Security:
- An empty API_PASSWORD passed validation (only the literal "changeme" was
rejected) and verify_password("", "") returned true, so a login with an
empty password minted an admin token. Require >= 16 characters and >= 32
non-whitespace bytes for JWT_SECRET; verify rejects an empty stored secret.
- syn_challenge_enabled required a real challenge_secret_hex: the public
placeholder from config.h is now rejected in every spelling.
- docker-compose: Redis/ClickHouse/Grafana are loopback-only and every
password uses ${VAR:?} instead of a default. An exposed Redis was a way to
lift bans and publish unbans to the whole fleet with one redis-cli.
- Empty CORS_ORIGIN no longer means "allow any origin".
- ban_cidr / userspace blacklist validate and mask prefixes; CIDR bans are
stored as ranges, so a /24 or /64 ban actually covers the subnet (before,
only the network address was blocked).
Availability:
- ClickHouse client has connect/request timeouts and no mutex held across
await: a hung analytics backend can no longer freeze the ban path. Events
go through a bounded buffer with a drop counter.
- Redis uses a ConnectionManager with per-command timeouts; pubsub and
reconcile reset the backoff after success; publish cannot block shutdown.
- Ban durations from pubsub are clamped and use checked_add; the sync task
survives panics instead of silently dying.
- Blacklist TOCTOU (remove_if) and replace_redis no longer empties the table
during a Redis reconnect.
- RateLimiter and reputation have hard caps with incremental eviction instead
of an unbounded DashMap and a stop-the-world retain.
- The attack detector scores before updating its baseline and needs several
quiet windows to leave UnderAttack, so a sustained flood keeps banning new
offenders instead of ending after one tick.
- accept() backs off on EMFILE/ENFILE, shutdown Err is treated as shutdown,
a global semaphore bounds in-flight connections, rate limiting runs before
PoW, whitelisted IPs are never banned, and connect/handshake/relay have
timeouts with an idle budget.
- PoW uses the configured difficulty as a floor, the clamp is enforced, and
nonce framing survives split segments and coalesced handshake bytes.
- Subnet tracker memory is capped (prefixes and per-prefix sources) and the
monitor bans with the configured TTL.
CI and docs:
- CI runs the test suite with --no-default-features --features protocol-http;
make ebpf fails on errors; the secrets gate catches weak compose defaults.
- doctor skips protected endpoints without a token and exits non-zero on
failure; a drain timeout returns exit code 1.
- TODO §2b records the review findings, what is fixed and what is deferred;
configuration/testing docs describe the new XDP and secret semantics.
75 lines
2.6 KiB
Rust
75 lines
2.6 KiB
Rust
//! PROXY protocol v2 support: header encoding for the backend and strict
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//! parsing of headers injected by trusted ingress peers.
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use crate::config::ProxyProtocolConfig;
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use std::net::SocketAddr;
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use std::time::Duration;
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use tokio::net::TcpStream;
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mod inbound;
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pub(super) use inbound::read_v2_header;
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/// Resolves the effective client address from an inbound PROXY v2 header.
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///
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/// Only peers inside `config.trusted_cidrs` may inject a header; anyone else
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/// is rejected instead of being believed. The whole header must arrive within
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/// `config.ingress_timeout_ms` and fit in `config.max_header_bytes`.
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///
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/// # Errors
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/// Fails when the peer is not trusted, on timeout and on any header parse error.
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pub(super) async fn resolve_client_addr(
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config: &ProxyProtocolConfig,
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client: &mut TcpStream,
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peer_addr: SocketAddr,
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) -> anyhow::Result<SocketAddr> {
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if !config.trusted_cidrs.iter().any(|cidr| cidr.contains(peer_addr.ip())) {
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anyhow::bail!("untrusted peer attempted inbound PROXY protocol");
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}
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read_v2_header(
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client,
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Duration::from_millis(config.ingress_timeout_ms),
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config.max_header_bytes,
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)
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.await
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}
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/// Encodes a PROXY protocol v2 TCP header for the backend.
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///
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/// The backend must accept connections only from trusted Rampart nodes, since
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/// anyone able to reach it could otherwise forge the source address.
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///
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/// # Errors
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/// Fails when the source and destination address families differ.
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pub(super) fn protocol_v2(source: SocketAddr, destination: SocketAddr) -> anyhow::Result<Vec<u8>> {
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const SIGNATURE: [u8; 12] = *b"\r\n\r\n\0\r\nQUIT\n";
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if source.is_ipv4() != destination.is_ipv4() {
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anyhow::bail!("PROXY protocol source/destination address families differ");
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}
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let (family, address_len) = if source.is_ipv4() {
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(0x11, 12usize)
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} else {
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(0x21, 36usize)
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};
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let mut header = Vec::with_capacity(16 + address_len);
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header.extend_from_slice(&SIGNATURE);
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header.push(0x21);
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header.push(family);
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header.extend_from_slice(&(address_len as u16).to_be_bytes());
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match (source, destination) {
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(SocketAddr::V4(src), SocketAddr::V4(dst)) => {
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header.extend_from_slice(&src.ip().octets());
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header.extend_from_slice(&dst.ip().octets());
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header.extend_from_slice(&src.port().to_be_bytes());
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header.extend_from_slice(&dst.port().to_be_bytes());
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},
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(SocketAddr::V6(src), SocketAddr::V6(dst)) => {
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header.extend_from_slice(&src.ip().octets());
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header.extend_from_slice(&dst.ip().octets());
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header.extend_from_slice(&src.port().to_be_bytes());
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header.extend_from_slice(&dst.port().to_be_bytes());
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},
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_ => anyhow::bail!("PROXY protocol source/destination address families differ"),
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}
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Ok(header)
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}
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