The edge Dockerfile copied Cargo.toml but not benches/, so cargo refused to
parse the manifest over the declared [[bench]] hot_paths target and the image
build died with exit 101 before compiling anything.
Also bump checkout/buildx/build-push to their node24 majors and pin
ubuntu-24.04 to clear the runner deprecation notices.
monitor.rs reached 257 lines after the trusted-network suppression (limit is
250). BanPolicy, enforce_tracker_verdicts, ban_xdp_verdicts and prefix_len move
to src/engine/subnet/enforce.rs; the monitor keeps the task, source selection
and verdict logging, re-exporting enforce_tracker_verdicts so existing paths
stay valid.
Also documents the new tests/edge_e2e.rs scenarios in docs/testing.md.
Drive a real TCP client through engine::listener and Gateway to a real
upstream on 127.0.0.1, covering plain HTTP proxying, the PoW gate
(coalesced nonce + request, wrong nonce dropped), the per-IP rate limit
and the blacklist. Ports are ephemeral, every wait is bounded, and the
accept loop is always stopped and awaited.
The gateway already refused to ban addresses from proxy_protocol.trusted_cidrs,
but the traffic-intelligence auto-ban and the subnet monitor still did, so a
trusted load balancer living inside a banned /24 (or below the reputation
threshold) could be knocked out together with its clients.
- TrustedProxyCidr moved to src/config/trusted.rs (the edge section file hit
the 250-line gate) and gained `overlaps_prefix`: a ban is suppressed when the
banned prefix intersects a trusted network.
- TrafficHook::with_trusted suppresses reputation and offender bans; its ban()
now reports whether the ban was installed so `ban_offenders` counts real
bans.
- The subnet monitor takes a MonitorSetup bundle (spawn had 8 arguments) and
suppresses both userspace CIDR bans and XDP prefix bans that overlap a
trusted network, logging a warning instead.
- IPv4-mapped addresses are normalised in `contains` too.
- Tests: overlap maths (v4/v6, /0 rejected), tracker suppression vs unrelated
networks, and auto-ban skipping a trusted range while still banning public
offenders.
- PROXY v2 header parsing is now the pure, total function
`parse_v2_header(buf, limit) -> (SocketAddr, consumed)`; the async reader
only reads bytes and delegates. This makes the parser reachable from tests
and fuzz targets and keeps every index bounds-checked.
- tests/proxy_v2_parser.rs: valid v4/v6 headers, bad signature, non-PROXY
command, TLVs, every truncated prefix, oversized header, unsupported
family, short address block, and a deterministic sweep over family/length.
- fuzz/: cargo-fuzz targets `http_head` (scan_head + evaluate) and `proxy_v2`
with invariants (no panic, no out-of-buffer consumption, family matches the
header). Seeds for the HTTP head keep coverage useful; `make fuzz` runs
60 s per target. Both targets ran clean (7M and 3M executions).
- docs/testing.md documents the fuzz workflow; .gitignore covers the
generated corpus/artifacts.
- All remaining #[cfg(test)] modules left src/ (manager auth/heartbeat,
protocol registry and HTTP parser, traffic hook/prefix/profile, TUI
Prometheus); 41 tests moved into 10 integration suites with the same names
and assertions, so `grep -rn '#[cfg(test)]' src/` is now empty.
- runbook.md: degradation signals (overloaded connections, ClickHouse drops,
XDP drops, generic mode, EMFILE backoff) and how to verify XDP was detached.
- troubleshooting.md: accept backoff, orphaned XDP, password/JWT startup
requirements, ClickHouse event loss.
- TODO: review round recorded as fixed/deferred.
- Inventory nodes/servers use cursor SCAN plus MGET batches instead of KEYS
and per-key GET; a Redis error returns 503 instead of an empty fleet.
- GET /blacklist no longer writes: the legacy metadata backfill moved to a
one-shot startup task. The list endpoint paginates (limit 100, max 1000,
offset max 10000) instead of dumping SMEMBERS.
