XDP behaviour: - udp_rate_limit6 (LRU, 128-bit source key) + throttle_hit6, so udp_policy = "rate-limit" now applies to native IPv6 as well. - scripts/xdp_ipv6_smoke.sh: phase 4 patches .rodata before load and verifies policy=2 on a real kernel (3 pass / 3 rate-limited). XDP loader (was completely broken, never reached the verifier): - .rodata is now one struct rampart_config with frozen offsets enforced by _Static_assert; XdpGlobals is #[repr(C)] and the image is built with offset_of!. Previously a 96-byte image was written into a 76-byte map at offsets clang had reordered, so load() failed with EINVAL. - patch_rodata fails loudly when the map size and the image size diverge. - build.rs tracks xdp/core and xdp/hooks, not just universal_filter.c. - build_ringbuf looked for "events_map"; the map is "events_ringbuf". - tests/xdp_object_maps.rs: verifies map names and .rodata size without root; the real binary was confirmed to attach in a netns. Docs and style: - Code comments are English, JavaDoc/Rustdoc style, without emoji or decorative banners (new project rule, TODO §0.8). - README rewritten bilingual: Russian first, English below, TOC and copy-paste quick start. - docs/README.md: documentation index and maintenance rules; configuration.md documents the whole [xdp] section and IPv4/IPv6 coverage; testing.md describes the real-kernel smoke; stale research links removed.
113 lines
3.1 KiB
Rust
113 lines
3.1 KiB
Rust
//! Integration tests for Traffic Intelligence on the hot path: auto-ban driven
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//! by reputation, attack detection on a synthetic spike and alerts on state
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//! transitions.
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use rampart::config::DetectAutobanConfig;
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use rampart::filter::blacklist::Blacklist;
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use rampart::traffic::alert::AlertDispatcher;
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use rampart::traffic::detector::{AttackDetector, AttackStatus};
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use rampart::traffic::hook::TrafficHook;
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use rampart::traffic::reputation::IpReputation;
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use std::net::{IpAddr, Ipv4Addr};
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use std::sync::Arc;
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use std::time::Duration;
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fn ip(octets: [u8; 4]) -> IpAddr {
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IpAddr::V4(Ipv4Addr::from(octets))
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}
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fn autoban_cfg(enabled: bool) -> DetectAutobanConfig {
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DetectAutobanConfig {
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enabled,
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reputation_threshold: -50,
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}
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}
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#[test]
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fn reputation_fall_after_drops_triggers_autoban() {
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let reputation = Arc::new(IpReputation::new());
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let blacklist = Arc::new(Blacklist::new());
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let hook = TrafficHook::new(Arc::clone(&reputation), Arc::clone(&blacklist), autoban_cfg(true), 60);
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let attacker = ip([198, 51, 100, 7]);
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for _ in 0..6 {
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// Six drops through the rate limiter: -10 each, auto-ban threshold is -50.
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reputation.record_bad(attacker);
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hook.on_connection_end(attacker);
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}
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assert!(
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reputation.score(attacker) <= -50,
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"reputation must fall below threshold"
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);
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assert!(
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blacklist.is_blocked(attacker),
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"auto-ban must fire after repeated drops"
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);
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}
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#[test]
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fn autoban_ttl_expires_ban() {
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let reputation = Arc::new(IpReputation::new());
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let blacklist = Arc::new(Blacklist::new());
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let hook = TrafficHook::new(
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Arc::clone(&reputation),
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Arc::clone(&blacklist),
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autoban_cfg(true),
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// Zero TTL taken from the config as a time mock.
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0,
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);
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let attacker = ip([198, 51, 100, 8]);
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for _ in 0..20 {
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reputation.record_bad(attacker);
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}
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hook.on_connection_end(attacker);
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std::thread::sleep(Duration::from_millis(5));
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assert!(
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!blacklist.is_blocked(attacker),
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"zero TTL must not produce an active ban"
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);
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}
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#[test]
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fn detector_flags_synthetic_traffic_spike() {
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let mut detector = AttackDetector::new();
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// Baseline: a quiet profile.
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for _ in 0..12 {
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detector.analyze(500.0, 50.0);
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}
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// Synthetic spike: 200x pps and cps for three consecutive windows.
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assert_eq!(
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detector.analyze(100_000.0, 10_000.0),
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AttackStatus::Suspicious,
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"first anomalous window is suspicious"
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);
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assert_eq!(detector.analyze(100_000.0, 10_000.0), AttackStatus::Suspicious);
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assert_eq!(
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detector.analyze(100_000.0, 10_000.0),
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AttackStatus::UnderAttack,
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"three anomalous windows in a row must escalate to UnderAttack"
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);
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}
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#[test]
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fn alerts_fire_only_on_state_transitions() {
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let dispatcher = AlertDispatcher::new();
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let sequence = [
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AttackStatus::Normal,
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AttackStatus::Normal,
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AttackStatus::Suspicious,
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AttackStatus::UnderAttack,
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AttackStatus::UnderAttack,
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AttackStatus::UnderAttack,
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AttackStatus::Suspicious,
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AttackStatus::Normal,
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AttackStatus::Normal,
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];
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let alerts: Vec<_> = sequence.iter().filter_map(|s| dispatcher.on_status(*s)).collect();
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assert_eq!(alerts.len(), 2, "two transitions must yield exactly two alerts");
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assert!(alerts[0].message.contains("attack started"));
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assert!(alerts[1].message.contains("attack ended"));
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}
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