Security:
- An empty API_PASSWORD passed validation (only the literal "changeme" was
rejected) and verify_password("", "") returned true, so a login with an
empty password minted an admin token. Require >= 16 characters and >= 32
non-whitespace bytes for JWT_SECRET; verify rejects an empty stored secret.
- syn_challenge_enabled required a real challenge_secret_hex: the public
placeholder from config.h is now rejected in every spelling.
- docker-compose: Redis/ClickHouse/Grafana are loopback-only and every
password uses ${VAR:?} instead of a default. An exposed Redis was a way to
lift bans and publish unbans to the whole fleet with one redis-cli.
- Empty CORS_ORIGIN no longer means "allow any origin".
- ban_cidr / userspace blacklist validate and mask prefixes; CIDR bans are
stored as ranges, so a /24 or /64 ban actually covers the subnet (before,
only the network address was blocked).
Availability:
- ClickHouse client has connect/request timeouts and no mutex held across
await: a hung analytics backend can no longer freeze the ban path. Events
go through a bounded buffer with a drop counter.
- Redis uses a ConnectionManager with per-command timeouts; pubsub and
reconcile reset the backoff after success; publish cannot block shutdown.
- Ban durations from pubsub are clamped and use checked_add; the sync task
survives panics instead of silently dying.
- Blacklist TOCTOU (remove_if) and replace_redis no longer empties the table
during a Redis reconnect.
- RateLimiter and reputation have hard caps with incremental eviction instead
of an unbounded DashMap and a stop-the-world retain.
- The attack detector scores before updating its baseline and needs several
quiet windows to leave UnderAttack, so a sustained flood keeps banning new
offenders instead of ending after one tick.
- accept() backs off on EMFILE/ENFILE, shutdown Err is treated as shutdown,
a global semaphore bounds in-flight connections, rate limiting runs before
PoW, whitelisted IPs are never banned, and connect/handshake/relay have
timeouts with an idle budget.
- PoW uses the configured difficulty as a floor, the clamp is enforced, and
nonce framing survives split segments and coalesced handshake bytes.
- Subnet tracker memory is capped (prefixes and per-prefix sources) and the
monitor bans with the configured TTL.
CI and docs:
- CI runs the test suite with --no-default-features --features protocol-http;
make ebpf fails on errors; the secrets gate catches weak compose defaults.
- doctor skips protected endpoints without a token and exits non-zero on
failure; a drain timeout returns exit code 1.
- TODO §2b records the review findings, what is fixed and what is deferred;
configuration/testing docs describe the new XDP and secret semantics.
73 lines
2.6 KiB
Markdown
73 lines
2.6 KiB
Markdown
# Локальное тестирование Rampart
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Запускаем всё в Docker на одной машине, без выхода в интернет.
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## Сеть
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Все контейнеры в одной bridge-сети `rampart-test`:
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```
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attacker ──┐
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├── rampart-edge ── backend (TCP echo stub)
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legit ─────┘ (XDP отключён в тестах,
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используется userspace-only режим)
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```
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## Быстрый старт
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```bash
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# 1. Сборка + сеть + backend + edge + attacker
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bash deploy/test/run_test.sh
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```
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Скрипт поднимает:
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- `backend` — TCP echo-заглушка на 25566;
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- `rampart` — edge-нода с конфигом `config.test.toml`;
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- `attacker` — контейнер с python3 для запуска `stress/flood.py`.
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## Сценарии тестирования
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### 1. TCP connection flood (CPS)
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```bash
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docker exec attacker python3 /flood.py --target rampart --port 25565 \
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--mode connect --duration 30 --threads 50
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```
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Ожидание: rate-limiter блокирует превышение лимита коннектов с одного IP.
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Метрика: `rampart_rate_limit_hits` растёт.
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### 2. Slowloris (медленные соединения)
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```bash
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docker exec attacker python3 /flood.py --target rampart --port 25565 \
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--mode slowloris --duration 30 --threads 200
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```
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Ожидание: таймаут чтения (`limits.handshake_timeout_secs`) закрывает соединения.
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Метрика: `rampart_connections_total{result="blocked"}` растёт.
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### 3. SYN flood (raw, требует hping3 или отдельный контейнер)
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```bash
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hping3 -S --flood -p 25565 <EDGE_IP>
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```
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Ожидание: обрабатывается kernel'ом; при включённом XDP — дропается в ядре.
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## Легитимный клиент
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Во время атаки параллельно проверяем, что обычные клиенты проходят:
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```bash
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python3 deploy/test/stress/legit.py --target localhost --port 25565
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```
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## Метрики
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Все метрики на http://localhost:9090/metrics:
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```
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rampart_connections_total{result="allowed|blocked"}
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rampart_rate_limit_hits
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rampart_pow_challenges_total{result="passed|failed|skipped"}
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rampart_pow_current_difficulty
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rampart_attack_status
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```
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ClickHouse (опционально): http://localhost:8123 — долгосрочное хранение событий.
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Grafana: http://localhost:3000 (логин `admin`, пароль из `GRAFANA_PASSWORD`) — дашборды из `deploy/grafana/`.
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