guard/deploy/test
loki5512344 c1a076a4a3
fix(core): close auth bypass, hangs and memory leaks found by review
Security:
- An empty API_PASSWORD passed validation (only the literal "changeme" was
  rejected) and verify_password("", "") returned true, so a login with an
  empty password minted an admin token. Require >= 16 characters and >= 32
  non-whitespace bytes for JWT_SECRET; verify rejects an empty stored secret.
- syn_challenge_enabled required a real challenge_secret_hex: the public
  placeholder from config.h is now rejected in every spelling.
- docker-compose: Redis/ClickHouse/Grafana are loopback-only and every
  password uses ${VAR:?} instead of a default. An exposed Redis was a way to
  lift bans and publish unbans to the whole fleet with one redis-cli.
- Empty CORS_ORIGIN no longer means "allow any origin".
- ban_cidr / userspace blacklist validate and mask prefixes; CIDR bans are
  stored as ranges, so a /24 or /64 ban actually covers the subnet (before,
  only the network address was blocked).

Availability:
- ClickHouse client has connect/request timeouts and no mutex held across
  await: a hung analytics backend can no longer freeze the ban path. Events
  go through a bounded buffer with a drop counter.
- Redis uses a ConnectionManager with per-command timeouts; pubsub and
  reconcile reset the backoff after success; publish cannot block shutdown.
- Ban durations from pubsub are clamped and use checked_add; the sync task
  survives panics instead of silently dying.
- Blacklist TOCTOU (remove_if) and replace_redis no longer empties the table
  during a Redis reconnect.
- RateLimiter and reputation have hard caps with incremental eviction instead
  of an unbounded DashMap and a stop-the-world retain.
- The attack detector scores before updating its baseline and needs several
  quiet windows to leave UnderAttack, so a sustained flood keeps banning new
  offenders instead of ending after one tick.
- accept() backs off on EMFILE/ENFILE, shutdown Err is treated as shutdown,
  a global semaphore bounds in-flight connections, rate limiting runs before
  PoW, whitelisted IPs are never banned, and connect/handshake/relay have
  timeouts with an idle budget.
- PoW uses the configured difficulty as a floor, the clamp is enforced, and
  nonce framing survives split segments and coalesced handshake bytes.
- Subnet tracker memory is capped (prefixes and per-prefix sources) and the
  monitor bans with the configured TTL.

CI and docs:
- CI runs the test suite with --no-default-features --features protocol-http;
  make ebpf fails on errors; the secrets gate catches weak compose defaults.
- doctor skips protected endpoints without a token and exits non-zero on
  failure; a drain timeout returns exit code 1.
- TODO §2b records the review findings, what is fixed and what is deferred;
  configuration/testing docs describe the new XDP and secret semantics.
2026-11-16 12:06:23 +01:00
..
stress Update links to the new GitHub account 2026-10-25 19:14:54 +01:00
config.test.toml feat!: universal redesign — drop Minecraft stack, single-crate architecture 2026-08-24 01:50:22 +02:00
README.md fix(core): close auth bypass, hangs and memory leaks found by review 2026-11-16 12:06:23 +01:00
run_test.sh feat!: universal redesign — drop Minecraft stack, single-crate architecture 2026-08-24 01:50:22 +02:00

Локальное тестирование Rampart

Запускаем всё в Docker на одной машине, без выхода в интернет.

Сеть

Все контейнеры в одной bridge-сети rampart-test:

attacker ──┐
           ├── rampart-edge ── backend (TCP echo stub)
legit ─────┘   (XDP отключён в тестах,
                используется userspace-only режим)

Быстрый старт

# 1. Сборка + сеть + backend + edge + attacker
bash deploy/test/run_test.sh

Скрипт поднимает:

  • backend — TCP echo-заглушка на 25566;
  • rampart — edge-нода с конфигом config.test.toml;
  • attacker — контейнер с python3 для запуска stress/flood.py.

Сценарии тестирования

1. TCP connection flood (CPS)

docker exec attacker python3 /flood.py --target rampart --port 25565 \
  --mode connect --duration 30 --threads 50

Ожидание: rate-limiter блокирует превышение лимита коннектов с одного IP. Метрика: rampart_rate_limit_hits растёт.

2. Slowloris (медленные соединения)

docker exec attacker python3 /flood.py --target rampart --port 25565 \
  --mode slowloris --duration 30 --threads 200

Ожидание: таймаут чтения (limits.handshake_timeout_secs) закрывает соединения. Метрика: rampart_connections_total{result="blocked"} растёт.

3. SYN flood (raw, требует hping3 или отдельный контейнер)

hping3 -S --flood -p 25565 <EDGE_IP>

Ожидание: обрабатывается kernel'ом; при включённом XDP — дропается в ядре.

Легитимный клиент

Во время атаки параллельно проверяем, что обычные клиенты проходят:

python3 deploy/test/stress/legit.py --target localhost --port 25565

Метрики

Все метрики на http://localhost:9090/metrics:

rampart_connections_total{result="allowed|blocked"}
rampart_rate_limit_hits
rampart_pow_challenges_total{result="passed|failed|skipped"}
rampart_pow_current_difficulty
rampart_attack_status

ClickHouse (опционально): http://localhost:8123 — долгосрочное хранение событий. Grafana: http://localhost:3000 (логин admin, пароль из GRAFANA_PASSWORD) — дашборды из deploy/grafana/.