guard/tests/xdp_whitelist_keys.rs
loki5512344 14dcaccdbf
fix(xdp): correct payload length, attach/detach, whitelist and ban upkeep
BPF program (the first two made the filter wrong on real hardware):
- Compute the TCP payload length from ip->tot_len (IPv4) / payload_len
  (IPv6) instead of data_end. Ethernet padding on a real NIC added 6 bogus
  payload bytes, broke expected_seq and dropped every connection after the
  fourth segment. scripts/xdp_pkt_test.sh reproduces it on synthetic frames
  and fails against the old code.
- Read map values (conn->fails, sent_at) before bpf_map_delete_elem; the LRU
  element is freed by the delete.
- Parse up to two VLAN/QinQ tags before L3; fragments are checked against the
  blacklist and passed instead of bypassing all filtering; first fragments are
  no longer dropped.
- Unknown non-SYN flows PASS: the program is a stateless filter fed by the
  conntrack state machine, not a firewall, so spoofed SYNs cannot evict
  established flows into a drop and replies to the daemon's own outbound TCP
  keep working.
- Reset conn->fails on in-order segments, honour SYN payload (TFO), fix the
  IPv6 SYN-ACK address swap, count every DROP path, drop SYN with IP options.
- Expired prefix bans are no longer deleted with the wrong LPM key; userspace
  reaps them with the exact key.

Loader:
- Remember the effective attach flags (native vs generic) and use them for
  detach/query, verifying the interface is clean afterwards. The old code
  always detached the native slot, leaving a generic program attached after
  shutdown.
- DetachGuard rolls back the attach if anything after it fails.
- ban_cidr validates the prefix length and masks host bits.
- Whitelist maps (v4 and the new v6 LPM trie) are populated from the config at
  startup and fail fast on error.
- Stats read all 13 counters, and a test asserts every map's key/value size
  against the Rust encodings.

Tests: xdp_pkt_test (padding, VLAN/QinQ, fragments), xdp_loader (attach flags,
rollback, detach), xdp_ban_keys, xdp_whitelist_keys, xdp_services, live
xdp_attach_smoke (ignored, needs root).
2026-11-16 12:06:05 +01:00

42 lines
1.4 KiB
Rust

//! Whitelist LPM key layouts (`whitelist_map` / `whitelist6_map`).
//!
//! The kernel keys are `struct lpm_key` (8 bytes) and `struct lpm_key6`
//! (20 bytes): a little-endian u32 prefix length followed by the address in
//! network order. A drift here silently whitelists the wrong range.
#![cfg(feature = "xdp")]
use rampart::xdp::{whitelist_key, whitelist6_key};
const ADDR_V4: [u8; 4] = [10, 1, 2, 0];
const ADDR_V6_2001_DB8: [u8; 16] = [0x20, 0x01, 0x0d, 0xb8, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1];
#[test]
fn whitelist_key_is_prefix_len_then_address() {
let key = whitelist_key(24, &ADDR_V4);
assert_eq!(key.len(), 8);
assert_eq!(u32::from_le_bytes(key[0..4].try_into().expect("4 bytes")), 24);
assert_eq!(key[4..8], ADDR_V4, "address kept in network order");
}
#[test]
fn whitelist_key_matches_the_blacklist_layout() {
assert_eq!(whitelist_key(32, &ADDR_V4), rampart::xdp::blacklist_key(32, &ADDR_V4));
}
#[test]
fn whitelist6_key_is_u32_prefix_len_then_16_address_bytes() {
let key = whitelist6_key(64, &ADDR_V6_2001_DB8);
assert_eq!(key.len(), 20);
assert_eq!(u32::from_le_bytes(key[0..4].try_into().expect("4 bytes")), 64);
assert_eq!(key[4..20], ADDR_V6_2001_DB8, "address kept in network order");
}
#[test]
fn whitelist6_key_does_not_confuse_leading_zeros_with_the_prefix_len() {
let key = whitelist6_key(128, &[0u8; 16]);
assert_eq!(u32::from_le_bytes(key[0..4].try_into().expect("4 bytes")), 128);
assert_eq!(key[4..20], [0u8; 16]);
}