guard/docs/minecraft-java.md

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Rampart перед Minecraft Java

Rampart can proxy Minecraft Java Edition over TCP. It checks the bounded Java handshake, forwards the original bytes unchanged, and then tunnels the connection to one Paper backend. This is an early integration: it does not replace an upstream DDoS scrubbing network.

Build and configure

Build the edge binary with the Minecraft handler:

cargo build --release --features protocol-minecraft --bin rampart

Use one backend per edge node. For a Paper server on the same host, the sample uses port 25566; change it to the address reachable over your private network or WireGuard tunnel.

whitelist = ["127.0.0.1", "::1"]

[bind]
address = "0.0.0.0"
port = 25565

[backend]
upstreams = ["10.20.0.5:25566"]

[protocol.minecraft]
enabled = true
max_frame_bytes = 8192
timeout_secs = 5
send_proxy_protocol = true

[pow]
enabled = false

PoW must stay disabled for Minecraft Java: the current PoW exchange is plain text and is not part of the Minecraft protocol. Configure the edge firewall to allow public TCP 25565, and keep Prometheus 9090 and the Paper backend port private.

Preserve player IPs safely

When send_proxy_protocol is enabled, Rampart prepends a PROXY protocol v2 header before the Minecraft handshake. On Paper, enable proxies.proxy-protocol in config/paper-global.yml. Paper documents this option for HAProxy or similar proxies: global configuration.

The PROXY header is not authenticated. Put the edge-to-Paper connection on a private network or WireGuard and firewall Paper's backend port to accept only the trusted edge IPs. Never expose a PROXY-enabled Paper port to arbitrary clients: they could forge the address in the header.

If Rampart runs in Docker, the container needs access to the configured backend address. The included sample image builds protocol-minecraft; the sample config keeps PROXY protocol disabled until Paper and the backend firewall are configured together.

DDoS boundary

Rampart can reject connections and apply local rate limits after packets reach the edge host. It cannot keep a home uplink available when an attack saturates that link. Put a Minecraft-aware DDoS proxy or a provider with game DDoS filtering in front of the VDS, hide the home's public address, and carry accepted traffic to the home server through a restricted tunnel. Two ordinary VDS instances without upstream filtering do not provide that protection.

Network layout and firewall

Use the VDS edge as the only public Minecraft endpoint. The provider should send filtered TCP 25565 traffic to that edge; the edge then reaches Paper over a private link (for example, WireGuard). Use addresses from your own VPN and replace the example roles below with the actual interfaces and addresses.

Service Allowed source Publicly reachable?
VDS edge TCP 25565 DDoS provider ranges, or the Internet only if the provider requires it Yes, through the provider
Paper TCP 25566 Edge VPN address only No
Redis TCP 6379 Manager and edge VPN addresses only No
Manager API TCP 8080 Admin VPN or explicitly allowed admin IPs No
Prometheus TCP 9090 Monitoring VPN / localhost No

Do not forward Paper, Redis, or management ports from the home router to the Internet. On Proxmox, allow the Paper port only on the tunnel/private interface and restrict it to the edge addresses. If Manager and Redis run on a VDS, bind or firewall Redis to the private interface and let each edge reach it through the VPN. Use the same protected Redis endpoint in Manager and every edge configuration; do not publish Redis with a Docker ports mapping. Protect the Manager API and monitoring UI with the admin VPN or firewall as well. A private tunnel limits who can reach these services; it does not add DDoS scrubbing to the public edge.

For a DDoS provider that sends PROXY protocol v2, enable inbound parsing only for that provider's TCP source ranges:

[proxy_protocol]
ingress_enabled = true
# Replace these documentation ranges with the provider's actual ranges.
trusted_cidrs = ["198.51.100.0/24", "2001:db8:1234::/48"]
ingress_timeout_ms = 750
max_header_bytes = 512

Rampart rejects connections from unlisted peers when ingress mode is enabled, and it applies per-IP limits and bans using the verified header source address. Keep the allowlist current with the provider's published ranges. The header is not cryptographically authenticated, so never trust arbitrary internet peers. This MVP accepts PROXY v2 TCP4/TCP6 address headers without TLVs; confirm that format with the provider before enabling ingress mode. XDP operates on the network peer address and is not used to ban the claimed player address on this path.

The Minecraft handler supports status and login handshake states and forwards the connection as a TCP tunnel. It does not inspect encrypted login/game packets or implement Velocity forwarding. Bedrock Edition uses UDP and is not supported by this handler.