- Router-wide DefaultBodyLimit 8 KiB and TimeoutLayer 10 s; every mutating
endpoint is rate limited (30/min per client IP) with idle eviction, and the
login limiter resets on success. reason > 256 bytes and malformed targets
are rejected with 400.
- SIGTERM/Ctrl-C trigger graceful shutdown; the heartbeat and eviction tasks
are cancelled and joined so in-flight ban edits reach Redis.
- MANAGER_TRUSTED_PROXIES enables X-Forwarded-For (right-to-left walk) only
for configured proxy networks; otherwise the TCP peer is used.
- tests/manager_api.rs covers 401/400/413/429/503 and CORS preflight through
the real router; manager_security gains limiter and proxy-IP tests.
- bind.address is parsed as IpAddr (no ":::port"), the socket domain follows
the family, and "::" binds dual-stack. IPv6 was impossible before.
- limits.relay_idle_timeout_secs (default 300, 1..=86400) replaces the
hardcoded relay constant; the deploy examples document it.
- The connection budget is an Arc<Semaphore> owned by Gateway instead of a
process-wide OnceLock, so tests and multiple gateways stay independent.
- PROXY header identity is validated: unspecified, loopback, link-local,
multicast, broadcast and addresses inside trusted_cidrs are rejected, and
IPv4-mapped IPv6 is normalised first. An invalid header falls back to the
transport peer. Bans targeting trusted_cidrs are suppressed, closing the
ban-amplification path through a trusted load balancer.
- TrustedProxyCidr::contains no longer overflows its mask for IPv6 prefixes
shorter than /96.
The subnet detector's spoof gate needs the number of distinct sources in a
prefix, but the XDP path reported 0, so a /24 flooded from a botnet could never
reach the Block verdict and the whole subnet detector was inert with XDP on.
- prefix_stats carries a 64-bit bitmap of hashed source addresses (interface
ID for IPv6, address for IPv4); userspace counts the set bits.
- read_prefix_stats now resets each entry after reading: the counters are
documented as per-window and compared against fixed thresholds, but were
cumulative, so with enough traffic every active prefix eventually looked
like an attack.
- The monitor no longer suppresses Block on the XDP path and no longer carries
the now-dead "no source diversity" branch.
ABI: the prefix_stats value grows 24 -> 32 bytes; the xdp_object_maps test
pins the new size.
Security:
- An empty API_PASSWORD passed validation (only the literal "changeme" was
rejected) and verify_password("", "") returned true, so a login with an
empty password minted an admin token. Require >= 16 characters and >= 32
non-whitespace bytes for JWT_SECRET; verify rejects an empty stored secret.
- syn_challenge_enabled required a real challenge_secret_hex: the public
placeholder from config.h is now rejected in every spelling.
- docker-compose: Redis/ClickHouse/Grafana are loopback-only and every
password uses ${VAR:?} instead of a default. An exposed Redis was a way to
lift bans and publish unbans to the whole fleet with one redis-cli.
- Empty CORS_ORIGIN no longer means "allow any origin".
- ban_cidr / userspace blacklist validate and mask prefixes; CIDR bans are
stored as ranges, so a /24 or /64 ban actually covers the subnet (before,
only the network address was blocked).
Availability:
- ClickHouse client has connect/request timeouts and no mutex held across
await: a hung analytics backend can no longer freeze the ban path. Events
go through a bounded buffer with a drop counter.
- Redis uses a ConnectionManager with per-command timeouts; pubsub and
reconcile reset the backoff after success; publish cannot block shutdown.
- Ban durations from pubsub are clamped and use checked_add; the sync task
survives panics instead of silently dying.
- Blacklist TOCTOU (remove_if) and replace_redis no longer empties the table
during a Redis reconnect.
- RateLimiter and reputation have hard caps with incremental eviction instead
of an unbounded DashMap and a stop-the-world retain.
- The attack detector scores before updating its baseline and needs several
quiet windows to leave UnderAttack, so a sustained flood keeps banning new
offenders instead of ending after one tick.
