guard/fuzz/fuzz_targets/http_head.rs
loki5512344 08b7292ac4
test: fuzz the HTTP and PROXY v2 parsers, make PROXY parsing pure
- PROXY v2 header parsing is now the pure, total function
  `parse_v2_header(buf, limit) -> (SocketAddr, consumed)`; the async reader
  only reads bytes and delegates. This makes the parser reachable from tests
  and fuzz targets and keeps every index bounds-checked.
- tests/proxy_v2_parser.rs: valid v4/v6 headers, bad signature, non-PROXY
  command, TLVs, every truncated prefix, oversized header, unsupported
  family, short address block, and a deterministic sweep over family/length.
- fuzz/: cargo-fuzz targets `http_head` (scan_head + evaluate) and `proxy_v2`
  with invariants (no panic, no out-of-buffer consumption, family matches the
  header). Seeds for the HTTP head keep coverage useful; `make fuzz` runs
  60 s per target. Both targets ran clean (7M and 3M executions).
- docs/testing.md documents the fuzz workflow; .gitignore covers the
  generated corpus/artifacts.
2026-11-16 12:47:25 +01:00

30 lines
929 B
Rust

#![no_main]
//! Fuzz target for the HTTP/1.x request-head parser.
//!
//! `scan_head` and `evaluate` consume attacker-controlled bytes on every
//! connection, so they must never panic and must stay within the buffer.
use libfuzzer_sys::fuzz_target;
use rampart::protocol::http::parser::{Policy, evaluate, scan_head};
fuzz_target!(|data: &[u8]| {
if let Some(head_len) = scan_head(data) {
assert!(head_len <= data.len(), "scan_head returned an out-of-bounds length");
let policy = Policy {
max_header_bytes: 8192,
blocked_paths: vec!["/admin".to_string()],
require_user_agent: true,
};
let _ = evaluate(&data[..head_len], &policy);
}
// The whole buffer (not only a terminated head) must also be safe: a
// truncated head is evaluated defensively by callers.
let policy = Policy {
max_header_bytes: 8192,
blocked_paths: vec![],
require_user_agent: false,
};
let _ = evaluate(data, &policy);
});