VNOX-Server/docs/02-protocol/security.md
loki5512344 c18ccadf99
chore(server): checkpoint deployed services and unfinished forums
User requested a checkpoint and stopped all agents. Deployed artifacts remain the last verified releases; unfinished settings/categories/forums are preserved as WIP. See TODO/roadmap for verification and remaining release/updater work.
2026-11-01 15:31:20 +01:00

4.3 KiB

Security

LNEx v4 status. TCP traffic runs over TLS 1.3. UDP voice path is still plaintext (Phase 2). See features/encryption.md for details.

Threat model

VNOX is designed for self-hosted deployments where the node operator is trusted. The threat model covers:

Threat Mitigated by
MITM on client-server connection TLS 1.3 with SPKI pinning / public CA, channel-bound Ed25519 auth
MITM on UDP voice path LNEx packet encryption (Phase 2; not active in v0.1.x)
Rogue node in federation Mutual keypair authentication on federation handshake (Phase 3)
Identity spoofing Ed25519 signature on every auth (challenge-response)
Metadata leakage (who talks to whom) Phase 2
Passive voice interception Packet encryption (Phase 2; not active in v0.1.x)
Replay attacks Sequence number + nonce per packet (Phase 2 wire encryption)
Brute-force on session Sessions are short-lived, token is not a password

Out of scope

  • Physical access to the server
  • Compromised node operator (they own the node, this is by design)
  • E2EE between clients (planned Phase 2, not in v1)
  • Anonymity / traffic analysis resistance

Encryption

TCP control traffic is protected by TLS 1.3 (rustls, ALPN vnox-lnex/4). The earlier LNEx v2 per-frame ChaCha20-Poly1305 layer is removed. Trust model, certificate handling, channel binding and version bump: see tls.md.

  • Self-hosted servers: self-signed certificate (key = server identity), client pins the SPKI SHA-256 fingerprint on first use and blocks any change.
  • Public CA certificates are accepted without a prompt.
  • Ed25519 client authentication is signed over a TLS exporter value so it cannot be relayed.
  • A TLS-terminating reverse proxy is not supported (it breaks the channel binding); use TCP passthrough.

UDP transport

UDP has no TLS. LNEx packet encryption (ChaCha20-Poly1305) is the only protection layer on the voice path. This is standard practice for real-time voice protocols (SRTP, DTLS-SRTP follow the same model).


E2EE (Phase 2)

In v1, encryption is between client and server (node). The node operator can theoretically decrypt voice and text in transit.

Phase 2 will introduce optional end-to-end encryption for:

  • direct messages
  • private channels (opt-in)

E2EE for voice is significantly harder (requires key distribution to all channel members in real time) and is a Phase 4 design question.


Identity verification

When user A sees a message from raven@nightcore.lnex, how do they know it's the same raven they spoke to yesterday?

In v1: the gateway enforces that a connected user's pubkey matches their asserted identity. The client can verify the server's claim by checking the pubkey shown in the UI against a known value.

Future: out-of-band key verification (QR code, safety number, similar to Signal).


Rate limiting and anti-flood

Applied at the gateway level:

Limit Default Configurable
Auth attempts per IP 5 / minute yes
Messages per user per second 10 yes
Voice packet rate per user ~50/s (20ms frames) no (codec-determined)
Federation connection attempts 3 / minute per remote yes
Max concurrent connections per IP 4 yes

Exceeding a rate limit returns ERR_RATE_LIMITED and may trigger a temporary ban depending on node configuration.


Node operator notes

What the operator can see

  • IP addresses of connected clients
  • usernames (nicknames) and pubkeys
  • channel activity (who joined when)
  • message content (in v1, no E2EE)

What the operator cannot do (by design)

  • impersonate a user's identity (requires their private key)
  • forge signatures on behalf of a user
  • if a proxy is used, pass TCP through (no TLS termination)
  • restrict UDP port to known IP ranges if possible
  • enable fail2ban or equivalent on auth failure logs
  • back up the node keypair (used for federation identity)
  • rotate node keypair on suspected compromise

See 03-server/operations.md for hardening checklist.

LNEx v4 additionally requires a short-lived, issuer-signed Central account proof bound to the client Ed25519 key, before any session or user write. Private mode has the same requirement. See Central account admission.