- accept() backs off on EMFILE/ENFILE, shutdown Err is treated as shutdown,
a global semaphore bounds in-flight connections, rate limiting runs before
PoW, whitelisted IPs are never banned, and connect/handshake/relay have
timeouts with an idle budget.
- PoW uses the configured difficulty as a floor, the clamp is enforced, and
nonce framing survives split segments and coalesced handshake bytes.
- Subnet tracker memory is capped (prefixes and per-prefix sources) and the
monitor bans with the configured TTL.
CI and docs:
- CI runs the test suite with --no-default-features --features protocol-http;
make ebpf fails on errors; the secrets gate catches weak compose defaults.
- doctor skips protected endpoints without a token and exits non-zero on
failure; a drain timeout returns exit code 1.
- TODO §2b records the review findings, what is fixed and what is deferred;
configuration/testing docs describe the new XDP and secret semantics.
BPF program (the first two made the filter wrong on real hardware):
- Compute the TCP payload length from ip->tot_len (IPv4) / payload_len
(IPv6) instead of data_end. Ethernet padding on a real NIC added 6 bogus
payload bytes, broke expected_seq and dropped every connection after the
fourth segment. scripts/xdp_pkt_test.sh reproduces it on synthetic frames
and fails against the old code.
- Read map values (conn->fails, sent_at) before bpf_map_delete_elem; the LRU
element is freed by the delete.
- Parse up to two VLAN/QinQ tags before L3; fragments are checked against the
blacklist and passed instead of bypassing all filtering; first fragments are
no longer dropped.
- Unknown non-SYN flows PASS: the program is a stateless filter fed by the
conntrack state machine, not a firewall, so spoofed SYNs cannot evict
established flows into a drop and replies to the daemon's own outbound TCP
keep working.
- Reset conn->fails on in-order segments, honour SYN payload (TFO), fix the
IPv6 SYN-ACK address swap, count every DROP path, drop SYN with IP options.
- Expired prefix bans are no longer deleted with the wrong LPM key; userspace
reaps them with the exact key.
Loader:
- Remember the effective attach flags (native vs generic) and use them for
detach/query, verifying the interface is clean afterwards. The old code
always detached the native slot, leaving a generic program attached after
shutdown.
- DetachGuard rolls back the attach if anything after it fails.
- ban_cidr validates the prefix length and masks host bits.
- Whitelist maps (v4 and the new v6 LPM trie) are populated from the config at
startup and fail fast on error.
- Stats read all 13 counters, and a test asserts every map's key/value size
against the Rust encodings.
Tests: xdp_pkt_test (padding, VLAN/QinQ, fragments), xdp_loader (attach flags,
rollback, detach), xdp_ban_keys, xdp_whitelist_keys, xdp_services, live
xdp_attach_smoke (ignored, needs root).
XDP behaviour:
- udp_rate_limit6 (LRU, full 128-bit source key) plus throttle_hit6, so
udp_policy = "rate-limit" applies to native IPv6 as well.
- scripts/xdp_ipv6_smoke.sh: phase 4 patches .rodata before load and
verifies policy=2 on a real kernel (3 pass / 3 rate-limited).
Loader (XDP could never load before this):
- .rodata is one struct rampart_config with frozen offsets enforced by
_Static_assert; XdpGlobals is #[repr(C)] and the image is built with
offset_of!. Before, a 96-byte image was written into a 76-byte map at
offsets clang had reordered, so load() failed with EINVAL.
- patch_rodata fails loudly when the map size and image size diverge.
- build.rs tracks xdp/core and xdp/hooks, not just universal_filter.c.
- build_ringbuf looked for "events_map"; the map is "events_ringbuf".
- tests/xdp_object_maps.rs checks map names and .rodata size without root.
Docs and style:
- Code comments are English, JavaDoc/Rustdoc style, without emoji or
banners (new project rule, TODO §0.8).
