, 8]);
rep.record_bad(idle);
rep.record_bad(active);
std::thread::sleep(Duration::from_millis(40));
rep.record_bad(active);
for _ in 0..8 {
rep.sweep();
}
assert_eq!(rep.len(), 1, "only the idle source may be evicted");
assert_eq!(rep.score(idle), 0, "evicted source is neutral again");
assert!(rep.score(active) < 0, "active source keeps its score");
}
#[test]
fn offenders_are_capped_per_cycle() {
let policy = ReputationPolicy {
idle_ttl: Duration::from_secs(600),
decay_half_life: Duration::from_secs(1800),
max_offenders: 3,
};
let rep = IpReputation::with_policy(policy);
for last in 1..=20u8 {
let source = ip([198, 51, 100, last]);
for _ in 0..6 {
rep.record_bad(source);
}
}
assert_eq!(
rep.offenders_below(-50).len(),
3,
"one cycle must not return the whole offender table"
);
}
#[test]
fn offenders_below_returns_worst_sources() {
let rep = IpReputation::new();
let bad = ip([10, 0, 0, 1]);
let good = ip([10, 0, 0, 2]);
for _ in 0..6 {
rep.record_bad(bad);
}
rep.record_good(good);
assert_eq!(rep.offenders_below(-50), vec![bad]);
}
#[test]
fn offenders_below_is_empty_without_offenders() {
let rep = IpReputation::new();
assert!(rep.offenders_below(-50).is_empty());
}
// Traffic hook auto-ban
#[test]
fn reputation_fall_after_drops_triggers_autoban() {
let reputation = Arc::new(IpReputation::new());
let blacklist = Arc::new(Blacklist::new());
let hook = TrafficHook::new(Arc::clone(&reputation), Arc::clone(&blacklist), autoban_cfg(true), 60);
let attacker = ip([198, 51, 100, 7]);
for _ in 0..6 {
// Six drops through the rate limiter: -10 each, auto-ban threshold is -50.
reputation.record_bad(attacker);
hook.on_connection_end(attacker);
}
assert!(
reputation.score(attacker) <= -50,
"reputation must fall below threshold"
);
assert!(
blacklist.is_blocked(attacker),
"auto-ban must fire after repeated drops"
);
}
#[test]
fn autoban_ttl_expires_ban() {
let reputation = Arc::new(IpReputation::new());
let blacklist = Arc::new(Blacklist::new());
let hook = TrafficHook::new(
Arc::clone(&reputation),
Arc::clone(&blacklist),
autoban_cfg(true),
// Zero TTL taken from the config as a time mock.
0,
);
let attacker = ip([198, 51, 100, 8]);
for _ in 0..20 {
reputation.record_bad(attacker);
}
hook.on_connection_end(attacker);
std::thread::sleep(Duration::from_millis(5));
assert!(
!blacklist.is_blocked(attacker),
"zero TTL must not produce an active ban"
);
}
#[test]
fn alerts_fire_only_on_state_transitions() {
let dispatcher = AlertDispatcher::new();
let sequence = [
AttackStatus::Normal,
AttackStatus::Normal,
AttackStatus::Suspicious,
AttackStatus::UnderAttack,
AttackStatus::UnderAttack,
AttackStatus::UnderAttack,
AttackStatus::Suspicious,
AttackStatus::Normal,
AttackStatus::Normal,
];
let alerts: Vec<_> = sequence.iter().filter_map(|s| dispatcher.on_status(*s)).collect();
assert_eq!(alerts.len(), 2, "two transitions must yield exactly two alerts");
assert!(alerts[0].message.contains("attack started"));
assert!(alerts[1].message.contains("attack ended"));
}