guard/scripts/check_default_secrets.sh
loki5512344 c1a076a4a3
fix(core): close auth bypass, hangs and memory leaks found by review
Security:
- An empty API_PASSWORD passed validation (only the literal "changeme" was
  rejected) and verify_password("", "") returned true, so a login with an
  empty password minted an admin token. Require >= 16 characters and >= 32
  non-whitespace bytes for JWT_SECRET; verify rejects an empty stored secret.
- syn_challenge_enabled required a real challenge_secret_hex: the public
  placeholder from config.h is now rejected in every spelling.
- docker-compose: Redis/ClickHouse/Grafana are loopback-only and every
  password uses ${VAR:?} instead of a default. An exposed Redis was a way to
  lift bans and publish unbans to the whole fleet with one redis-cli.
- Empty CORS_ORIGIN no longer means "allow any origin".
- ban_cidr / userspace blacklist validate and mask prefixes; CIDR bans are
  stored as ranges, so a /24 or /64 ban actually covers the subnet (before,
  only the network address was blocked).

Availability:
- ClickHouse client has connect/request timeouts and no mutex held across
  await: a hung analytics backend can no longer freeze the ban path. Events
  go through a bounded buffer with a drop counter.
- Redis uses a ConnectionManager with per-command timeouts; pubsub and
  reconcile reset the backoff after success; publish cannot block shutdown.
- Ban durations from pubsub are clamped and use checked_add; the sync task
  survives panics instead of silently dying.
- Blacklist TOCTOU (remove_if) and replace_redis no longer empties the table
  during a Redis reconnect.
- RateLimiter and reputation have hard caps with incremental eviction instead
  of an unbounded DashMap and a stop-the-world retain.
- The attack detector scores before updating its baseline and needs several
  quiet windows to leave UnderAttack, so a sustained flood keeps banning new
  offenders instead of ending after one tick.
- accept() backs off on EMFILE/ENFILE, shutdown Err is treated as shutdown,
  a global semaphore bounds in-flight connections, rate limiting runs before
  PoW, whitelisted IPs are never banned, and connect/handshake/relay have
  timeouts with an idle budget.
- PoW uses the configured difficulty as a floor, the clamp is enforced, and
  nonce framing survives split segments and coalesced handshake bytes.
- Subnet tracker memory is capped (prefixes and per-prefix sources) and the
  monitor bans with the configured TTL.

CI and docs:
- CI runs the test suite with --no-default-features --features protocol-http;
  make ebpf fails on errors; the secrets gate catches weak compose defaults.
- doctor skips protected endpoints without a token and exits non-zero on
  failure; a drain timeout returns exit code 1.
- TODO §2b records the review findings, what is fixed and what is deferred;
  configuration/testing docs describe the new XDP and secret semantics.
2026-11-16 12:06:23 +01:00

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#!/usr/bin/env bash
#
# check_default_secrets.sh — reject placeholder and weak secrets committed as
# real values in code, deploy configs, or docs.
#
# Catches:
# 1. the literal placeholder "changeme";
# 2. Compose-style fallbacks to weak defaults, e.g. ${REDIS_PASSWORD:-rampart_dev}
# or ${GRAFANA_PASSWORD:-admin};
# 3. Redis `requirepass` with a weak or empty password.
#
# Intentional occurrences are whitelisted in two layers:
# 1. File level — the validation code itself:
# src/bin/rampart-manager.rs (startup guard rejecting the default)
# src/manager/security.rs (password/secret policy + placeholders)
# src/manager/api/auth.rs (login handler)
# 2. Line level — a matching line is skipped when it contains "must not be" or
# "test" (case-insensitive), states the prohibition ("запр" root: запрет /
# запрещено / запрещён — the project docs are partly Russian), or is a
# comment / markdown table row (starts with '#', '//', '*', '|', '--').
#
# Any remaining occurrence is an offender -> exit 1, offending lines listed.
set -u
SCAN_DIRS="src deploy docs"
FILE_WHITELIST="src/bin/rampart-manager.rs src/manager/security.rs src/manager/api/auth.rs"
# "<extended regex>@@<human description>" pairs. The `|` inside alternations is
# safe because entries are split on the first `@@`.
PATTERNS=(
'changeme@@placeholder password "changeme"'
'\$\{[A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*:-[[:space:]]*(rampart_dev|admin|password|secret|root)@@fallback to a weak default value'
"requirepass[[:space:]]+[\"']?[[:space:]]*(rampart_dev|admin|password|redis|secret|root)@@requirepass with a weak password"
"requirepass[[:space:]]*([\"']{2})?[[:space:]]*\$@@requirepass without a password"
)
cd "$(CDPATH= cd -- "$(dirname -- "$0")/.." && pwd)" || exit 1
offenders=$(mktemp)
trap 'rm -f "$offenders"' EXIT
for dir in $SCAN_DIRS; do
[ -d "$dir" ] || continue
for entry in "${PATTERNS[@]}"; do
pattern="${entry%%@@*}"
description="${entry#*@@}"
while IFS= read -r match; do
[ -n "$match" ] || continue
file="${match%%:*}"
rest="${match#*:}"
lineno="${rest%%:*}"
content="${rest#*:}"
skip=0
for whitelisted in $FILE_WHITELIST; do
[ "$file" = "$whitelisted" ] && skip=1
done
if printf '%s' "$content" | grep -qiE 'must not be|test|запр'; then
skip=1
fi
trimmed="${content#"${content%%[![:space:]]*}"}"
if [ "${trimmed:0:2}" = "//" ] || [ "${trimmed:0:2}" = "--" ]; then
skip=1
fi
case "${trimmed:0:1}" in
'#'|'*'|'|') skip=1 ;;
esac
if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then
printf 'FAIL %s:%s: %s [%s]\n' "$file" "$lineno" "$trimmed" "$description" >> "$offenders"
fi
done < <(grep -rnE --binary-files=without-match "$pattern" "$dir" 2>/dev/null)
done
done
if [ -s "$offenders" ]; then
sort -u "$offenders" >&2
echo "secrets gate: FAIL — placeholder/weak secret used as a value (see lines above)" >&2
exit 1
fi
echo "secrets gate: PASS — no placeholder or weak default secrets in: $SCAN_DIRS"
exit 0