- README rewritten bilingual: Russian first, English below, nav buttons,
compact TOC and copy-paste quick start.
- docs/README.md: documentation index and maintenance rules;
configuration.md documents the whole [xdp] section and IPv4/IPv6
coverage; testing.md covers the real-kernel smoke; stale links removed.
IPv6 parity:
- blacklist6_map (LPM trie, 20-byte key) and is_blacklisted6(); the
native_v6 path now passes the port gate and the L4 checks instead of
returning XDP_PASS early.
- ban_cidr() covers V4 and V6; gateway bans by /32 or /128; subnet monitor
bans v6 /64 prefixes; ban_ip() removed (dead code is a bug).
- v6 TCP feeds prefix stats through prefix_key_from_v6 (subnet detector
now sees IPv6); UDP policy=drop and detect_tcp_bypass apply to v6.
- tests/xdp_ban_v6.rs and scripts/xdp_ipv6_smoke.sh (real netns/verifier).
Bug fixes (both families):
- Ban expiry compared SystemTime epoch-ns against bpf_ktime_get_ns(), so
bans never expired. Userspace now writes CLOCK_MONOTONIC via
xdp::monotonic_ns(); regression in tests/xdp_ban_clock.rs.
- The L4 gate required sizeof(struct tcphdr) for every protocol, so short
UDP datagrams bypassed the port gate and the blacklist. The minimum is
now per-protocol (UDP 8 bytes); smoke covers it.
- rust_crypto pulled the unmaintained rsa crate (Marvin timing advisory) and
a second copy of digest/rand/sha2 into the graph; aws-lc-rs has neither
- skip the duplicate untrusted 0.7 (aws-lc-rs vs rustls)
- test job needs libbpf-dev/clang/linux-libc-dev: build.rs compiles the XDP
program even under --all-features
- rust-test needs libelf-dev/zlib1g-dev for vendored libbpf
- clang -target bpf needs the multiarch include dir for asm/types.h
- deny.toml: allow BSL-1.0 (xxhash-rust), skip duplicate versions pulled by
redis/jsonwebtoken vs reqwest/axum, drop stale socket2 skip
- update rustls-webpki to 0.103.16 (RUSTSEC-2026-0382)
- enable jsonwebtoken rust_crypto provider so auth tests can run
- xdp: real 24-byte xdp_event parsing (fixes LE byte-swap of src IP),
opt-in [xdp] auto_ban (RATE_LIMIT always, CONN_DROP at fails>=threshold;
EVENT_BAN/POLICY_DROP excluded by design), rampart_xdp_autobans_total;
wired in app before load(); 10 tests in tests/xdp_events.rs
- build: --no-default-features compiles — redis paths cfg-gated behind
store-redis, manager fail-fasts without it; CI gates the config now
- app: RunExit enum replaces process::exit in lib; single exit site in main
- tests: seed PoW roundtrip token (was ~1/16 flaky; 50 pre-fix fails -> 0)
- docs: TODO statuses refreshed (round 2)
Found on real kernel 5.15 (netns+veth, challenge enabled):
1. truncated IP: after bpf_xdp_adjust_tail the IPv4 tot_len / IPv6
payload_len still claimed the original SYN size — peer silently
dropped the malformed SYN-ACK, challenge never seen
2. endianness: marker/bad_ack written as raw host-order halfwords into
network-order tcpw[] — client echoed swap16halves(bad_ack) in its
RST.seq, verification always failed (CHAL_FAILED == CHAL_SENT)
Post-fix e2e: SYN -> bad-ACK SYN-ACK (XDP_TX) -> client RST ->
verified -> retry connects transparently; counters SENT=1 VERIFIED=1
FAILED=0
- ratatui + crossterm; separate bin reading Prometheus exposition format
- counter table (xdp stats, auto-bans, intel), pps/drops history chart,
status panel with error banner, q/quit r/refresh
- prometheus text parser (labels, escapes, NaN/Inf), Fetcher trait for tests
- 152 tests green