Security:
- An empty API_PASSWORD passed validation (only the literal "changeme" was
rejected) and verify_password("", "") returned true, so a login with an
empty password minted an admin token. Require >= 16 characters and >= 32
non-whitespace bytes for JWT_SECRET; verify rejects an empty stored secret.
- syn_challenge_enabled required a real challenge_secret_hex: the public
placeholder from config.h is now rejected in every spelling.
- docker-compose: Redis/ClickHouse/Grafana are loopback-only and every
password uses ${VAR:?} instead of a default. An exposed Redis was a way to
lift bans and publish unbans to the whole fleet with one redis-cli.
- Empty CORS_ORIGIN no longer means "allow any origin".
- ban_cidr / userspace blacklist validate and mask prefixes; CIDR bans are
stored as ranges, so a /24 or /64 ban actually covers the subnet (before,
only the network address was blocked).
Availability:
- ClickHouse client has connect/request timeouts and no mutex held across
await: a hung analytics backend can no longer freeze the ban path. Events
go through a bounded buffer with a drop counter.
- Redis uses a ConnectionManager with per-command timeouts; pubsub and
reconcile reset the backoff after success; publish cannot block shutdown.
- Ban durations from pubsub are clamped and use checked_add; the sync task
survives panics instead of silently dying.
- Blacklist TOCTOU (remove_if) and replace_redis no longer empties the table
during a Redis reconnect.
- RateLimiter and reputation have hard caps with incremental eviction instead
of an unbounded DashMap and a stop-the-world retain.
- The attack detector scores before updating its baseline and needs several
quiet windows to leave UnderAttack, so a sustained flood keeps banning new
offenders instead of ending after one tick.
- accept() backs off on EMFILE/ENFILE, shutdown Err is treated as shutdown,
a global semaphore bounds in-flight connections, rate limiting runs before
PoW, whitelisted IPs are never banned, and connect/handshake/relay have
timeouts with an idle budget.
- PoW uses the configured difficulty as a floor, the clamp is enforced, and
nonce framing survives split segments and coalesced handshake bytes.
- Subnet tracker memory is capped (prefixes and per-prefix sources) and the
monitor bans with the configured TTL.
CI and docs:
- CI runs the test suite with --no-default-features --features protocol-http;
make ebpf fails on errors; the secrets gate catches weak compose defaults.
- doctor skips protected endpoints without a token and exits non-zero on
failure; a drain timeout returns exit code 1.
- TODO §2b records the review findings, what is fixed and what is deferred;
configuration/testing docs describe the new XDP and secret semantics.
58 lines
1.9 KiB
Rust
58 lines
1.9 KiB
Rust
//! Edge daemon shutdown drain: signal handling, drain timer and exit code.
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use std::time::Duration;
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use tokio::sync::oneshot;
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use tokio::sync::watch;
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/// Daemon exit outcome. The exit code is computed here, but `process::exit` is
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/// only called from the binary entry point (`src/bin/rampart.rs`), which keeps
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/// the library free of the `exit` lint.
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#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
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pub enum RunExit {
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/// The listener finished cleanly: the drain fit into the timeout.
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Ok,
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/// The drain timeout expired: the binary must terminate the process immediately
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/// (replaces the former `process::exit(0)` inside the shutdown timer).
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DrainTimeout,
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}
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impl RunExit {
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/// Process exit code for this outcome.
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///
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/// A forced drain timeout loses connections that did not finish in time, so
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/// it must not look like a clean shutdown to supervisors and scripts.
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#[must_use]
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pub const fn code(self) -> i32 {
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match self {
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Self::Ok => 0,
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Self::DrainTimeout => 1,
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}
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}
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}
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/// Spawns the background shutdown task.
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///
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/// The timer must end the process, but `process::exit` now lives in the binary,
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/// so this only reports the drain timeout to `run` over a oneshot channel. The
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/// process is given five seconds to drain after the signal.
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pub(crate) fn spawn_shutdown_drain(shutdown_tx: watch::Sender<bool>, drain_tx: oneshot::Sender<()>) {
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tokio::spawn(async move {
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wait_for_signal().await;
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tracing::info!("shutdown signal received, draining connections...");
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let _ = shutdown_tx.send(true);
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tokio::time::sleep(Duration::from_secs(5)).await;
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tracing::info!("shutdown timeout reached, exiting");
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let _ = drain_tx.send(());
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});
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}
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async fn wait_for_signal() {
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let ctrl_c = tokio::signal::ctrl_c();
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let mut term = tokio::signal::unix::signal(tokio::signal::unix::SignalKind::terminate())
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.expect("failed to install SIGTERM handler");
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tokio::select! {
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_ = ctrl_c => {}
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_ = term.recv() => {}
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}
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}
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