guard/src/store/redis/sync/event.rs
loki5512344 c1a076a4a3
fix(core): close auth bypass, hangs and memory leaks found by review
Security:
- An empty API_PASSWORD passed validation (only the literal "changeme" was
  rejected) and verify_password("", "") returned true, so a login with an
  empty password minted an admin token. Require >= 16 characters and >= 32
  non-whitespace bytes for JWT_SECRET; verify rejects an empty stored secret.
- syn_challenge_enabled required a real challenge_secret_hex: the public
  placeholder from config.h is now rejected in every spelling.
- docker-compose: Redis/ClickHouse/Grafana are loopback-only and every
  password uses ${VAR:?} instead of a default. An exposed Redis was a way to
  lift bans and publish unbans to the whole fleet with one redis-cli.
- Empty CORS_ORIGIN no longer means "allow any origin".
- ban_cidr / userspace blacklist validate and mask prefixes; CIDR bans are
  stored as ranges, so a /24 or /64 ban actually covers the subnet (before,
  only the network address was blocked).

Availability:
- ClickHouse client has connect/request timeouts and no mutex held across
  await: a hung analytics backend can no longer freeze the ban path. Events
  go through a bounded buffer with a drop counter.
- Redis uses a ConnectionManager with per-command timeouts; pubsub and
  reconcile reset the backoff after success; publish cannot block shutdown.
- Ban durations from pubsub are clamped and use checked_add; the sync task
  survives panics instead of silently dying.
- Blacklist TOCTOU (remove_if) and replace_redis no longer empties the table
  during a Redis reconnect.
- RateLimiter and reputation have hard caps with incremental eviction instead
  of an unbounded DashMap and a stop-the-world retain.
- The attack detector scores before updating its baseline and needs several
  quiet windows to leave UnderAttack, so a sustained flood keeps banning new
  offenders instead of ending after one tick.
- accept() backs off on EMFILE/ENFILE, shutdown Err is treated as shutdown,
  a global semaphore bounds in-flight connections, rate limiting runs before
  PoW, whitelisted IPs are never banned, and connect/handshake/relay have
  timeouts with an idle budget.
- PoW uses the configured difficulty as a floor, the clamp is enforced, and
  nonce framing survives split segments and coalesced handshake bytes.
- Subnet tracker memory is capped (prefixes and per-prefix sources) and the
  monitor bans with the configured TTL.

CI and docs:
- CI runs the test suite with --no-default-features --features protocol-http;
  make ebpf fails on errors; the secrets gate catches weak compose defaults.
- doctor skips protected endpoints without a token and exits non-zero on
  failure; a drain timeout returns exit code 1.
- TODO §2b records the review findings, what is fixed and what is deferred;
  configuration/testing docs describe the new XDP and secret semantics.
2026-11-16 12:06:23 +01:00

84 lines
2.5 KiB
Rust

//! Decoding and validation of blacklist events received from Redis.
//!
//! A remote or stale manager must not be able to ban an address for an
//! arbitrary duration, so every ban is range-checked against
//! [`MAX_BAN_DURATION_SECS`] before it reaches the in-memory table.
use crate::filter::blacklist::{Blacklist, MAX_BAN_DURATION_SECS};
use redis::Msg;
use serde::Deserialize;
use std::time::Duration;
#[derive(Deserialize)]
struct BlacklistEvent {
ip: String,
action: String,
#[serde(default = "default_duration")]
duration_secs: u64,
#[serde(default)]
expires_at_unix: Option<i64>,
}
fn default_duration() -> u64 {
300
}
pub(super) fn handle(msg: &Msg, blacklist: &Blacklist) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
let payload: String = msg.get_payload()?;
let event: BlacklistEvent = serde_json::from_str(&payload)?;
let ip: std::net::IpAddr = event.ip.parse()?;
match event.action.as_str() {
"ban" => {
let duration = match event.expires_at_unix {
Some(expires_at) => absolute_duration(expires_at)?,
None => checked_duration(event.duration_secs)?,
};
match duration {
Some(duration) => {
blacklist.add_redis(ip, duration, "manager_event");
tracing::info!(ip = %event.ip, "blacklist add via Redis");
},
None => {
blacklist.remove_redis(ip);
tracing::info!(ip = %event.ip, "blacklist expiry already passed");
},
}
},
"unban" => {
blacklist.remove_redis(ip);
tracing::info!(ip = %event.ip, "blacklist remove via Redis");
},
action => anyhow::bail!("unknown blacklist action: {action}"),
}
Ok(())
}
/// Converts an absolute expiry into the remaining ban duration.
///
/// Returns `Ok(None)` when the expiry is already in the past.
fn absolute_duration(expires_at: i64) -> anyhow::Result<Option<Duration>> {
if chrono::DateTime::from_timestamp(expires_at, 0).is_none() {
anyhow::bail!("invalid blacklist event expiry timestamp");
}
let remaining = expires_at.saturating_sub(chrono::Utc::now().timestamp());
if remaining <= 0 {
return Ok(None);
}
let remaining = u64::try_from(remaining)?;
if remaining > MAX_BAN_DURATION_SECS {
anyhow::bail!("blacklist event expiry exceeds {MAX_BAN_DURATION_SECS}s");
}
Ok(Some(Duration::from_secs(remaining)))
}
/// Validates a relative ban duration.
fn checked_duration(secs: u64) -> anyhow::Result<Option<Duration>> {
if secs > MAX_BAN_DURATION_SECS {
anyhow::bail!("blacklist event duration {secs}s exceeds {MAX_BAN_DURATION_SECS}s");
}
if secs == 0 {
return Ok(None);
}
Ok(Some(Duration::from_secs(secs)))
}