guard/src/engine/tunnel/proxy.rs
loki5512344 c1a076a4a3
fix(core): close auth bypass, hangs and memory leaks found by review
Security:
- An empty API_PASSWORD passed validation (only the literal "changeme" was
  rejected) and verify_password("", "") returned true, so a login with an
  empty password minted an admin token. Require >= 16 characters and >= 32
  non-whitespace bytes for JWT_SECRET; verify rejects an empty stored secret.
- syn_challenge_enabled required a real challenge_secret_hex: the public
  placeholder from config.h is now rejected in every spelling.
- docker-compose: Redis/ClickHouse/Grafana are loopback-only and every
  password uses ${VAR:?} instead of a default. An exposed Redis was a way to
  lift bans and publish unbans to the whole fleet with one redis-cli.
- Empty CORS_ORIGIN no longer means "allow any origin".
- ban_cidr / userspace blacklist validate and mask prefixes; CIDR bans are
  stored as ranges, so a /24 or /64 ban actually covers the subnet (before,
  only the network address was blocked).

Availability:
- ClickHouse client has connect/request timeouts and no mutex held across
  await: a hung analytics backend can no longer freeze the ban path. Events
  go through a bounded buffer with a drop counter.
- Redis uses a ConnectionManager with per-command timeouts; pubsub and
  reconcile reset the backoff after success; publish cannot block shutdown.
- Ban durations from pubsub are clamped and use checked_add; the sync task
  survives panics instead of silently dying.
- Blacklist TOCTOU (remove_if) and replace_redis no longer empties the table
  during a Redis reconnect.
- RateLimiter and reputation have hard caps with incremental eviction instead
  of an unbounded DashMap and a stop-the-world retain.
- The attack detector scores before updating its baseline and needs several
  quiet windows to leave UnderAttack, so a sustained flood keeps banning new
  offenders instead of ending after one tick.
- accept() backs off on EMFILE/ENFILE, shutdown Err is treated as shutdown,
  a global semaphore bounds in-flight connections, rate limiting runs before
  PoW, whitelisted IPs are never banned, and connect/handshake/relay have
  timeouts with an idle budget.
- PoW uses the configured difficulty as a floor, the clamp is enforced, and
  nonce framing survives split segments and coalesced handshake bytes.
- Subnet tracker memory is capped (prefixes and per-prefix sources) and the
  monitor bans with the configured TTL.

CI and docs:
- CI runs the test suite with --no-default-features --features protocol-http;
  make ebpf fails on errors; the secrets gate catches weak compose defaults.
- doctor skips protected endpoints without a token and exits non-zero on
  failure; a drain timeout returns exit code 1.
- TODO §2b records the review findings, what is fixed and what is deferred;
  configuration/testing docs describe the new XDP and secret semantics.
2026-11-16 12:06:23 +01:00

75 lines
2.6 KiB
Rust

//! PROXY protocol v2 support: header encoding for the backend and strict
//! parsing of headers injected by trusted ingress peers.
use crate::config::ProxyProtocolConfig;
use std::net::SocketAddr;
use std::time::Duration;
use tokio::net::TcpStream;
mod inbound;
pub(super) use inbound::read_v2_header;
/// Resolves the effective client address from an inbound PROXY v2 header.
///
/// Only peers inside `config.trusted_cidrs` may inject a header; anyone else
/// is rejected instead of being believed. The whole header must arrive within
/// `config.ingress_timeout_ms` and fit in `config.max_header_bytes`.
///
/// # Errors
/// Fails when the peer is not trusted, on timeout and on any header parse error.
pub(super) async fn resolve_client_addr(
config: &ProxyProtocolConfig,
client: &mut TcpStream,
peer_addr: SocketAddr,
) -> anyhow::Result<SocketAddr> {
if !config.trusted_cidrs.iter().any(|cidr| cidr.contains(peer_addr.ip())) {
anyhow::bail!("untrusted peer attempted inbound PROXY protocol");
}
read_v2_header(
client,
Duration::from_millis(config.ingress_timeout_ms),
config.max_header_bytes,
)
.await
}
/// Encodes a PROXY protocol v2 TCP header for the backend.
///
/// The backend must accept connections only from trusted Rampart nodes, since
/// anyone able to reach it could otherwise forge the source address.
///
/// # Errors
/// Fails when the source and destination address families differ.
pub(super) fn protocol_v2(source: SocketAddr, destination: SocketAddr) -> anyhow::Result<Vec<u8>> {
const SIGNATURE: [u8; 12] = *b"\r\n\r\n\0\r\nQUIT\n";
if source.is_ipv4() != destination.is_ipv4() {
anyhow::bail!("PROXY protocol source/destination address families differ");
}
let (family, address_len) = if source.is_ipv4() {
(0x11, 12usize)
} else {
(0x21, 36usize)
};
let mut header = Vec::with_capacity(16 + address_len);
header.extend_from_slice(&SIGNATURE);
header.push(0x21);
header.push(family);
header.extend_from_slice(&(address_len as u16).to_be_bytes());
match (source, destination) {
(SocketAddr::V4(src), SocketAddr::V4(dst)) => {
header.extend_from_slice(&src.ip().octets());
header.extend_from_slice(&dst.ip().octets());
header.extend_from_slice(&src.port().to_be_bytes());
header.extend_from_slice(&dst.port().to_be_bytes());
},
(SocketAddr::V6(src), SocketAddr::V6(dst)) => {
header.extend_from_slice(&src.ip().octets());
header.extend_from_slice(&dst.ip().octets());
header.extend_from_slice(&src.port().to_be_bytes());
header.extend_from_slice(&dst.port().to_be_bytes());
},
_ => anyhow::bail!("PROXY protocol source/destination address families differ"),
}
Ok(header)
}